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Until relatively recently, multinational corporations from emerging markets (EMMNCs) were 
minor contributors to the global stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). This research seeks 
to understand the significant expansion of EMMNCs in the past two decades, using PT 
Semen Indonesia as a case study. This research is particularly important in highlighting the 
developmental state model’s persistence in Southeast Asia. The state continues to play a 
directive role in the design of structure, strategies and targets by adjusting to new global and 
regional economic challenges and opportunities for Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). The political economy of Indonesia’s industrial policy reflects the efforts of 
successive presidents and their advisors to encourage national economic development by 
finding a workable formula to balance often-competing economic pressures—from global 
institutions and economic powers to domestic business and political constituencies. A 
qualitative case study was the methodology used to examine the trends and tensions of PT 
Semen Indonesia’s growth and its internationalisation. As a case study, PT Semen Indonesia 
was analysed from an international, political and economic perspective. Research findings 
indicate that the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia reflects key aspects of the developmental 
state model. The expansion was influenced by national priorities, and the institutional 
arrangements between the Indonesian state and PT Semen reveal the strategic importance of 
the cement industry for the state, which retains a decisive shareholding in the company. This 
thesis contends that the intricate relationship between the Indonesian state and PT Semen 
exemplifies the persistence of various elements of the developmental state, despite the 
adoption of a privatisation agenda in the wake of the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. However, 
this thesis concludes that the internationalisation of PT Semen, as the first Indonesian 
multinational corporation (MNC) SOE, was primarily driven by commercial pragmatism that 
reached the government target on infrastructure and good economic factors, such as rapid 
economic growth and the ASEAN Economic Community. The company’s growth and 
maturation correspond to the dominant model of EMMNCs in terms of ownership, weak 
institutionalisation, business capacity, market seeking motivation and preference for 
horizontal FDI. The latter preference is exemplified by PT Semen’s acquisition of Thang 
Long Cement in Vietnam. 
Keywords: Global expansion, MNC, EMMNCs, IPE, developmental state 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the contemporary world, emerging markets (EMs)
1
 have experienced rapid economic 
development and are key players in global trade and investment, together with developed 
economies, in the past couple of decades (Development, 2017; IMF 2018). As an example, 
China became the third-highest investor and the first among EMs (OECD 2017). The primary 
concern on the raising of EMs is how they undertake global expansion with the longstanding 
belief that they lacked the competitive advantage or that they couldn’t protect their 
companies from international competition (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti 2014; 
Williamson 2014). The primary question to address is whether the literature on emerging 
markets multinational corporations (EMMNCs)
 2
 is enough to cover the discussion on EMs 
such as Indonesia and whether it can identify the challenge they face today, as many studies 
have previously focused on Indonesian conglomerates. To date, there has been little 
agreement among developing countries on the theory of international investment. This 
research suggests that Indonesia’s investment overseas contributes to the study of EMMNCs. 
This project provides an advanced understanding of Indonesia by focusing on the case of PT 
Semen Indonesia and comparing the state-owned enterprise with prior global companies in 
similar sectors, such as Cemex and Temasek. 
To understand EMMNCs like Cemex, one may expect that Mexico liberal economic policy 
has influenced the company’s decision to internationalise and that Singapore’s export 
                                                             
1 EM or emerging economy (EE) are terms (though used in the same context) that although they vary in 
meaning, are substantially similar (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright 2000). EM refers to the country that 
has two standards. First, it has rapid economic development. Second, it also has applied favourable policies 
on liberalisation and free-market principles. However, it is crucial to note that EMs represent 
heterogeneous and vast groups of countries, based on their economic and political capacities. IMF has a 
more visible identification of EMs: they broadly applied towards two views. From purely economic 
measurements, EMs were coined to the states that have GDP per capita between 2,000 and 12,000 US 
dollars (Ghosh 2010). In socio-economic aspects, it applies to states that have at least two features. First, 
they are volatile due to natural disasters, external price stocks and domestic policy instability. Second, they 
experience a transition status, especially in demographic, economy, political and social aspects. For 
example, cases of fertility rates, life expectancy and education levels (Mody 2004). The OECD, in one of 
its publications refers EM to the six largest economies but non-OECD countries following Brazil, Russia, 
India, Indonesia, China and South Africa (OECD 2009). 
2 The terms of multinational corporations (MNCs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are often used interchangeably, as well as the term firm-enterprises and company. 
However, in this thesis, MNC is preferred because it aligns with the terminology used in the core literature 
for this project. To avoid ambiguity in the definition of MNC, this thesis simply asserts that the 
multinational companies are the firms operating in the production activity in two or more countries. 
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industrialisation gave rise to Temasek’s successes. However, the case of Indonesia is more 
complicated. Indonesia has been promoting foreign direct investment (FDI) for a long time. 
Indofood’s is successfully the world’s largest instant noodles manufacturer and flour miller 
(Aguiar 2007). Indonesia recently became a recipient of inward FDI, with numbers that far 
exceed its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Despite this, in 1994 and during 1998–
2004, Indonesia has achieved a higher number of OFDI compared to inward direct 
investment (IFDI) (Sambodo 2017). However, the current data indicate that Indonesia is 
behind countries in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore and Malaysia (ASEAN 2018). Falling 
behind other emerging economies in terms of international companies does not mean that 
Indonesia lacks OFDI, despite the claim that Indonesia has been lagging OFDI promotion 
(Sambodo 2017). In fact, the number of Indonesia’s OFDI has been growing (ASEAN 2018). 
The most compelling evidence for this is the expansion of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
overseas, which were previously dominated by conglomerates.  
The progresses of Indonesian SOEs beyond national borders have both pros and cons. 
However, the state capital flight through OFDI is something new for Indonesia. Indonesian 
OFDI, as mentioned above, was undertaken by conglomerates such as Salim Group. 
However, Indonesian SOEs participation in OFDI as argued by this thesis may be regarded in 
a positive light. This research aims to unravel the changing nature of Indonesian OFDI. The 
optimistic outlook on Indonesia’s SOEs to become more globalised has been linked to 
Indonesia’s sound economy. It is the largest economy in Southeast Asia (World Bank 2018). 
By 2025, Indonesia is expected to be among the world’s six-most significant emerging 
market economies, along with Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Russia—which will 
account for more than half of all global growth (World Bank 2011). Accounting for 
Indonesia’s economic boom, the transformation of its SOEs is interesting to note and should 
not be overlooked. The question, then, is how is this possible with the liberal economic 
prescriptions that are imposed by the international community in the wake of the 1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis that negate SOEs?  
This thesis primary focus is the formation and expansion of PT Semen Indonesia, a cement 
company operating in a strategic sector of the Indonesian economy that is linked to 
construction and infrastructure, including the subsidiary in Vietnam through its SOEs—one 
of which is PT Semen Indonesia, the case study of this this. This case study provides 
advanced understanding of how SOEs still play a key part of Indonesian development 
15 
projects. Expanding nationally and internationally, PT Semen Indonesia was the first 
Indonesian SOE that acquired Vietnam’s cement company through FDI (Semen Indonesia 
Tbk 2016c). This thesis thus examines how the Indonesian state has sustained its 
‘developmentalist’ role in an era in which the developmental state was supposed to have 
ended. 
Subsequently, this thesis contributes to the argument that Indonesia is carving out a unique 
economic development path by seeking a balance between domestic economic priorities and 
international pressure for economic reform. The expansion of Indonesian firms arguably 
endorsed by Al-Fadhat (2017), who demonstrated the continuing importance of the state in a 
market-oriented system. This research thus explores PT Semen Indonesia’s mechanism and 
motivations of growth and expansion. This project also touches on the global context that 
supports its expansion, which is influenced by factors such as the ASEAN Economy 
Community, the rise of China and the economic weight of emerging market SOEs that are 
demonstrated through numbers of SOE EMMNCs in Southeast Asia (ASEAN 2018). The 
nature of SOEs and the relationships between state and private companies are changing under 
globalisation, but this does not mean that economic models are converging to a global 
consensus on the best way to engineer growth. 
The following section will review the current trend of SOE EMMNCs in the world and SOEs 
in Asia to provide the context of this research project. 
1.1 The Shifting Trend of Multinational Corporations 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) from the global north continue to occupy positions of 
strength in the global economy and in technology—MNCs such as Apple, Microsoft and 
ExxonMobil. In 2016, despite its slowing sales, Apple still achieved US$233 billion in sales 
and US$53 billion in profit. In the oil sector, ExxonMobil remains the world’s largest oil 
company (Forbes 2016a). Microsoft is in the top rank of technology companies in the United 
States (US) and dominated over 14 out of 25 of the largest technology companies, including 
Intel, IBM and Apple (Forbes 2016b). This reflects historical advantages, which include the 
length of time that developed countries have been able to dominate international trade and 
investment. Despite the growth of emerging markets, MNCs from developed economies are 
still the largest sources of global FDI (UNCTAD 2016). Therefore, MNCs are still 
16 
conventionally regarded as agents of Western economic and political dominance within the 
global political economy. 
From an international political economy (IPE) perspective, the question of motive for 
offshore investment is pertinent. To foreground issues of power and commercial self-interest, 
Frieden and Lake (2003) question why English investors from Manchester were willing to 
invest in tea plantations in Ceylon during the British Raj. The answer is complicated and 
linked to issues of power, the opportunity to invest outside the home country and commercial 
interest in the increased profitability by reducing production costs. Fieldhouse (2002) 
proposed that, to study MNCs and compare them with EMMNCs, one must simply ask 
whether the same holds true for each. This thesis follows Fieldhouse’s (2002) lead in 
researching the experiences of corporations from emerging economies and asks how their 
evolutionary patterns mirror or depart from the MNC ideal type.  
MNC formation in emerging market economies is gathering pace. The OFDI from third 
world countries were, until relatively recently, minor contributors to the global stock of FDI. 
It was widely agreed among critical IPE scholars that FDI flowed from ‘north to south’, while 
the economic benefits—in the form of an economic surplus—flowed in the opposite direction 
(Galtung 1971; Wallerstein 2004). Most scholars argued that developing nations were lacking 
in capital, technology, managerial skills and other resources compared to developed countries 
(Tarzi, as cited in Frieden & Lake 2003). It was thus difficult, in theory, to reverse the 
direction of economic flow and ‘catch up’ (Frieden & Lake 2017). For decades, third world 
countries had no choice but to become satisfied as FDI recipients and were thus deemed 
‘dependent’. Although developing countries had key elements for economic growth, low-cost 
labour, natural resources and mass markets, they lacked capital and bargaining power (Tarzi, 
as cited in Frieden & Lake, 2003). This led them to be powerless when they negotiated their 
interests to the MNCs and developed world, as they were locked in a pattern of what Andre 
Gunder Frank termed ‘dependent development’ (Frank 1979).  
However, political economists of a statist persuasion, such as Weiss (1997), Beeson (2004), 
Thurbon and Weiss (2016), place greater emphasis on the role of the state in leading 
industrial development and being the raison d’être of the ‘developmentalist state’ (Caldentey 
2008). By the same token, this thesis this finds that the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia was 
consequently the implication of state support to some extent. Despite being privatised, PT 
Semen Indonesia is still classified as a state asset. In that regard, PT Semen Indonesia has 
17 
enjoyed government favour, while the sector competitor, Indocement, was no longer 
‘protected’ after Suharto stepped down. The discussion of this conglomerate is beyond the 
thesis’s scope; this thesis instead pays more attention to how the government and its political 
institutions have treated the cement sector as a strategic industry for supporting the national 
infrastructural project and what this implies for PT Semen Indonesia’s growth and expansion. 
1.2 EMMNC SOEs Global Expansion in the Asian Context 
The narrative of EMMNCs, particularly the SOE, has a long history, yet it is limited. 
EMMNCs began during Asia’s rapid industrialisation in 1960s to 1990s, following the end of 
World War Two. The rising of East Asia (except China) has prompted a major structural 
change in the global economy. Japan was the first country in the region to industrialise and 
contribute an increasing share of global FDI from the 1960s onwards, followed by the ‘tiger 
economies’ of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. In 1965, the tiger economies 
only provided one-twentieth of the world’s manufacturing output. Thirty-five years later, 
these countries reached almost one-fifth of total global exports (Amsden 2001). This was 
known as the second period of outward FDI of developing countries (Rajah et al. 2010), or 
the pre-globalisation time (Dunning 2007). Yet, most of the companies like Samsung (South 
Korea) and Indofood (Indonesia) are tycoons; Temasek Holding (Goldstein & Pananond 
2008) may have been the only government linked company (GLC).  
The current period of developing countries’ OFDI, which began in the late 1990s, indicates a 
new trend. As the studies by Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014), Marinov and Marinova 
(2013) and Ramamurti (2012) identified, there are some changes. First, based on quantities 
and qualities, more home countries and companies are participating, including several SOEs. 
Second, there have been substantial progresses within the expansion mechanism; for 
example, large investments flow to developed countries, which was not common in previous 
decades. The same idea can be applied to the sector, which concentrated on manufacturing 
and primary industries, but then shifted to service sectors such as telecommunications, 
tourism and finance (Development 2017; UNCTAD 2007). The other transformation is the 
motives of EMMNCs, from being mostly market seeking to also being asset seeking (Rajah 
et al. 2010). These novel transformations can reflect the comparison of PT Semen Indonesia, 
Cemex and Temasek, which is provided in Chapter 7. However, the comparison will be 
limited to identifying similarities and differences. The findings show that PT Semen 
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Indonesia emerged as the first Indonesian EMMNC out of a complex situation between an 
outward and inward-looking economy.  
In the light of Indonesia’s OFDI, the trend is fascinating itself. Indonesia has been a minor 
contributor to global FDI (Carney & Dieleman 2011), though some argued that this is also 
due to the consequence of having a large market (ASEAN 2018) However, other EMs, such 
as China, also have big markets and keep expanding abroad (Peng 2012). It is common to see 
Indonesia’s largest conglomerates such as Salim Group or Sinar Mas Group invested 
overseas and how it related to the country’s success as a national player, as well as its close 
link to Suharto. It is unpopular for SOEs, like PT Semen Indonesia, to do so. Like many other 
SOEs, the idea to internationalise is not a strategic option for Indonesian SOEs, especially 
due to Indonesia’s large domestic market (Hiratsuka & 平塚大祐 2006; ASEAN 2018). 
Some also argue that Indonesia is preoccupied with domestic problems, such as the poverty 
gap, environmental challenges and infrastructure bottlenecks, and that it is too inward looking 
(Warburton 2017; Aspinall 2016; OECD 2015a; Patunru & Rahardja 2015; Robison & Hadiz 
2017). 
This is likely the reason why the narrative on Indonesia’s OFDI has been neglected. In the 
past 10 years, there were only seminal works on Indonesia’s companies’ expansion, such as 
that by Carney and Dieleman (2011), Al-Fadhat (2017) and Sambodo (2017). What is not yet 
clear is Indonesia’s SOEs. To understand why Indonesia’s SOEs have been slow to 
internationalise can never be explained by simple factors, such as market size. This thesis 
thus seeks to complement previous research on Indonesia’s MNC as found by Carney and 
Dieleman (2011) that the country has been missing what they called a ‘dragon’ or business 
group and to go beyond that puzzle to understand how it would be possible for Indonesia’s 
SOEs to conduct business more than just doing export? It is interesting to note how 
Indonesian SOEs—not only PT Semen Indonesia, but also PERTAMINA, Telkom and 
Perusahaan Gas Negara—are today starting to acquire foreign companies. However, this 
thesis will only focus on PT Semen Indonesia, as it provides a deeper understanding on the 
company’s evolution and sector setting.  
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Figure 1.1: EMMNC SOES Distribution by Major Home Economy In 2017.  
Source: UNCTAD (2017) 
1.3 PT Semen Indonesia Overview 
PT Semen Indonesia has always been the pioneer among Indonesia’s SOEs. It is the first to 
invest abroad and is one of the earliest state-run businesses that has transformed into a 
strategic holding entity (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2016c), which is not common among 
Indonesian SOEs. The company itself is the biggest Indonesian cement producer. It shared 
around 39,4 per cent of the national market (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2018,p.22) and its 
capacity as well is the largest in Southeast Asia especially after taking over Holcim Indonesia 
(Jakarta Post 2018).  
Prior to its gradual change in management from separated entities to strategic holding, the 
company (which was previously PT Semen Gresik
3
) was the first SOE open to the public in 
July 1991. The decision to privatise the company was not motivated by the desire to 
substantially make the cement group more efficient; it was to boost the state’s funds. 
Otherwise stated, the company was being sold due to the needs of state financing rather than 
any strategic reasons. Regardless of this change of ownership, selling the state asset to the 
                                                             
3 This thesis is using the parent company (HoldCo) to imply PT Semen Indonesia and its subsidiaries 
(OpCo) which refers to PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen Padang, PT Semen Tonasa, TLCC, PT Semen 
Indonesia Aceh and PT Semen Kupang. The previous operational and strategic holding company before 
2012, which is later explained in this chapter, will refer to PT Semen Gresik Group with PT Semen Gresik 
as the parent company (HoldCo). 
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public consequently placed the company as a corporate law subject, meaning that the SOEs 
expected to follow the corporate mechanism instead of the state rule. However, the company 
continued to be controlled under government interventions because even after the 
privatisation, the government remained the majority shareholder by having a 51-per cent 
government of the company’s share. 
In terms of positive effects, following the period of being partly privatised, PT Semen 
Indonesia managed to compete with the leading player in the sector—Indocement. Chapters 6 
and 7 conclude that there were at least three influencing factors on the matter. First there is a 
government factor, in which cement was the top priority since Suharto developed a long-term 
agenda (REPELITA) and it remained a priority until Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and 
Joko Widodo (Jokowi); cement companies all over Indonesia pushed the company to be 
managed under one management—the PT Semen Gresik Group. Second, the presence of 
professional leadership, including Dwi Suciptjo, on the board has encouraged positive 
transformation and innovation in the company, making the group more mature and ready for 
global expansion. Third, the situation after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) made 
Indocement face difficult financial problems—the company was no longer protected by 
Suharto and PT Semen Indonesia took advantage and became the government’s favourite 
company.  
The success of PT Semen Indonesia being the largest cement producer in Southeast Asia is 
linked to its heavy work and a gradual evolution that the SOE experienced. In general, there 
were three periods before PT Semen Indonesia transformed into a strategic holding company. 
In 1995, PT Semen Gresik (the previous version of PT Semen Indonesia) started to acquire 
shares from other cement SOEs—PT Semen Padang and PT Semen Tonasa—and 
subsequently changed into an operating holding company, under PT Semen Gresik as the 
leading firm. From 2003 to 2005, the management and operation were joined and accelerated. 
This time, the holding system operated as a functional holding and still assisted PT Semen 
Gresik as the parent company. In 2012, the company continued the holding in terms of 
management and operation, but in a more sophisticated design as a strategic holding. This 
structural change began with the acquisition of 70 per cent of the Vietnam-based company, 
Thang Long, which officially made the company an international investor. The sophisticated 
design itself signified that all the subsidiaries could enhance their potential and competence 
in their field operations, production and marketing (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2016d).  
21 
After its strategic holding, PT Semen Gresik Group changed its name to PT Semen Indonesia. 
The new name represented the company’s vision. In line with the government’s support in 
holding the management system, findings show that the motives behind PT Semen 
Indonesia’s holding was to enhance its competitiveness and raise its bargaining position. 
According to Dwi Suciptjo, the ex-CEO of PT Semen Indonesia, the hope was to create a 
synergy among subsidiaries and maximise the potential of each production.  
Prior to the appointment of Hendi Prio Santoso as the current president director, the company 
was preparing a strategic plan to expand overseas and to be the ASEAN tiger in the cement 
sector (Lubis 2014). PT Semen Indonesia is also aiming to purchase more cement companies 
in the region. However, its successes also come with challenges. In the present day, the 
global economic downturn has affected PT Semen Indonesia sales. Cement consumption has 
dropped since 2016, despite the company’s profits being raised by 1.3 per cent compared to 
the year 2014 (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2017a). Competitors increased from 12 companies in 
2012 to 15 in 2017 (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2017a; Jakarta Post 2018). These issues are 
starting to influence the holding’s ambition for internationalisation. Hendi’s decision to 
Jakarta Post pone the overseas expansion and focus on the domestic market by acquiring the 
local subsidiaries of Holcim Indonesia (2019)—the third-largest Indonesian cement company 
(Berhad 2018)—seems to be the new strategy that the company will use. The question is, will 
be this domestic strategy ruin the holding’s long-term vision of being a global player? Or is 
the strategy simply an alternate path to building a cement empire in the region? This thesis 
offers insights to advance the understanding of what is happening to PT Semen Indonesia as 
one of the earliest internationalised SOEs in Indonesia. 
1.4 Research Questions and Scope of the Study 
This thesis intends to address research questions as follows:  
1) Does the growth and expansion of PT Semen Indonesia demonstrate the 
developmental state model’s persistence in Southeast Asia?  
2) How and why has the state encouraged PT Semen Indonesia?  
3) How far has the country’s agenda developed since the era of SBY and what will 
Jokowi’s eagerness to follow the agenda lead to? 
4) How has PT Semen Indonesia adapted its firm structure, strategies and targets to 
adjust to new global and regional economic challenges and opportunities? 
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5) Are existing models of EMMNCs enough to explain the expansion of PT Semen 
Indonesia? 
6) How representative is PT Semen Indonesia of EMMNCs? 
In this thesis, the case is limited to PT Semen Indonesia
4
, which consists of Semen Padang, 
Semen Gresik, Semen Tonasa and Thang Long Vietnam. Global expansion refers to the 
company’s FDI by acquiring Thang Long Cement. IPE refers to the body of theory that is 
used to analyse and describe the political and economic dimensions of transnational 
economic processes. This thesis thus bridges the fields of IPE, economic policy and 
international business studies to present a fresh perspective on corporate-state dynamics in an 
emerging market economy. 
1.5 Research Statement 
The contribution of my research lies in the belief that Indonesia’s OFDI has its own unique 
path that has not been much focused on, especially after the AFC. The expansion of the firm 
in this context arguably demonstrates the role of the state in the free-market system. On that 
point, this research seeks to discover the motives of PT Semen Indonesia’s growth and 
expansion, in line with the key questions addressing how far the state has been controlling the 
business, to what extent, with what method and how differently it has been done compared to 
prior EMs in the regional and global economy. Additionally, by undertaking this research, 
this thesis explores the global economic context that supports the expansion of PT. Semen 
Indonesia.  
This thesis is thus built on two propositions. First, the internationalisation of PT Semen 
Indonesia has not been solely shaped by the logic of business; it should be understood as an 
implication of the home country’s development agenda (Yadong & Huaichuan 2009; Aguiar 
2007; Marinov & Marinova 2013). This can be accomplished by considering the elements of 
Indonesia’s developmental state that survived despite the structural adjustment programs that 
were adopted under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank after the 1997 AFC and its 
link to the SOE as Indonesia’s agent of development (see Dicken 2011). Meanwhile, liberal 
economic theory, such as that supported by Dunning (2007), cannot fully explain the 
                                                             
4 To minimise confusion in this thesis, the use of the word Semen Gresik refers to the cement company 
before it became PT Semen Indonesia, while PT Semen Indonesia refers to the parent holding company.  
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formation and expansion of Southeast Asian EMMNCs because it downplays the pivotal role 
that the state and political institution plays, which is context sensitive in Asia.  
The basic argument is that from the liberal perspective, government intervention is 
detrimental to economic growth in the long run. Liberal economic theory from Smith (1776) 
to Friedman (2009) asserts the primacy of market processes over government control and 
Marx (2018), or the Marxist perspective, believed that state control creates clientelism, which 
serves only an oligarch interest. However, the developmental state model (DSM) theory 
argues that it is only by following the model’s path that a country as experienced as the first 
Asian Miracle Group
5
 will have power over the global economy. The DSM path refers to the 
state’s role in reflecting on at least three concepts: national priorities, institutional hardware 
and institutional software (see Weiss 2003; the Literature Review). In the case of Indonesia, 
one can observe that the state’s intervention in the economy has been extended through its 
ownership of strategic firms. SOEs like PT Semen Indonesia remain a significant feature of 
the Indonesian economic landscape.
6
  
Instead of arguing that the neoliberal system, with its free-market principles, has brought 
positive outcomes to Indonesian firms, this thesis advances the claim that the state’s presence 
inside the Indonesian industry is a major commercial advantage for companies like PT Semen 
Indonesia. It can be both argued and demonstrated that an SOE can be an asset to the national 
economies of EMs when the state does not exploit such enterprises as sources of 
supplemental revenue or patronage. As such, this thesis claims that the evolution of PT 
Semen Indonesia exemplifies a residual ‘developmentalist’ orientation in Indonesian 
industrial policy and that it mirrors the continuing interest of many Asian governments in 
strengthening rather than privatising state-owned EMMNCs. The Asian Model, with some 
important modifications, continues in the proper role of the state in national economic 
development. Therefore, the characteristics of the old DSM persist in more dynamic and 
adaptive ways. They can be found in the continuing of the cement industry as the 
                                                             
5
 According to Page, JM (1994, p. 615) Asian Miracle Group is a group that has high performing economy 
during 1965 to 1990s consists of Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan as well 
as the Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
6 This thesis focuses on one company as single case study, rather than captures an agglomeration of 
Indonesia SOEs. This is because, in the earlier time of this research, other Indonesian SOEs just started 
their internationalisation projects. Second, focusing on more than a case study will cost much energy and 
resources. It is more feasible to undertake research about a successful SOE and select more details for 
investigation. 
24 
government’s priority and in the high demand for infrastructural development in the past 
decade. They can also be clearly observed in the perpetuation of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy’s organisational arrangements, in which Indonesian officials’ mindsets focus on 
development catch-up. Additionally, adapting the DSM becomes apparent through the close 
connections between the government and the SOEs. As this thesis will argue, these 
connections were highlighted as a major contributor to Indonesia’s economic difficulties at 
the time of the AFC (Kirkpatrick 2014, p. 17) rather than the full privatisation of the state’s 
assets that the Indonesian state had opted for. This modified version of developmentalism is 
referred to in this thesis as ‘neo-developmentalism’, which is led by a ‘neo-developmental 
state’.  
As very little was found in the literature on Indonesia’s SOE internationalisation, this thesis 
also proposes the inner and outer factors of the overseas expansion (which follows the Firm 
Specific Advantage and Country Specific Advantage theories). This thesis focuses on the 
home country rather than the host country since selecting Vietnam was a decision that was 
made after the motivation to expand
7
. The CSA explores the economic, political and 
sociocultural condition of the home country, including the market size, government policies 
and infrastructure. The high demand for infrastructure and economic performance is a key 
factor that can significantly boost PT Semen Indonesia’s sales. The growing market 
subsequently helped the group win its domestic competition. These findings confirm the links 
between the home country’s economies to the success of the company. However, there are 
also other relevant factors, such as Indonesia’s longstanding position of looking inward. As 
this chapter has explained, the expansion of Indonesian SOEs has been slow to progress.  
Conversely, the FSA considers the internal company’s factors to understand expansion. This 
includes the ownership, business capacity, performance and technology of the company. This 
thesis’s findings are consistent with previous works on EMMNCs. For example, regarding 
ownership, PT Semen Indonesia demonstrates a strong link with the Indonesian government 
as the majority shareholder. Therefore, the company has no standard of rate of return and 
incentives given. In exchange, the company must ‘pay’ through its public service program. 
This result matches earlier studies on the same topic of EMMNC SOEs (Aguiar 2007).  
                                                             
7 Interview with PT Semen Indonesia Board of Directors on 28 October 2016, in Jakarta, and with staff of 
the Ministry of SOEs.  
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The findings regarding the management factor also clearly support the idea of being a 
conglomerate, or a diversified group. This is beneficial for fixing the market’s imperfection, 
as it helps the group leverage and be cost effective. In terms of performance, the group has 
improved its capacity, production and market shares. This can be observed in how the 
company became the national champion in the cement sector. Regarding motives and 
strategies as determinants of internationalisation, this project found that PT Semen Indonesia 
was motivated by a market-seeking motive. Concern for fierce competition after the AFC as 
well as the desire to depend on its traditional market were the reasons underlying the 
company’s decision to look for another potential market outside Indonesia. These thesis 
findings also suggest that PT Semen Indonesia used strategies of horizontal acquisition to 
globalise. This is in line with Marinov and Marinova (2013), who argued that the type of 
OFDI taken in the natural resources sector tends to be horizontal based on two 
considerations: the transaction cost advantage and the competitive advantage of the 
subsidiary.  
This study further offers important insights into the discussion of EMMNCs—notably, in the 
case of Indonesia and the policymaking of Indonesian SOEs. Along with this thesis’s 
contribution to the theoretical and empirical stance, one may argue that the expansion seems 
to occur regionally instead of globally. However, this thesis rejects such claims and instead 
argues that the geography of the market areas have spread outside Asia and that the 
Vietnamese subsidiary became the hub of overseas market.  
1.6 Research Strategies 
1.6.1 Design and Method 
This thesis used a qualitative design with a case study method. The background of this project 
was to investigate the area of EMMNCs, which was previously dominated by quantitative 
studies.
8
 Nevertheless, this thesis will not claim that earlier studies—mainly those of Luo and 
Tung (2007), Marinov and Marinova (2013), Pananond and Zeithaml (1998), Yadong and 
Huaichuan (2009) and Yiu et al. (2007)—were wrong and that this different approach was 
superior, as such an argument would not be fair. This thesis only underlines the importance of 
                                                             
8
  Piekkari and Welch (2004) admitted that qualitative research remains a minority and that it can even be 
marginalised within international business. Even so, their book tried to bring the IB study outside the range 
of either quantitative or qualitative studies alone. 
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reiterating the same need for applying a qualitative approach to the theory of EMMNCs, 
especially for the topic of expansion. The reason is that observing the trend of EMMNCs 
today would be misleading if it was simplified through the statistical lens.
9
 Further, the 
argument underlying qualitative research is its capability to let humankind be examined, 
regarding their motivations, reasons, actions and beliefs (Kuo & Myers 2012).  
As previously mentioned, the theory of EMMNCs is limited to Indonesia’s experiences. 
Therefore, by employing a case study method, the investigation of EMMNCs is practical and 
theoretical, and it will lead to a better understanding. Creswell (2009) explained that a case 
study can explore a program, event, activity, process or individual in-depth. Although other 
studies have been undertaken in relation to private EMMNCs in Indonesia (specifically, the 
firm PT Indofood Makmur or Salim Group) and Pertamina is a state-run company, studies of 
Indonesian corporations is limited, and there have been no previous attempts to research and 
analyse PT Semen Indonesia. The significance of PT Semen and the justifications for this 
research focus are as follows: 
1) PT Semen Indonesia is a state-owned company (51 per cent of its shares are owned by 
the Indonesian government). 
2) PT Semen Indonesia is the first Indonesian government–owned company to 
extensively and internationally expand its operations—for which reason PT Semen 
Indonesia is preferred to Pertamina Persero, which is a SOE focused on exports and 
one that has only a minor shareholder in overseas projects.  
3) PT Semen Indonesia is the largest cement company in Indonesia and in Southeast 
Asia in terms of production and assets (i.e., business capacity). 
4) Becoming a new holding company, PT Semen Indonesia is a representative sample of 
the EMMNC SOEs population, which recently found a way ahead compared to other 
well-established SOEs in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.  
5) PT Semen Indonesia is originally established in Indonesia, which is regarded as one 
of the most significant emerging markets following China and India.  
Similarly, critics also appeared with the case study output. It is true, at some points, that case 
studies could not provide a conclusion to the broader group. Just because PT Semen 
                                                             
9
 Today, subjects that were previously studied by social scholars, such as family, marriage and religion, are 
legitimate areas of economic analysis. Although economics welcome all kinds of topics, in terms of 
methods, it is still limited (Cronin 2016). 
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Indonesia was identified as an EMMNC does not mean that all of EMMNCs will exhibit in 
the same fashion. However, the qualitative case study is powerful because it offers alternative 
insights through an understanding of the reality. The researcher witnessed the rise of Chinese 
and Singaporean SOEs and found many fascinating findings. However, it is not enough; 
researchers need new analytical tools to be better informed. Because the transformation of the 
world economy is not finished yet, it is fluid and transformative.  
1.6.2 Data Collection Technique and Ethical Issues 
In line with the data collection method, the case study technique combined different methods 
for gathering data (Yin 2015). This thesis will use two methods: secondary data and semi-
structured interviews.  
1.6.2.1 Secondary Documents 
Secondary document archives were used to gather all ready-made data (Merriam & Tisdell 
2015), which provided a strong base for the research’s further steps. The documents included 
relevant primary documents such as annual reports, official press releases, policy papers, 
journals and firm open-access data sets and supplementary documents. For a literature search, 
it is necessary to identify high-quality papers and evaluate those papers’ applicability to the 
research (Vom Brocke et al. 2009).  
During this research, the secondary data collection started with the official documents from 
both the government and the company. Next, the researcher extracted articles from 
newspapers and media archives, including videos from television programs. From statistical 
data, the researcher can piece together the firm’s production capacity and market share and 
compared it with data on the total market in regional and global levels.  
1.6.2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are the primary source of the findings. This is because the 
interviewees were experienced eyewitnesses of the phenomena directly (Merriam & Tisdell 
2015). Therefore, the interviewee is classified as a key person. The interview is designed to 
include open-ended questions to reflect the shareholder or decision-maker’s perception, 
meaning, experiences (Yin 2015) and firsthand information. Therefore, the main questions 
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that were addressed related to the firm’s expansion, which enabled a deeper exploration for 
more information and clarification.  
At this data collection stage, the chosen method was purposive sampling. The participants of 
the interview are limited (nine interviewees, listed are provided in Appendix 1). This method 
of sampling does not intend to acquire many informants because there is no need for either 
representation or generalisation of the interviewees. This method was only chosen to access 
deeper information from the insiders. However, in light of qualitative philosophy, it is 
unfeasible to explain why a person or institution acted a certain way or why any event 
occurred without asking people about it (Myers 2013). Those insiders were decision-makers 
and highest-level staff who were selected in the company search based on their positions and 
experiences of the company.  
Interviews were conducted in Indonesia, in Jakarta, Pangkep and unintentionally in East Java 
(a face-to-face session with the consent of the interviewees). The interviews were recorded 
and noted in a particular time, as the interviewees agreed. The key person from each 
institution was expected to give answers, but not all accepted the invitation. To manage this 
issue, the basic expectation was to interview no fewer than one figure from the government 
side and one from the company side. Both the board of PT Semen Indonesia and the 
government officials had a great deal to do. This is understandable, as their positions 
represent pivotal institutions and even the country’s public interest. In the end, the interviews 
were undertaken in at least four ministries, with the PT Semen Indonesia parent company 
director on the period of 2017 when the interview was undertook and one subsidiary. The 
data collection through field work finished for about year, as the interviewees were difficult 
to meet and the author must flight back and forth Melbourne -Jakarta. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis begins with a broad-to-specific context of PT Semen Indonesia as the case study. 
Overall, the thesis content structure is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis Structure Overview. 
The Introduction aims to bring the context of MNCs from Ems, particularly on the presence 
of SOEs, into the current project, particularly by focusing on what has occurred on a global 
level. Following this is a discussion on SOE expansion in Asia and the overview of PT 
Semen Indonesia’s holding. The next section of this chapter presents the core of the research: 
the comprehensive questions regarding PT Semen Indonesia, along with the scope of the 
study, statement of the research, research strategies and structure.  
The second chapter conceptualises and justifies the IPE logic of thinking and perspectives, 
with an emphasis on the theory of the developmental state. Along with the literature, Chapter 
2 also elaborates on the theories of the EMMNCs. It is essential to map the theoretical 
conceptualisations behind the topic of EMMNCs today as the basis to unfold the works of the 
global political economy.  
Next, the third chapter will clarify the significance of Indonesia’s case, including the political 
economy situation, in general and specifically regarding SOE. This is crucial because it 
outlines the narratives of Indonesia’s economic changes, notably its investment records to 
give a background of the case.  
Chapter 4 recognises and investigates the DSM features of Indonesian SOEs. The theory of 
the DSM becomes the analysis tool to examine PT Semen Indonesia from a global political 
economy. The examination was accomplished based on the DSM proposed by Weiss (2000, 
p.23): national priorities, organisational arrangements and institutional links and was further 
added with the latest work of Weiss and Thurbon’s (2016, p. 639) strategic industrial policy, 
institutional software and institutional hardware. This section will also elaborate on the 
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correlation between Indonesian SOEs and the country’s industrial policies and institutional 
software—such as the Indonesian president, a well-known nationalist who promised to 
launch a new economic policy package and who tried to boost economic growth through 
infrastructure investment. The institutional hardware refers to the institutions of Indonesian 
government, such as the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, or the Indonesia Investment 
Coordinating Board.  
After understanding the case of PT Semen Indonesia from a DSM perspective, Chapter 5 
provides the context of PT Semen Indonesia and its evolution from being an operational 
company in 1991 to becoming a strategic holding in 2012. This chapter is thus useful for 
understanding how the SOE began as the national champion in cement industry.  
Chapter 6 attempts to identify PT Semen Indonesia as a representation of EMMNCs among 
the ones analysed based on internal (FSA) as well as external determinants (CSA). These two 
determinants call for a further comparison between PT Semen Indonesia and the other 
EMMNC SOEs. This chapter also addresses the motivation and strategy that PT Semen 
Indonesia pursued to become internationalised.  
The final part of the thesis, Chapter 7, will contain the implications of the findings, including 
the theoretical contribution and the policy implications, together with limitations of the study. 
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Chapter 2: Analytical Framework and Literature Review 
While EMMNCs are a popular topic for research and many studies like Pearce (2012), 
Goldstein (2009) and Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014) gave systematic explanations, 
limited studies exist on the political institutions and development process within the home 
countries, which may be common due to the nature of investment as economic term. This 
literature review tries to build on this research and goes beyond the economic calculation. 
This research thus locates the study of EMMNCs within the broad field of IPE, though it still 
incorporates some elements of international business with PT Semen Indonesia as a case 
study. It brings together scholarship on Asian industrialisation and the developmental state 
debate to build an analytical framework with which to analyse the evolution of PT Semen 
Indonesia. Emphasis is placed on the importance of analysing power structures and power 
relations, both inside and outside a company, to appreciate its mode of operation. Power and 
institution are central to the study of IPE, as is the study of MNCs. This thesis draws on IPE 
theories—realist, liberal and critical—to inform its analysis and establishes how the study 
adds a missing piece to the jigsaw of our understanding about the growing significance of 
EMMNCs. More specifically, this thesis delivers discourse about the DSM to present an 
explanation of the role of the state and institutions. It finally explores EMMNCs to identify 
the concept and motives of expansion and models.  
2.1 International, Political Economy Logic of Thinking 
IPE was this thesis’s framework to analyse and explain EMMNC formation. Distinct from 
formal business studies, IPE takes a critical stance towards the economic phenomenon and 
assumes that political and economic phenomena are causally related. Economic events and 
patterns cannot be considered independently of parallel and conterminous political processes. 
Instead of analysing EMMNCs purely in terms of ownership, market-, resource- and 
strategic-asset seeking, firm-specific advantages, country-specific advantages, leverage and 
global supply chains, the IPE framework allows for the study of relevant non-economic 
factors, such as the influence of political actors, power structures, roles of institutions, 
policies and cultural ethics. This thesis uses an eclectic approach by combining ‘middle-
range’ theories from different IPE models or paradigms and business economics to synthesise 
the analytical approaches and establish richer research findings.  
32 
The study of EMMNCs benefits from inquiry into the rules or institutions that shape 
company operations, and that constrain or facilitate company decisions. Institutional 
frameworks that affect PT Semen Indonesia directly include the Indonesian government as 
the home country and the governments of countries in which it invests as the host country; 
ASEAN cooperation arrangements that cover trade and finance; and global regulatory 
institutions, especially the WTO and IMF. Institutional analysis extends to the cultural and 
social factors that influence economic behaviours, which, in the case of this thesis, involves 
the examination of the so-called ‘Asian way’. This Asian way has a broader meaning and 
context, yet it is used here to show the typical economic landscape in Asia.  
The beginning of IPE as an independent study began in 1970s, with an interest on whether 
economics led politics or politics led economics in terms of shaping economic outcomes. 
There is realistically no example of a perfect market economy of a polity in which economic 
outcomes can be determined purely by government policy. Cohen (2014) thus stated that IPE 
emerged as discipline to close the gap between economics and politics in empirical and 
theoretical research. IPE scholars like Palan (2013) and Miller (2008) could then claim to be 
interdisciplinary because of their ability to comprehend social phenomena using the tools of 
political and economic analysis.  
IPE as a study principally focuses on three core premises (Underhill 2000). First, social 
phenomena are unable to occur without a link between economy and politics. Second, the 
link of those concepts lies on politics as the objective and method, while the economy 
represents the structure. Third, it is irrelevant to separate local and national constraints with 
an international level of analysis. Those three premises reflect the understanding of IPE 
intellectuals that economic outcomes of any kind are mostly affected in the political sense. 
The implication for the distribution of power in the IPE context is related to the distribution 
of wealth. 
Further, the roots of IPE are shared with international relations in the four paradigms: 
mercantilist or realist (and statist), liberal, socialist/Marxism and the latest constructivism 
(Frieden & Lake 2017; Gilpin & Gilpin 2001; Walter & Sen 2009). In classical mercantilism 
(or realism in some of the literature), the main actor is the state. The state has power over 
other actors, including economic actors. Kindleberger (1986) in The World Depression 
argued that the world needs a powerful state to create stability for international public goods 
(this later became known as the theory of hegemonic stability). A powerful state in classical 
33 
mercantilism refers to a militarily powerful state. Later, under the field of neo-mercantilism, 
the power of the state included economic resources and capabilities. Economic power 
signifies both the relative size of a country’s economy and the state’s capacity to translate this 
power into political influence abroad. Mercantile states also seek to influence economic 
actors at home through selective support, subsidies or privileges to special regions, industries 
or companies through comprehensive and national-focused economic policies (Malmgren 
1970). 
In contrast to mercantilism, liberalism holds the view that individuals and firms interacting in 
open markets are the key to economic prosperity. Liberals thus argue that the state should not 
interfere directly in the affairs of business but that it should instead be concerned more with 
policies to promote free trade and free markets. State intervention in the form of state-run 
businesses and controlled markets only restrict and minimize economic potential (Smith 
1776; Friedman 2009). In the modern world, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations 
marked the neoliberalism period with their economic policies in the Era of the New Right 
(Cooper 2012). Under Reagan and Thatcher, privatisation and deregulation were claimed as 
the best policy prescriptions. Debates about East Asian economic growth has focused on 
whether liberal market forces or state intervention was decisive in promoting Asian 
industrialisation, beginning with Japan (Johnson 1982). Chang (2007), for example, argued 
that without state intervention in the form of tariffs, subsidies and strategic direction in the 
form of industrial policy, East Asian states would not have been able to industrialise. Stiglitz 
(2007) also questioned the claim that there can be anything remotely resembling an idealised 
‘level playing field’ in a global economy that is dominated by powerful multinationals. 
Chang (2007) and Stiglitz’s (2007) argument spans statism and liberalism in that neither 
advocates against capitalism, only an extreme liberal (neoliberal) version of it that is shaped 
by theoretical propositions and value judgements rather than broad-based empirical evidence.  
The third classical IPE body of theory is socialism/Marxism, which unlike the two previous 
approaches, focuses on the relations between actors and the subsequent implications. 
Socialists maintain that a market–capitalist mode of production undermines the livelihoods of 
working people, or ‘labour’ (Palan 2013, p. 8-10). Under market conditions, capitalists 
become richer and the labouring classes are exploited. Rather than giving prosperity to the 
whole society, the liberal–capitalist system segregates society into classes and increases 
inequality between the poorest and the richest. Consequently, socialist scholars look for 
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evidence of the weaknesses within capitalism to argue that market economies are in decay 
and that, eventually, capitalism will collapse or be transformed into socialism, in which there 
will be no classes and the means of production is enjoyed by the whole of society (Frieden & 
Lake 2017; Gilpin & Gilpin 2001). Further, the extended study of Marxism with neo-
Marxists such as Wallerstein (2004), Frank (2018) and Cardoso and Faletto (1979) continued 
the tradition of Marxist intellectual thinking by taking the context of the twentieth century to 
explain the inequality. Wallerstein (2004) further took the division of labour into a broader 
context of capitalism to a world system theory. He described the world’s inequality into three 
levels of hierarchy: core, semi-periphery and periphery, with the core as the top of the 
production chain. This theory maintains economic power, making profits and pushing the 
semi-periphery and periphery to provide raw material and cheap labour.  
However, this thesis adopts the view that the three approaches will not satisfactorily explain 
the case. Instead, they need to be elaborate. The reality of today’s world is multidimensional, 
dynamic and fluid, which means that no single perspective or paradigm is enough to grasp 
and explain these complexities. Starting from that understanding, there is another approach 
that, because of its ‘non-mainstream’ status and multi-method approach, is not widely 
accepted in IPE. This is because of its ‘undefined’ ontology, epistemology and methodology 
roots. However, this eclectic perspective is gathering support, such as in the works of Strange 
(1991) and Stubbs (1999). The application of this eclectic and pragmatic interdisciplinary 
approach to this thesis is explained further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
2.2 The Developmental State Model 
Within the IPE framework, this thesis is particularly interested in taking the developmental 
model as the point of departure to make sense of the expansion of Indonesian SOEs. This is 
because there is an indication that the transformation of the company is a part of the bigger 
picture of Indonesian economic growth, which is directed by the state. This model of 
economic development was popular in the 1980s and 1990s. It was first proposed by Johnson 
(1982) to describe Japan’s success, accuracy or explanatory power, and its persistence 
remains a matter of debate.
10
 The paradigm discussed above posits an explanation of this 
                                                             
10 At the IPE workshop in Brisbane, I discussed with Elizabeth Thurbon on how she placed the DSM into 
theoretical consideration. However, she argued that the DSM is beyond the ideology of the three main 
paradigms of IPE. She underlined that the model cannot be squeezed into a paradigm. In fact, it is more 
practical than theoretical. It illustrates the policymaking and outcome of some countries notably Northeast 
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model. The liberal view is that the developmental state is an example of a capitalist, national 
and industrial state (Pirie 2007; Park et al. 2012). It exists to coordinate the development of 
capitalist market economies, and liberal scholars draw on the experiences of European 
countries in their early stages of industrialisation (Fritz & Menocal 2007). The economic 
success of countries is claimed to be the result of outward-oriented economic policies that 
support private business, capital accumulation and export production. High growth in East 
and Southeast Asia is widely attributed to export-oriented industrial development that is led 
by market forces with a strong private sector (Öniş 1991). For neo-liberal economists, 
reliance on the state for protection impedes company efficiency and constrains national 
economic growth (Jomo 2001). Ctiticisms of developmental states which focussed on ‘rent-
seeking’ or so-called ‘crony capitalism’ became more strident following the Asian Financial 
Crisis.  
This perspective on the DSM opposed the view that the model is permanently owned by East 
Asian countries. Fritz and Menocal (2007) argued that to be judged, as ‘developmental’, a 
state does not need to be in control of everything and successful in all spheres. Further, the 
model is not associated with specific policies. DSM countries are widespread in different 
times and places and they have different social and economic policies (Fritz & Menocal, 
2007). In that regard, Yeung (2017a) supported the view and identified that the key of DSM 
success is the allocation of financial resources, which were substantially given by the US 
during the Cold War.  
Unlike the liberalist view, the mercantilist or statist view is that the market alone is incapable 
of ensuring growth in the long run and that markets cannot always operate to their maximum 
efficiently. Beeson (2004) called this state-led development. The states thus has a necessary 
role in correcting market failures by directly investing in the industry and promoting the 
conditions that are favourable to long-term economic development (Jayanthakumaran 2016; 
Öniş 1991; Amsden 1992; Wade 1990). To that end, the state is intentionally ‘getting the 
price wrong’ (Amsden 1992).11 However, the success of getting the price wrong is 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Asia in dealing with global economy. I will still explain the model based on the three approaches since 
many literatures support the idea that there is still some degree of ideological basis to it. However, as this 
thesis uses an eclectic approach, the concept of the DSM will not be argued in paradigmatic debate.  
11
 This term for distorting the market is expressed in two ways; foreign exchange rates and long-term 
interest rates. This strategy consists of varied policy outputs, such as trade controls, foreign exchange 
controls, export incentives, selective credit allocation, tax incentives, public enterprises other means of 
punishing firms that do not comply (Wade 1990).  
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determined by the ability to ‘govern the market’, including protecting it from powerful 
interest groups (Wade 1990). This approach situated the state, its intervention and its role in 
the heart of the DSM.  
A realist paradigm is taking its own position by asserting that the developmental state is 
neither free market nor socialist, but instead a rational and pragmatic response to the 
competitive power dynamics of capitalism (Woo-Cumings 1999). Some literature categorised 
this approach as ‘institutional’ because the premise that is advanced is neither neoclassical 
liberal nor mercantilist or statist. According to Duysters et al. (2009), the DSM is the mixture 
of market orientation and state intervention.  
Some studies (Yeung 2017b; OECD 2015c; Stubbs 2009) identified this school of thought as 
neo-mercantilism, with the notion that they are aware of the globalising influence on the 
market economy, but they also contend that the state—as their core of analysis—is being 
transformed (Weiss 2000, 2003). According to Weiss (1997), states are not working against 
the global system, but they are working collaboratively with global processes. From Weiss’s 
view, there were two important prepositions regarding developmental states, which she 
explained below. 
First, globalisation impacts on the state, but not necessarily in the restrictive way 
anticipated by the standard view. Contrary to the idea of globalization as constraint, 
the global economy does not preclude a role for national governance, but tends 
increasingly to demand it … The related proposition however is that the ways in 
which these enabling conditions of globalization are likely to inform state response 
and be actualized in policy outcomes will depend heavily on existing features of the 
domestic institutional environment (Weiss 2003, p. 245-6). 
In this thesis, the discussion of the developmental state is most influenced by the third 
perspective and the work of Thurbon and Weiss (2016) and Weiss (2000). It is asserted that 
the state playes a vital role in early industrial development and, while there are undoubtedly 
weaknesses in regulatory capacity and widespread distributional injustice in developing 
countries, the removal of state direction is not the solution.  
The developmental state frame helps to appreciate the dynamics of state–firm interactions, in 
the case of PT Semen Indonesia. To better articulate a model for this thesis, it is important to 
track the concept of developmentalism. According to Park et al. (2012), developmentalism is 
an ideology that places the state as the main driving force for attaining economic progress. 
Economic sectors must thus be ruled by specific policies to protect, expand and adapt 
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domestic industries to cope with the challenges of the global economy. In that respect, states 
play a strategic role in governing the national and international markets to meet national ends 
(Öniş et al. 1991).  
However, DSM is not simply about the state leading the market. The state and market have to 
be synergised (Öniş et al. 1991). This comes with two consequences: a direct link between 
the bureaucrats, which has the responsibility to rule the market with the business, and a stable 
and predictable environment (Öniş et al. 1991). The two are crucial in assuring that the 
intervention works to reach the top priority of developmental goals. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the country must be authoritarian to have a DSM, as many studies 
demonstrated. Johnson (1999) refuted this idea and explained that authoritarianism works to 
solve the problem, such as mobilising the country to direct its energy to the developmental 
project.  
Dicken (2011) stated that interventionist states have successfully and simultaneously 
integrated the functions of owner, coordinator, regulator and entrepreneur. Those multi-
function levels and forms could be identified through the types of enterprise, governance 
structure, incentive system and resource allocation (Pearce 2012). This was, as written by 
Amsden (2001, p. 3), ‘new institutional economics’. Amsden (2001, p.8) further explained 
that:  
This model qualifies as new because it was governed by an innovative control 
mechanism. A control mechanism is a set of institutions that imposes discipline on 
economic behaviour. The control mechanism of ‘the rest’ revolved around the 
principle of reciprocity. Subsidies (‘intermediate assets’) were allocated to make 
manufacturing profitable—to facilitate the flow of resources from primary product 
assets to knowledge-based assets—but did not become giveaways. Recipients of 
subsidies were subjected to monitorable performance standards that were 
redistributive in nature and results-oriented. The reciprocal control mechanism of 
‘the rest’ thus transformed the inefficiency and venality associated with government 
intervention into collective good, just as the ‘invisible hand’ of the North Atlantic’s 
market-driven control mechanism transformed the chaos and selfishness of market 
forces into general well-being. 
Although the DSM may be popular in the tiger economies, the DSM was adopted 
simultaneously in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Amsden 2001). It was also adopted by 
other countries outside the region. However, the cultural context is emphasised, making it 
difficult for other countries in the world to experience the same mechanism and outputs (Park 
et al. 2012).  
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In general, there are some characteristic that DSM countries shared. Weiss (2000, p. 23) 
specifically distinguished them by at least three criteria:  
1) priorities that were aimed at enhancing the productive powers of the nation, raising 
the investible surplus and ultimately closing the technology gap between themselves 
and the industrialised countries  
2) organisational arrangements that embody a relatively insulated pilot agency in charge 
of that transformative project—which in turn presupposes both an elite bureaucracy 
that is staffed by the best managerial talent available who is highly committed to the 
organisation’s objectives—and a supportive political system  
3) institutional links with organised economic actors that privilege cooperative rather 
than arm’s-length relations, and sectors or industry associations rather than individual 
firms as the locus of policy input, negotiation and implementation. 
In an updated work, Thurbon and Weiss (2016) refined Weiss’s (2000) conceptualisation of 
the DSM by clarifying three key characteristics: the institutional hardware, which refers to 
the professional insulation and economic connectedness of the bureaucracy; the institutional 
software, which is the mindset of the political actor that guides their action; and the strategy, 
which reflects the country’s industrial policy. The institutional hardware can be found in the 
existence of pilot agency that takes the responsibility of policy input and the national 
development plan. Although this agency is insulated, it has consultative and coordinating 
relations to the economic actors, including private sectors (Thurbon & Weiss 2016).  
However, having institutional hardware is not all that is needed. The DSM needs to possess 
institutional software. The bureaucrats of the pilot agency must maintain political will and 
commitment to the developmental goals. This may differ among countries, yet it is usually 
motivated by outside pressure, such as China’s motive to catch up with the West (Thurbon & 
Weiss 2016). Even so, a DSM not only consists of institutional hardware and software. It 
needs a strategy to pursue its development agenda. This is widely known as strategic 
industrial policy. This kind of policy, however, is not only export oriented, but it can be 
mixed and changed over time and place. However, this policy will only be effective from 
input to output if the institutional hardware and software are supported by state capacities 
(Thurbon & Weiss 2016).  
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Weiss (2000) argued that when any one of these three elements was missing, it sways the rest 
of the elements. If a state development system lacked the first element, it could be weakened 
and unable to coordinate economic affairs that re insulated from special interests. If the third 
element cannot be established, policy design is likely to be of poorer quality and policy 
implementation would be compromised, leading to policy failure. However, this is not to say 
that the lack of three elements absolutely negate the DSM. To use the DSM, a country has to 
experience a process of becoming one. This means that neither Japan nor South Korea 
succeeded with the DSM by transforming suddenly. The determinants by Weiss (2000) and 
Thurbon and Weiss (2016) thus become the point of departure of this thesis.  
However, it is important to note that the economic context in the two decades after the era of 
the DSM has been changed. With that in mind, this thesis further claims that the neo-DSM—
the modified version of the classic DSM—goes beyond some of the recent DSM studies of 
Yeung (2017a), Pirie (2018), Dent (2017) and You (2017). This thesis suggests that after the 
AFC, the existing studies (Hill 2014; Park et al. 2012; Minns 2001; Pirie 2007; Jayasuriya 
2005) concluded too quickly regarding the failure of the DSM, or how East Asia turned to 
neoliberal ideology. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that today’s DSM and the old 
version were never the same. With this notion, it is too much to believe that the classic DSM 
is still present, so this thesis will not attempt to defend such a view. It instead proposes that 
the neo-DSM exists now. The neo-DSM considers the three indicators of the old DSM model, 
as identified by earlier studies (e.g., Weiss [2000], see Table 2-1). However, this case study 
seeks to examine the changing nature of the model as it manages the present dramatic 
changes of the world political economy. The structural adjustment adopts the economic 
reform—for example, it unavoidably changes the power of the government to reign, making 
it difficult to insulate the bureaucracy as much as before. Conversely, the democratic political 
system hinders the state’s activism to find a way to intervene with the economic process so 
that it follows its lead. Countries continue to believe in the economic development agenda 
based on state intervention. Therefore, this thesis proposes a practical context for Indonesian 
SOEs and investigates deeper than just the ideological debate regarding whether the model is 
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2.2.1 The Developmental State in Southeast Asia: Historical Background 
From 1965 to 1990, no other region had the fastest-growing economy than East Asia (Page, 
1994). The golden era of Jakarta Post -WWII marked Japan as the only non-Western 
industrial country (Tipton 1998). By 1990, Japan was the second-largest economy with a 
GDP per capita that was twenty times bigger than that of the US (Charles 1995). Japan’s 
competitive advantage was based on a relatively low-paid but educated workforce, the 
availability of huge export markets in the West and social stability at home that was 
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buttressed by improving living standards, a heavily protected domestic market (which 
ensured the local consumption of Japanese goods) and the political dominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party. Scholars noted that this advantage made Japan the ‘number one’ of Asian 
growth (Tipton 1998, p.3). 
During this high-growth phase, the Japanese government—in cooperation with industry–
directed the rapid expansion of heavy industries including motor vehicle and electronics 
industries that are synonymous with modern-day Japan. It was during this period that the 
Japanese economy developed a strong export-oriented focus (EOI) and foreign investment. 
Its OFDI climbed from US$4.7 billion in 1980 to US$12.2 billion in 1985 (Appelbaum & 
Henderson 1992). One of the most profitable areas was Japanese car manufacturers, who 
began to out-compete their US rivals and who made brand names like Nissan and Toyota, 
which are as well-known and respected as major US carmakers, General Motors and Ford 
(Charles 1995).  
It is important to note that industrial growth fed both international and domestic demands for 
Japanese-produced goods. Export as well as national sales played an important role. By 
joining the world trade, Japan had successfully produced agricultural and protoindustrial 
products outside the country (Tipton 1998). The importance of national institution—the 
Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI)—was also likely to establish efficient 
and effective industrial policies in Japan (Weiss 2000).  
Japan’s industrial success eventually prompted other East Asian countries to pursue a similar 
path. Taiwan and South Korea gained much attention after Japan’s success. In South Korea, 
President Park Chung Hee established a monopoly on political power in the early 1960s by 
controlling the judiciary, press, public assembly and speech (Tipton 1998, p. 424) and by 
copying the example that was set by Japan (Appelbaum & Henderson 1992, p. 38). Park 
‘guided’ major Korean industrial corporations—Samsung, Hyundai, Hanjin, LG and SK (the 
Chaebol) (Lasserre & Schütte 2006 p. 119))—to develop export-oriented manufacturing 
enterprises by creating the Economic Planning Board (EPB) (Appelbaum & Henderson 1992, 
p. 125) and allowing selectively foreign investment (Appelbaum & Henderson 1992 p. 39). 
However, unlike Japan, Park’s regime was extremely repressive (see Tipton 1998, p. 425-7). 
The country saw no democratic elections until Roh Tae-woo- the chairman of the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party announced the next direct presidential election (Minns 2011, p. 
1033).  
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Empirically, FDI that flows from the so-called Asian tiger economies to the developing and 
developed worlds increased significantly from 1977 to 1985 (Lecraw 1993; Guillen & 
Garcia-Canal 2009). Countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore became 
important players in the field of foreign investment in various industries—from plastics, 
garments, textiles, electronics, chemicals and heavy machinery. Their subsidiaries were 
located in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe. Taiwan’s investment strategies 
enabled the global expansion of firms such as Taiwan Semiconductor, HTC and Acer. Other 
investments made by EMMNCs were related to manufacturing, trading and construction. The 
electronic product maker, South Korea, is also known for Samsung, LG, Hyundai and Kia. 
Further, Singaporean real estate firms such as CapitaLand and hotel names such as City 
Developments have done well, yet their operations are still slow compared to the giant MNCs 
(Kumar 1982; Guillen & Garcia-Canal 2009).  
Taiwan moved down the path of EOI in the 1970s, under the control of the Kuomintang 
(KMT), which imposed martial law after arriving from mainland China in 1949. By the 
1960s, it had created, through the repression of political opponents, a ‘stable political climate’ 
(Tipton 1998; Kuo & Myers 2012). The beginning of Taiwan’s economy was smaller than 
Myanmar in terms of GNP (Tselichtchev & Debroux 2012, p.222). Like in Japan and Korea, 
government policy directed the local and foreign investment from the United States and 
Japan. One remarkable instance of the government’s control was observed in the 
government’s first four-year plans for economic development (Tipton 1998, p. 305). In the 
1950s, Taiwan changed from ISI to export promotion to catch up with South Korea 
(Tselichtchev & Debroux 2012, p. 223). Even so, the US had just started to focus on 
electronic products in 1960s, with Texas Instruments, Sharp, Philips, Sanyo, and Sony 
Matsushita.  
Taiwan followed an outwardly oriented industrial policy that favoured corporations that were 
loyal to the KMT, despite its limited domestic market and scarcity of raw materials and 
technology (Tipton 1998, p. 429-30). Taiwan’s success, like Japan and South Korea, relied on 
economic institutions—such as The Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(Tipton 1998, 431). It was the first country that created export processing zones (EPZ) 
(Appelbaum & Henderson 1992,p. 43). Through EPZs, Taiwan had shifted from the import–
substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy to the export-led growth (ELG) strategy by 
becoming the producer of machinery, mechanical goods, electronics and electronic 
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equipment (e.g., Acer). This is considered the key to understanding the economic 
transformation of Eastern Asia.  
The rise of EMMNCs in Southeast Asia reflects the major economic transformations in the 
region during the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to the Asian Development era, most Southeast Asia 
countries depended on ISI. Foreign companies were considered the main contributors for the 
economy (Lasserre & Schütte 2006,p. 168) and made those countries dependent to foreign 
investment (Athukorala 2010, p. 23). ISI in Southeast Asia gave way to EOI in the 1970s and 
80s (Studwell 2013,p. 148). Japan, where the state took the lead in setting industry policies 
and promoting export growth in which competitive advantages could be exploited to break 
into markets in the US and Europe, attracted the attention of policymakers in Southeast Asian 
states. This happened in Malaysia, where foreign companies were invited to build export 
processing operations, and the country had not built any well-established industries until the 
1980s (Studwell 2013, p. 105).  
Learning from the first Asian development model, based on Japan’s experience with 
industrialisation, export-oriented strategies began to be implemented in other Southeast Asian 
states besides Singapore, who adopted EOI policies after leaving the Malaysian Federation in 
1965. Malaysia was an early adaptor to this form of industrial expansion. Its industries were 
not based on local innovation in new products and processes, but instead they were 
downstream-processing sites for capital and ideas that were generated elsewhere (Amsden 
1995, p. 793). As part of the tiger economies’ success story in the region, the 
conglomerates—giant group companies such as Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) from 
Malaysia, Charoen Pokphand (CP) from Thailand and Indofood from Indonesia—started to 
rise. State-owned enterprises and most of all enterprises with close ties to government 
politicians were important players in this new phase of industrialisation in Southeast Asia.   
The Malaysian case started in the early 1980s; the Mahathir government moved to reduce 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)’s financial dependence on Malaysia’s ethnic 
Chinese business elite, and to reduce imports of steel, pulp, paper and petrochemicals. Prime 
minister Mahathir Mohammad (1980–2003) established the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM). As a state enterprise, HICOM was a product of Mahathir’s ‘look East’ 
policy (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992, p. 183-184; Wad and Govindaraju 2011,p. 153), 
which aimed to emulate South Korea’s development of domestic heavy industries in the 
1970s. HICOM was intended to oversee the creation of the Proton, Malaysia’s national motor 
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car. It was produced by United Motor Works (UMW) Holdings, which was owned by a 
Chinese businessman who was close to Mahathir and a board member of HICOM (Studwell 
2013). 
The other Malaysian giant company is Petronas. It began in the 1970s when the nationalistic 
policy wave reached Southeast Asia, including Malaysia. Petronas is currently still 
dominating the market. Last year, it was listed among the world’s largest companies. It owns 
the Engen Refinery (Enref) in South Africa through a majority shareholding in Engen 
Petroleum Ltd. Under Engen, Petronas is present in over 20 countries. It also exports its 
products to over 30 more countries, mostly in Africa and in the Indian Ocean Islands. By 
having around 1,500 service stations through Engen, Petronas operates all over sub-Saharan 
Africa and India (BERHAD 2014). In downstream oil production, most of Malaysia’s oil is 
exported to Japan, Thailand, South Korea and Singapore (Rahim & Liwan 2012, p. 265). 
Further, as the rest of ‘the next’ NICs in the region, Thailand also enjoyed an economic boom 
with a double-digit growth from 1988 to 1990 (Tang 2000, p. 99). One explanation for this 
was the industrial restructuring (Tang 2000, p. 101). The export of Thai products climbed 
since 1980—a trend led by private agribusinesses like Thailand’s CP. It is one of the largest 
internationalised Thai firms and is closely linked to prominent Thai politicians, and the 
group’s CEO, Dhanin Cheeravandona (Pananond & Zeithaml 1998, p. 168). CP was able to 
have subsidiaries in 20 countries and succeeded long after the 1950s; it was able to pass 
through the AFC (Ramamurti & Singh 2009, p. 169; Pananond & Zeithaml 1998, p. 167). Its 
business victory over the fluctuations in the global economy, according to Pananond and 
Zeithaml (1998, p. 169), was caused by many factors, including its responsiveness to the 
changing political and economic environment in Thailand, its maintaining of group cohesion, 
acquisition of advanced technology, achieving of market integration and strategic 
diversification.  
High levels of FDI from Japan and Northeast Asia fuelled this growth spurt. The trust that 
placed too heavily on the boom of NICs economy then ended chaotically. The decline in 
Japanese FDI in industrialising Asia in the early 1990s is one underlying factor in the region-
wide financial crisis of 1997-1998 because countries like Thailand, the epicentre of the 
‘meltdown’, replaced Japanese FDI with credit (Tselichtchev & Debroux 2012, p. 35). The 
miracle of Asian countries with high growth did not last long; they created more vulnerability 
(Stiglitz & Yusuf 2001, p. 65). The assumption was that economic growth would be sustained 
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at the higher levels of the late 1980s (Page 1994; World Bank 1993), which was not the case. 
The conglomerates went bankrupt and the high inflation hit almost every Southeast Asian 
country because of currency depreciation (Stiglitz & Yusuf 2001, p. 70-2).   
Industry in Asia, including in Southeast Asia, has not been conducted in the same manner as 
Western countries. If Western companies based on individualistic orientation and were 
established by professional contracts, then business in Asia work according to patron–client 
system. According to these firms, the principle of the economic man in the context of Asian 
industrialisation was questionable (Lasserre & Schütte 2006). This is because, first, family 
ties and community-based relations shaped interactions in Asian social, political and 
economic aspects. Second, as the consequence of these community-based relations, the value 
of power in terms of economy or politics leads to personal rather than professional 
connection. Third, the role of the state is highly significant, and it controls private and public 
matters at once. All those inquiries regarding the economic man in the Asian context was thus 
misunderstood by Western thinkers. Despite its shortcomings that influenced the AFC (i.e., 
corruption and abuse of power), those characteristics are also pivotal explanations of the 
Asian Miracle. 
2.2.2 The Developmental State and East Asian SOEs 
Yeung (2017a) highlighted that SOEs were the cornerstone of the developmental state’s 
initial industrialisation program and that many have been internationalised. Therefore, it is 
impossible to ignore SOEs in the discussion about the DSM. Many studies investigated the 
link between the DSM and SOEs. For example, Kim and Chung (2018) suggested that Asia’s 
economic model, which placed the state in the centre of the economy, might have been the 
reason behind the SOEs gaining prominence. This can be observed in the early history of 
Asian countries, including China, Singapore and Indonesia, who relied on SOEs in their 
nation building (Vietor and Thompson 2003, p.7). In the case of Taiwan and Singapore, 
SOEs became a key actor in both economies during DSM’s prime.  
In Singapore’s economic setting, GLCs (another type of SOE) have been long associated with 
the country’s development success. Even so, the case of Singapore’s SOE—Temasek—will 
be the focus of Chapter 6; it is still relevant to demonstrate here the context of GLCs in a 
tiger economy. The DSM that Singapore demonstrated can be better understood by 
understanding the role of GLCs in Singapore’s export-led industrialisation since the 1960s 
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(Zutshi and Gibbons 1998,p. 223), which was managed by the investment company, 
Temasek. Apart from other tiger economies, Singapore more heavily relied on its state than 
its private companies to promote its industrial growth (Zutshi & Gibbons 1998,p. 224). 
Having the GLCs assume the entrepreneurial role, government ownership is considered the 
key aspect of the DSM that is presented in Singapore’s economy.    
Despite being owned and led by the state apparatus (especially before the late 1990s) (Chwee 
Huat 1990, p.48), Temasek ran on a commercial basis, which was a factor that many 
subsidiaries listed in the stock market (Ramirez & Tan 2004, p. 511). Most of the national 
projects, including the industrial estates and infrastructural development, were completed by 
GLCs (Goldstein & Pananond 2008). The investor company also outperformed the private 
sectors, such as telecommunications, media, Jakarta Post al services and transport (Goldstein 
& Pananond 2008). Temasek has been an active, worldwide investor (Huat 2016).  
Today, Singapore is not alone. There is China, which has numerous SOEs globally. It is 
unsurprising that a growing body of literature has now investigated China’s SOEs (Gang 
2013; Luo et al. 2010; Horesh & Lim 2017; OECD 2016a; Lin 2015; Peng 2012). Most of 
those studies (Horesh & Lim 2017; Baek 2005; Xu 2012) highlighted the association between 
its SOEs and the development model. Gang (2013) affirmed that China’s SOEs have been 
key actors in strategic industries and sectors. The Chinese government gave them some 
privileges, such as access to the market (Kim & Chung 2018), licensing and government 
contracts (Gang 2013) and financial support (Xu 2012; Breslin 2007)—especially to strategic 
industries, like oil industries that are crucial to China’s economic growth (Xu 2012).  
This economic openness has brought reform to China’s SOEs. The largest example of this 
was the transfer of Chinese SOEs from the ministry to the State‐owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC). The Chinese government initially undertook 
massive SOE reform in the late 1990s by turning a subject to company law (Gang 2013). The 
third-largest momentum of China’s SOEs was the ‘go global policy’—one of China’s 
development plans (Luo et al. 2010; Horesh & Lim 2017). The marrying of national interest 
and economic efficiency was a part of China’s development strategy. Luo et al. (2010, p. 69) 
stated that: 
The early years of the 21st century have witnessed a growing awareness on the part 
of both government and Communist party leaders that globalization offers China an 
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opportunity to project its influence and power beyond the boundaries of the Chinese 
nation-state. 
But the one that joined such an international competitive market are the national champion. 
Those SOEs were merged and consolidated based on sectors after the implementation of the 
strategy ‘grasp the large and release the small’ by privatised the loss and small SOEs (Baek 
2005). They thus became large conglomerates. According to Breslin (2007, p. 52-53) and 
Baek (2005, p. 489), China might have been inspired to establish such business from the 
zaibatsu in Japan and Chaebol in Korea.  
In recent years, Beeson and Pham (2012) have conducted research on Vietnam’s SOEs from 
a DSM perspective. To explain the state-led development process in Vietnam, Beeson and 
Pham (2012) used two case studies of Vietnamese SOEs to explain the role of those two 
firms as agents of state-directed economic development. Beeson and Pham (2012) argued that 
state behaviour must be considered from a historical and geopolitical perspective. After the 
end of WWII, North Vietnam followed the one-party state—the command economy model of 
the Communist Bloc—and it shunned the capitalist global economy. At the end of the war 
with the US in 1975, the same model was enforced across a unified Vietnam, until the demise 
of the Soviet Union prompted a reorientation towards the capitalist West. Beeson and Pham 
(2012) noted that this was the time when capitalist economy merged with socialist principles. 
Like China, Vietnam pursued international market-oriented and state-led industrialisation, 
within a system of authoritarian one-party rule.  
Despite the support from the international and financial institution for assuring Vietnamese 
economic reform, the country can maintain a degree of autonomy regarding international 
agency prescriptions (Beeson & Pham 2012, p. 544). The country maintains an East Asian 
tradition of state-led and ‘interventionist’ public policy. According to Beeson and Pham 
(2012) and supported by Leftwich (1995) and Stubbs (2009), the government is still 
competent in guiding the direction and style of economic development, despite the lack of 
state capacity and ability to identify a developmental state. For Beeson and Pham (2012), 
Vietnam is a positive model of developmentalism. 
In East Asia’s general experience, any attempt to separate between politics and economics is 
problematic. In Vietnam, the state had the economic development role. After the 1997 crisis, 
Vietnam had experienced some reform of its SOEs, much like other Southeast Asian 
countries (Beeson & Pham 2012). By then, there were two notable indications. First, there 
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was a sharing of ownership over the SOEs. Second, the state still possessed the 40 per cent 
shares. The anticipation of observing Vietnamese SOEs being transferred from state to 
private seemed misjudged. Rather than being ‘free’, the state power became formalised and 
centralised over legal and managerial reform (Beeson & Pham 2012). 
The other notable aspect of Vietnamese SOEs is the strategy of extending the business 
capacity of the SOEs by merging the national champions with local firms, such as Thang 
Long Cement. The rest, which were considered weak or unprofitable, have been equitised, 
sold or liquidated. Many that escaped from being equitised were incorporated into General 
Corporation 90 and 91 (two of the biggest SOE groups). Although it was difficult to trace 
China’s influence on Vietnam after 1979, it is noticeable that SOE management in both 
countries mirrored each other. SOE reform in Vietnam more closely followed a ‘Beijing 
consensus’ rather than the ‘Washington consensus’ (Beeson & Pham 2012).  
Beeson and Pham (2012) also found that state-run firms in Vietnam treated the state as their 
principal consumer, in return for monopolistic or oligopolistic rights and favourable 
involvement in national key projects. Beeson and Pham (2012, p. 540) noted that the SOEs 
were placed within the heart of Vietnam’s developmental strategy. Each SOE was an arm of 
the government, and the government and SOEs existed in a symbiotic relationship (Beeson & 
Pham 2012, p. 551-2).  
Beeson and Pham (2012) demonstrated the DSM’s continuing appeal. The persistence of 
state-led developmentalism in the case of Vietnam, through its SOEs, is useful for examining 
the same situation in the Indonesian context. SOE policies in Vietnam and Indonesia share 
some characteristics. For instance, even after the AFC, Vietnam did not privatise its SOEs; it 
maintained them instead, due to their importance in the strategic sectors of Vietnam’s 
economy. Nevertheless, there are significant differences. The Vietnamese state’s equity in its 
SOEs is still lower compared to the Indonesian standard of 51 per cent of the company’s 
shares, which makes the state financially more powerful than public shareholders. 
2.3 The Conceptualisation of EMMNCs 
Why should there be renewed interest in EMMNCs? One reason could be the consequence of 
the growing size and influence of corporations and corporate business networks over the past 
half century. Debate regarding EMMNC theory has been increasing, particularly in recent 
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years. There are studies, as mentioned above, that have claimed that EMMNC is similar to 
the old MNC—such as Dunning, Kim & Park (2008, p. 158) and Dicken (2011, p. 3) who 
believed that the ownership of the means of production and the national origins of a business 
firm are totally irrelevant. However, more expertise explored the specific characteristics of 
EMMNCs. For that reason, this part of EMMNC theory will highlight the discourse regarding 
the nature of EMMNCs and the motives for expanding.  
The latest studies by Hennart (2018), Demirbag and Yaprak (2015), Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Ramamurti (2014), Marinov and Marinova (2013), Peng (2012), Marinov et al. (2012), 
Ramamurti (2012), Rajah et al. (2010), Gammeltoft et al. (2010), Goldstein (2009), Dunning 
(2007) and the author (together with Arfani [Arfani, R & Bachtiar, F.(eds) 2013]), the co-
editor of Economic Powerhouse of the South: Emergence and Transformation of Developing 
Countries MNCs,seek to explain the rise and expansion of EMMNCs.  
To understand EMMNC, it is important to know the difference between MNC and 
EMMNCs. In a broader sense, Gilpin & Gilpin’s (2000) defined MNC as a company that has 
headquarters in its country of origin and at least one international branch or affiliate in a host 
country. While a definition provided by Yeung (1994) defined EMMNC as a domestic 
corporation with headquarters outside the OECD that controls the assets and/or influences the 
decision-making process of one or more branches, cross-border businesses and/or venture 
partners. This second definition might be identical to the general concept of MNC by Gilpin 
& Gilpin. 
However, the distinction lies behind the two: the subject and object of the capital flight of the 
investment. EMMNCs refer to the MNCs that arise from developing nations (home 
countries), which have subsidiaries in developing or even developed countries. The FDI 
destination and origin has substantially separated EMMNC from prior MNC. At a minimum, 
the nature of the home country economy is typically different, which can affect the method 
and behaviour of home countries in foreign investment activities. This is what this thesis 
regards as an EMMNC characteristic. Several studies—such as Heenan and Keegan (1979), 
Lall (1982), Li (2003), Luo and Tung (2007), Goldstein (2007), Ying (2008), Gammeltoft 
(2008, 2009), Ramamurti and Singh (2009), Gammeltoft et al. (2010), Marinov and Marinova 
(2013), Rajah et al. (2010) (see Table 2-2)—addressed the characteristics of EMMNCs. Even 
Dunning (2007), who tended to regard MNCs and EMMNCs as similar, still acknowledged 
that developed and developing countries have emerged from different contexts and features. 
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A developed country’s MNC that was dominated by the private sectors has been expanding 
with both horizontal and vertical FDI from capitalistic economies. Developing countries’ FDI 
has just emerged in the Jakarta Post –globalisation era, in search for a market that is close to 
their boundaries. 
Despite that many studies address EMMNCs, there is no consensus among scholars regarding 
whether EMMNCs are different than MNCs and how to define them. This thesis thus 
proposes four determinants to identifying and understanding EMMNCs, based on prior 
literature: a) Country Specific Advantage (CSA), b) Firm Specific Advantage (FSA), c) 
motivation and d) FDI type. However, this thesis goes beyond the FSA and CSA theories to 
give a clear and contextual picture of the case study, with some elaboration of the concepts 
from various scholars regarding management, economics and IPE studies (see Table 2-3). 
CSA is evident at the country situation such as national capacity, state policies and the 
international economic context. Whereas FSA focuses on the company level like ownership, 
management and technology. 
CSA includes political, economic, cultural or financial strengths, as well as the natural 
resources or human resources that a country possesses, known as the ‘diamond’ of the home 
country. For example, in terms of political advantage, being politically stable is a key 
advantage that allows a company’s confidence to shift its attention of offshore opportunities, 
if it is assured that investments are safe at home. Similarly, the tariff and non-tariff policies 
also become crucial in the context of economic factors and crucial to economic capacity and 









Table 2-2 Outward FDI from Emerging Economies. 
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Goldstein (2009) argued that strong ties between governments and the firms are significant to 
explain the rise of EMMNCs. An example would be Chinese firms that have expanded 
rapidly after the Chinese Communist Party adopted China’s ‘go global’ policy12 (Gammeltoft 
et al., 2010). Ultimately, the state has a crucial part to play in the development and expansion 
of companies in which the government acts as ‘supporter and organizer of technology 
networks’ (Duysters et al. 2009). This argument is also confirmed by the literature from 
Marinov and Marinova (2013). 
Table 2-3 EMMNCs Characteristics  
Context Indicators Description 
Country-specific 
advantage 
(mostly home country)   
Regulatory environment  Weak institutions, including 
property right regime and legal 
system—but states are highly 
supportive (e.g., ‘go global’ 
policy) 
 Economic environment  Poor infrastructure and high 
growth of the economy and 
consumption, massive 
infrastructure development, 
large consumers both in home 
and global markets, an 
integrated market system and 
free-entry barriers  
 Cultural Environment   Family/community values and 
flexibility of networks 
Firm-Specific Advantage  Business capacity  
 
Weak competitive advantage 
and limited assets, dominated 
                                                             
12
 The ‘go global policy’ is a Chinese government policy started in 1999 to push the country’s national 
champion companies to advance their competitiveness by expanding overseas. This policy includes giving 
incentives and financial support to Chinese companies (Luo & Tung 2007) As Luo, Xue and Han (2010) 
described it: 
‘To curtail these problems and achieve the ‘go global’ mission, the central government made changes in 
areas relating to OFDI, including (1) the creation of incentives for OFDI, (2) streamlining administrative 
procedures (including decentralization of authority to local levels of government), (3) easing capital 
controls, (4) the provision of information and guidance on investment opportunities, and (5) reducing 
political and investment risks’. 
However, the SOEs obtained more privilege than private companies in this particular policy setting (Guo 




by medium scale 
 Performance  Adopted corporate governance, 
follower in innovation  
 Technology  Not possessing advanced 
technology  
 Ownership  Public (state-owned) and 
private (small or large) 
Motivation  market/resource/asset/efficie
ncy seeking 
Asset seeking, but many took 
market seeking as well 
Type of FDI  Horizontal or vertical  Horizontal and vertical in 
strong and distinctive relational 
structures (e.g., Chaebol and 
Keiretsu) 
 Heenan and Keegan (1979), Lall (1982), Li (2003), Dunning and Lin (2007), Luo and Tung (2007), Goldstein 
(2007), Ying (2008), Gammeltoft (2008), Duysters et al. (2009), Ramamurti and Singh (2009), Gammeltoft et 
al. (2010), Marinov and Marinova (2013), Rajah et al. (2010), Dunning et al. (1996), Gammeltoft et al. (2012) 
Aykut and Goldstein (2006) and Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) 
 
Dunning (2007) cited government policies as one of the central factors transforming firms 
from EMs to expanding globally. As such, the firm’s expansion relies much on the 
government’s role, including what Dunning exposed as national objectives and economic 
competitiveness. This thesis must also relate to Dunning’s (2007) research on firms, as he 
offered an eclectic paradigm for explaining EMMNC activity through ownership–location–
internalisation (OLI). Yet, Dunning’s theory may failed to explain the leapfrogging of stages 
which Ems undertook in order to internationalise.  
Regarding the economic determinants, several studies have reported that EMs are widely 
known for their poor infrastructure (Athukorala 2007; OECD 2016a). EMMNCs face a more 
challenging set of global circumstances than developed-country MNCs, in that competition is 
fiercer and developed-country competitors are far ahead in terms of innovation, processes and 
networking (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008, p. 957). On a positive note, EMs might be 
enabled with a high-growth economy and growing consumption at home with government 
protections, and in the global market (World Bank 2011; IMF 2016). These advantages can 
help EMMNCs develop infrastructure (UNCTAD 2007; Hill & Gochoco-Bautista 2013), 
become a part of the integrated market system and expand without barriers (Dunning 2007).  
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The integration of the global economy thus enhanced the EMs to be significant players. 
Duysters et al. (2009) even argued that the internationalisation of EMMNCs starts from its 
response to globalisation. As IMF defined, globalisation is the result of human innovation 
and technological progress (IMF 2008). Consequently, globalisation then integrated the 
economy in terms of the exchange of goods, services and capital. The more mobile the 
activities across boundaries are, the greater the possibilities for profits and power sharing 
among countries that could lead EMMNCs to participate. Indeed, internationalisation become 
EMMNCs strategy to overcome the intense competition that is a consequence of 
globalisation. 
2.3.1.1 Modelling EMMNC Advantages 
The FSA is defined as the internal factors that influence a company’s decision to invest 
internationally (Rugman and Verbeke 2001, p. 243). According to Rugman and Verbeke 
(2001, p. 238), there are two types of FSA: the functional production and organisational 
capability. The first type relates to propriety assets like technology, manufacturing, marketing 
and know-how. Organisational capability includes coordination and asset control (Rugman & 
Verbeke 2001, p. 283). This kind of company advantage, although authentic, contrasts with 
the CSA, as it is transferable between the home and the host countries (Rugman 2006, p. 20). 
This transferability is beneficial for the company to copy or move their competitiveness from 
their home to their host countries.  
South Korea’s global expansion was a result of what Lee and Lim (2001, p. 50) refer to as 
imitation innovation—the technological regime that provides a catching-up ladder and 
leapfrogging catching-up patterns. This organisational capacity enabled companies to adapt 
their business structures; it borrowed ideas from successful Western companies and adapted 
these for Korean social and cultural conditions. This performance capability influenced 
corporate governance and innovation and enabled Korea, and subsequently Southeast Asian 
industrialisers, to catch-up.  
FSA focuses on a firm’s business capacity. This capacity, however, is not only limited to the 
economic value of the company or its asset; it also reflects the production capacity, market 
share, sales and profit. Usually, EMMNCs have a weak competitive advantage and limited 
assets, and dominated by medium-scale (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti 2014). Despite that 
they were able to turn into a key player in the sector and compete with MNCs from 
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developed economies through acquiring assets or by taking over their competitors (World 
Bank 2011; Dunning 2007).  
To add to their weak performance, EMMNCs are still followers in terms of technology, with 
some who succeeded to compete the developed MNCs. However, this situation was not 
always a disadvantage for EMMNCs. Although they possessed usually lower technology 
capacity (Duysters et al. 2009; Lall 1983; Yeung 1994) than their counterparts from 
developed economies, many have discovered new ways of efficient technology that fits their 
EMs market. Williamson (2014, p. 157) called this ‘cost innovation’. This relates to the 
accumulation of new expertise inside the firm that is crucial to determine the firm’s direction 
and success in the long term (Pananond & Zeithaml 1998). 
Additionally, the ownership of the company is also vital for identifying EMMNCs and 
distinguishing them from MNCs. This is because the ownership reflects the strategic decision 
that was made within the company, including where to invest the capital or other factors than 
just economic reasons. Strange (1992, p. 61) highlighted that: 
It used to be thought that internationalism was the preserve of the large, privately 
owned Western ‘multinational’ or transnational corporations. Today, thanks to the 
imperatives of structural change, these have been joined by many smaller firms, and 
also by state-owned enterprises and firms based in developing countries. Thus it is 
not the phenomenon of the transnational corporation that is new, but the changed 
balance between firms working only for a local or domestic market, and those 
working for a global market and in part producing in countries other than their 
original home base. 
However, the structural change as Strange mentioned above began in the 1980s, when private 
companies from East Asia emerged (Strange 1992, p. 62). Preceding the new millennium, 
little evidence has been found on MNC SOE. Conversely, for the past couple years, there has 
been a growing number of developing-country SOEs expanding overseas (Dunning & 
Lundan 2008, p. 28). The typical SOE is a legally autonomous entity that operates along 
commercial lines but is owned in whole or in part by a government, as it first established by 
state capital (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014; Ramamurti 1987). Many companies, although they 
are hybrid entities between state and private (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014), are directed at a 
greater or lesser distance by a national government. In line with this second type of firm, Luo 
and Tung (2007) highlighted that this kind of EMMNC operates on political objectives by 
their home government instead of corporate returns. According to Strange (on Frieden, Lake 
& Lake 2002), such firms were created to win a share of global markets for the benefit of 
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wealth generation at home, which Dicken (2011, p.22) named as a state’s basic economic 
goal.  
For being an SOE, most EMMNCs deprive in making a hard choice between state-driven and 
market-driven agents, as they were somehow born to prefer both—which Collinson and Sun 
(2012) coined as a hybrid actor. There are two main factors in making the role of an SOE in a 
developing country become crucial. The first factor is the level of economic development 
among developing countries. This factor is substantial in determining the needs of the country 
to have a specific governmental body where it works to achieve developmental goals. The 
lower the development capacity of the country, the bigger role the SOE plays in pursuing the 
strategy of catching up. Most likely, the SOE that has the biggest role is the national 
champions. Second, the component that defines the diversity of SOE in countries is the 
history of economy and politics (Kirkpatrick 2014; OECD 2015c, p. 11).). The OECD report 
on State-Owned Enterprises in the Development Process argued that the path dependency 
matters in exposing a country to depend on state enterprises. If the country has a long history 
of socialism or a central, planned economy, then they presumably have SOEs by default. For 
the country that had only been committed for the developmental mandate, the creation of 
SOEs is part of a proactive strategy (OECD 2015c, p. 11).  
Following the CSA and FSA, the third determinant is the motivation of EMMNCs to go 
global. This key determinant of internationalisation focuses on the host country. It relates to 
what the company or home country had and did not have (driven factor); it can be market 
seeking, resource seeking, or asset/efficiency seeking (Harrison & Rodríguez-Clare 2009; 
Marinov & Marinova 2013). The driven factor then affected the selection of the host country. 
Additionally, the FDI distribution will show the geography of EMMNCs. Generally, in 
contrast with MNCs from developed-world countries, EMMNCs tend to be regional rather 
than global, except for systemically significant global companies that operate in all world 
regions, such as in motor vehicle assembly, ICT and mining (Dicken 2011 p. 164; Gilpin & 
Gilpin 2000, p. 181). This is because developed countries tend to expand based on market or 
resource seeking due to their limited market and resources, while EMMNCs prioritise asset 
seeking instead. However, numerous EMMNCs today are motivated by market seeking FDI; 
the global companies in Southeast Asia and China have been choosing this path of expansion 
regardless of their large market (Hiratsuka & 平塚大祐 2006, p. 5) because of the 
competitive market that they encountered at their home market. In many cases, this 
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consequently pushed the company to cut the production cost such as transport. It is important 
to note that the factor of production cost is affected by a better access to the market or the 
benefit of low wages. If the motive to expand overseas arises from having access to closer 
markets, then it becomes market-seeking FDI (Hiratsuka & 平塚大祐 2006, p.4). Hiratsuka 
and 平塚大祐 (2006, p.1) described it as so: 
The supposition is that when export expands until total transport costs become 
large, suppliers will move their production facilities to a nearby overseas market, in 
order to reduce operating costs. Otherwise, suppliers would lose their market due to 
global competition. 
The last factor that must be accounted for is the type of FDI that EMMNCs pick. This 
different type of FDI links with the motivation to undertake internationalisation. Broadly 
speaking, EMMNCs transform into global competitors through two strategies: vertical or 
horizontal business. The process of the firm becoming an EMMNC started from its capability 
to improve its quality by establishing a new management model and entering new sectors as 
it transforms into a holding or conglomerate (Duysters et al. 2009). Vertical integration 
means vertically integrated, that the whole production process is made into separated 
production units (Frieden & Lake 2003) that earn the profits previously earned by suppliers, 
which makes this strategy of integration closely linked to efficiency seeking. There are some 
considerations for why companies undergo this process to internationalise, which include the 
nature of the production process, the complexity of technology, economies of scale, the speed 
of technical change and the evolution of demand (Lim & Fong 1982, p. 590). Simply put, the 
company is entitled to high levels of flexibility (Chandler & Mazlish 2005, p.30), but it can 
concurrently control the resources (Dunning & Lundan 2008, p. 165). It is not surprising that 
most vertical FDI is done by a ‘footloose’ industry (Blomstrom & Kokko 1996,p. 27) or the 
industry with characteristics of labour-intensive processes and component specialisation 
(Blomstrom & Kokko 1996,p.25).  
Conversely, most EMMNCs used the second method—horizontal strategy, or horizontally 
diversified, in which the production process from start to finish is completed in one country 
(Athukorala 2007) usually through an acquisition, merger or strategic alliance (Dunning & 
Lundan 2008). This strategy usually picks to expand the market (Dicken 2011) or market 
seeking (Marinov et al. 2012). Conversely, this type of FDI also minimises the costs of 
production or boosting host-country revenue productivity compared to separate management 
(Frieden & Lake, 2003).  
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By the explanation above, it is evident that the difference between the horizontal and vertical 
method are influenced by the motivation and strategy that the company chooses. The 
motivation factor and type of FDI thus explain each other. Usually, EMMNCs undertook 
horizontal instead of vertical FDI (Walter & Sen 2009, p. 198). This is because EMs do not 
need efficiency seeking or low-cost production which usually achieved through vertical FDI 
to secure the market because they already have low-skilled labours and abundant resources. 
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Chapter 3: The Significance of Indonesia’s Case 
This chapter illustrates the shifts in Indonesia’s political economy since independence, 
highlighting the different emphases and preferences of successive Indonesian presidents—
from Sukarno (1950–1965) to the current incumbent (at time of writing), Jokowi (2014–
present). It provides the economic and political context for the emergence of PT Semen 
Indonesia. Although the basis for privately owned conglomerates like the Salim Group or 
Lippo Group, Indonesia is far behind Singapore and even Thailand in terms of capital 
investment overseas (OECD 2016a). To understand EMMNCs, it is important to bear in mind 
that they have not emerged in a policy vacuum; they come from the complex industrialisation 
process in which state support is decisive. Departing from model of developed country MNCs 
in which industrialisation is posited as the driver for comapny formation, this thesis explains 
how EMMNCs fostered industrialization in Asia, led by the state. Thus, an overview of the 
Asian pattern of industrialization helps to illustrate the early emergence of EMMNC which 
generally originate from the region. In fact, the vital point of understanding the empirical 
context is exploring the policy and state agendas of development which will be the centre 
point of this thesis.   
3.1 Indonesia Political Economy Changes and Evolution 
Mishra (2015) advises that instead of thinking about Indonesian economic trends in linear 
terms, the direction of change must be viewed as a dynamic of transition, where development 
is growing faster and where global influences have been present for centuries. At the same 
time, there has always been a significant element of state control and state-supported 
monopolistic practices in the evolution of the Indonesian economy. As trade and investment 
began to globalise in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the era of European mercantile 
expansion began. One of the oldest and most prominent proto- multinational conglomerates 
was the Dutch East India Company owned by Dutch merchants, the Heeren 17, and chartered 
by the Dutch state. This company established agreements and gradually secured monopoly 
trade rights with port cities along the seas route from Europe to island Southeast Asia (Gilpin 
& Gilpin 2001; Irwin 1991). Java was the hub of Dutch political and economic power from 
the early days of the Dutch East India Company’s ‘infiltration’ of the Indonesian Archipelago 
and this is where infrastructure development occurred earliest and became most advanced 
(Booth 1998). The Dutch East India Company was followed by the similarly chartered British 
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East India Company, which established strongholds in India and on the Malay Peninsula, and 
they defined the mercantile model of colonial trade until the nineteenth century, when direct 
state control was exerted over colonial territories and modern joint stock corporations came 
to predominate.  
The long period of Dutch colonialism had a huge effect on Indonesia’s economy (Lindblad, 
JT 2010). Before and since its independence, Indonesia’s economy has been mostly reliance 
to foreign capital (Oei 1969, p. 42; Dieleman 2007, p. 60). In the liberal economic theory, 
foreign capital (or FDI) is considered a productivity booster. The transfer of various 
requirements of economic development that is trusted for being able to bring the spill over 
effect, such as know-how, skills, money, technology and innovation from one country 
(usually who was developed who has all those requirements) to another (one mainly 
developing nations). Having said that, the spill over effect of FDI needs time to occur. 
However, foreigner involvement in the economy has always been a tense debate among 
Indonesians, both in grassroot groups and the government (Roberts et al. 2015, p. 59).  
Indonesian economic policy was defined by its concern for development at home and for 
national control over the country’s economic assets. During the era of President Soekarno 
(1949–1965), state economic policy prioritised the production of basic needs and export 
industries will be managed by state enterprises (Booth 1998). Hence, Indonesian 
development followed an economic–nationalist path. All the enterprises that belonged to the 
Dutch were nationalised, under Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution, which granted the 
state control over the management of all economic resources, including the land, water, 
forests, fisheries, energy and minerals (Booth 1998). The Foreign Investment Law 1958, the 
country’s first such law, highlighted eight areas that FDI inflows excluded: railways, 
telecommunications, shipping and aviation, electrical power stations, irrigation and water, 
gun power and weapons, atomic power stations and mining (1958). Mining and irrigation 
were erased from the next foreign investment law, while mass media was eventually 
included.  
In the ensuing era of General Suharto, foreign investment was encouraged, but with a strong 
preference for local Indonesian shareholding in foreign companies (Oei 1969, p. 40). The 
democratic system was tightly controlled—with its power orchestrated through the state 
party, Golkar—and it was supported by the military. While retaining a strong nationalistic 
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orientation, the Indonesian state encouraged market-led economic development that was 
supported by rising oil prices until the mid-1980s (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006, p. 345). 
After WWII, multinational corporations from the US expanded into Asia and Europe, as the 
US assumed its hegemonic role in the liberal international order (Gilpin & Gilpin 2001). In 
the 1980s, with the growth of global capital markets and transnational capital flows, Western 
FDI in Asia climbed—but, after decades of state-directed industrialisation, the emergence of 
Asian multinational corporations as significant competitors also signalled a ‘global shift’ in 
economic influence (Gilpin & Gilpin 2001; Dicken 2011).  
During the Cold War, the Suharto presidency signified the victory of capitalist democracy or 
economics over politics and rationality over patrimonialism (Hadiz & Robison 2005). 
Suharto placed his trust on the Western-educated economists who believed in Western 
economic superiority (Liddle 1991, p.412). The previous economic condition, as mentioned 
above, was difficult. Foreign investment was ultimately one of the pivotal funding schemes 
for accelerating the economic development that was relied on US and Japan. Trade and the 
national economy were liberalised to invite foreign investors (Lindblad 2015, p. 219). Debt 
from international agencies flowed into many sectors and the physical infrastructure was 
rapidly constructed. The major change was the foreign investment law. It included open-
handed tax concessions to the foreign investors (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006, p. 341).  
This Investment Law (1967) was issued to provide the investors with benefits and incentives. 
Despite the advantages of foreign investment, there were some conditionality in conducting 
business, which was restricted to the 1967 law. For example, the investment must be in the 
form of joint ventures. The portion of state equity also needed to expand to 75 per cent from 
51 per cent. However, this was not until Suharto came into power and legislated the Mining 
Basic Regulation, which thereafter sent Freeport to Indonesia. Freeport was a signed contract, 
in which the company had a right to explore the most resource-rich region in the world. 
Successfully searching, in 1988 Freeport finally discovered gold and copper in Papua and 
started its operation. The Freeport company in Indonesia then embarked the foreign hunt for 
natural resources in Indonesia (Vaswani 2011). 
A year later, the Indonesian government also enacted the Domestic Investment Law 1968. 
This act implied to the Chinese descant (non-bumiputra), who concurrently held domestic 
investment the most (Oei 1969). With this new regulation, any sectors opened for private 
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sectors would be tax free in five years, commencing from the enactment in some productive 
fields. Many articles stated that investments had not been a subject to any property tax and 
were waived from import duties (Pangestu 1991, p. 95). 
In general, the period of the 1970s to 1980s was remarkable. The economic structure was 
polarised between liberalist and nationalist. It revealed how the interest was pulled and 
pushed between domestic versus foreign capital, Chinese and pribumi, state and private and 
small-scale and large-scale capital (Pangestu, & Habir 1989, p. 234; Liddle, R. W. and R. 
Mallarangeng (1997, p. 111). According to Robison (2009), the 1980s phase indicated four 
major outlooks on investment. First, the large-scale investments were in for the oil and gas 
industry. Second, the law instrument of investment was contained under the foreign capital 
investment law, which extended to agriculture, forestry, mining, manufacturing and tertiary 
areas. Third, in facilitating and managing the investment by the Chinese descent, the new law 
under the first act issued was called the Domestic Capital Investment Law 1968. Fourth, the 
small-scale industry, such as petty trade and the cottage industry, were being supported by 
being given trade concessions; this promoted under the Company Regulation Ordinance of 
1934 as a part of the old Dutch Law (Robison 2009, p. 197-8).  
For three decades of his presidency, to assure his control over politics and economics, 
Suharto presided over a regime that relied on patron–client connections (Resosudarmo & 
Kuncoro 2006). Political stability was achieved at the expense of popular legitimacy and it 
could only be sustained with continued economic growth to absorb the demands of a growing 
population. In the context of Indonesia, state decision-making processes involved the 
interplay of three influencer groups: technocrats, technicians and patrimonialists 
(Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006, Liddle 1991).  
The technocrats were the pro-market economists who were educated in Western campuses 
and were worked as the economic professors from the University of Indonesia (Liddle 1991).  
They were appointed as Suharto’s economic advisors and were given key positions within the 
policymaking process, such as the Head of Bappenas or Ministry of Finance (Kuntjorjakti 
1988, p. 193; Liddle & Mallarangeng 1997, p.111). The technicians were also in a shared 
position with the technocrats in the economic policymaking. However, they came from 
different educational backgrounds. Trained as engineers, these figures were led by Ginanjar 
Kartasasmita and Habibie, who were called nationalists because of their state-led 
development thinking (Soesastro 1989, p. 858; Liddle 1991, p. 147). This shared position 
63 
between the technocrats and technicians sometimes created a tension that the patrimonialists 
took advantage of. Patrimonialists are known as politicians around Suharto with 
Sudharmono—the secretary of state—as one of their key persons, who enjoyed patronage for 
economic gain (Soesastro 1989, p. 859).  
All these groups compete for Suharto’s favour, which narrowed the pool of ideas for how 
Indonesia was governed. The consequence of this was that the rising foreign debt and the 
accumulation of private wealth by Suharto, his family and key supporters went unchecked. 
During Suharto’s abuse of power, Pertamina was the main source of Suharto’s portage fund, 
together with the State Logistic Agency (BULOG) and family and cronies’ businesses 
(Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006). Through them, Suharto benefited in his personal wealth and 
power support. This structural weakness was not considered serious enough to bring potential 
costs such as economic crisis in the future (MacIntyre et al. 2008). One of the closest of 
Suharto’s cronies was Liem Sioe Liong (Sudono Salim). With Lim, Suharto mutually shared 
his economic power by giving the state contracts and opportunities to Lim’s business in 
various sectors, along with Suharto’s import–substitution economy in his early days 
(Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006; Sato 1993).  
Triggered by events elsewhere in Asia, Indonesia’s economic crisis in 1997–1998 exposed 
the weaknesses of the Suharto regime (MacIntyre et al. 2008). The high economy growth, 
low inflation and non-oil export were principally boosted by ‘short-run’ factors such as 
subsidy, physical infrastructure and the production of import-relied products (Nasution 2000). 
Recession followed the crisis because of the rupiah devaluation and dramatic rise of interest 
rates. The Suharto administration was incapable of handling the economic hardship and lost 
integrity. A Letter of Intent (LOI) with the IMF led to the implementation of ‘stabilisation’ 
and market openness (Nasution 2000). These events supposedly signified the end of so-called 
‘crony capitalism’—which, to Western analysts, was synonymous with developmentalism. 
A few months before the fall of Suharto, the barrier to running the palm oil business was 
abolished. President Instruction (INPRES) Number 6 1998, regarding the foreign investment 
in the palm oil industry was released (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro 2006). That president 
instruction was a justification of the investment inflow promotion of foreign companies in the 
palm oil sector. By passing the law, the government claimed it had given investors business 
certainty and created supportive atmosphere. Even so, the economic downturn in 1997 started 
from the crisis in financial sector to political turmoil created significant distrust from 
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investors. The FDI amount slumped. The Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board’s 
(BKPM) approval over investment diminished by less than half, in contrast with the number 
of FDI in 1977 (Lindblad 2015, p. 227). The inauguration of Habibie returned the 
liberalisation of investment. The foreign takeover in the Indonesian banking system was 
approved in May 1999. The foreign banks were also welcomed to open branches anywhere 
across the country (Lindblad 2015, p. 228). The effect of the 1997 AFC in the next five to six 
years still foreshadowed the Indonesian economy, even after Suharto’s fall. It also applied to 
investment. The recovery took time, especially to return investor confidence.  
The consequences of the political crisis of 1997, specifically its consequence to economic 
downturn, were significant. The conglomerates were no longer dominated—at least, not to 
the same degree that they had been during Suharto’s period (Dieleman 2007, p. 88). The 
collapse of the Suharto government following the financial crisis of 1997 forced many 
Indonesian privately owned businesses to escape political economic turmoil inside Indonesia 
by relocating to neighbour countries, like Singapore or Malaysia (Dieleman 2007, p. 90; Al-
Fadhat 2017, p. 128). The conglomerates also tried to maintain a low profile. They 
understood that the situation was not beneficial for them, especially after they escaped from 
paying the debt. The uproar of the Indonesian public was despised by any group that was 
affiliated with Suharto (Dieleman & Sachs 2008, p. 1290-91). However, being unseen and 
keeping a low profile for more than decade, the conglomerate tried to find their way back to 
influencing the Indonesian economy. However, this will not be the focus of this thesis. This 
thesis will instead focus on how Indonesia managed its economy after private conglomerates 
relocated outside Indonesia and the correlations between Indonesia’s rapid growth and 
massive economic expansion, to the trend of its SOEs to go global.  
MacIntyre et al. (2008, p. 2) observed that even after the crisis, none of the countries in South 
East Asia implemented wide-ranging liberal economic reforms. Some industrial sectors were 
opened up to greater foreign investment, including as will be discussed the Indonesian 
cement sector. However, in Indonesia notably, despite claims that it was more liberalised and 
a visibly open economy and moving in the direction of the liberal capitalist ideal, still held to 
its economic nationalism. In every aspect of Indonesian periods of leadership, all have been 
globalised; however, Indonesia still implemented state-centric policies. Considering the 
nationalists view among Indonesian officials and scholars has been presented since a long 
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ago on the point of independence ideas (Hill 2000, p. 95). Presently, there are still highly 
anti-Western sentiments in Indonesian society. 
After three decades of Suharto’s presidency, Indonesians were longing of having a new 
democratically elected president. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from the National 
Awakening Party won the indirect election and transformed Indonesia in his eccentric way, 
which included his large cabinet, numerous reshuffles and numerous official visits (Burton 
2002). The cabinet matter, for example, was intentionally made for political consolidation 
rather than economical solution.  
During his period in 1999, Gus Dur created Dewan Ekonomi Nasional (DWN), or the 
National Economic Council. This institution was appointed to be Gus Dur’s economic 
advisory. According to Soesastro (2000, p.318), the situation might be related to Gus Dur’s 
lack of economical understanding. The coordinating minister of economy, finance and 
industry was Kwik Kian Gie. At the time when Gus Dur was still in charge, the reformation-
born institution Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was reformed and the 
bank of Indonesia officially became an independent agency (Soesastro 2000, p.400-1). The 
government that was supported by the IMF undertook a three-year economic agenda of a 
medium-term macroeconomic framework, to restructure policies, rebuild economic 
institutions and improve natural resource management (Soesastro 2000, p. 141).  
Ultimately, apart from what Liddle stated about his mismanaging of Indonesian economic 
recovery and estranging the pro-democracy activists (MacIntyre et al. 2008, p. 235), Gus Dur 
had substantially promoted multiethnic and religious tolerance among Indonesians. He 
contrarily placed the fundamental pillar of democracy—multiculturalism and pluralism 
(Patunru and Von Luebke 2010, p. 9). The National Food Logistics Agency (BULOG) 
corruption scandal led to his downfall in 2001 (Roberts et al. 2015, p.78-9). 
The impeachment of Gus Dur was a turning point of Indonesian presidential election. For the 
first time in the history, Megawati Soekarno Putri (Mega) acted as the first woman president 
of the country, even surpassed the history of any other country in the region. During her 
period, the international situation was in crisis. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 
and US Global War on Terror raised a national reaction in Indonesia. As the biggest Moslems 
population, most Indonesians were opposed US unilateral foreign policy. Yet, Megawati 
instead was on the side of President Bush (Roberts et al. 2015, p.79).  
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Despite the debate of Indonesian Islamic identity and position towards the case of terrorism, 
the macro economy under Megawati tend to become more stable than previous period of Gus 
Dur (Roberts et al. 2015, p.79). Despite the debate of Indonesian Islamic identity and position 
towards the case of terrorism following 9/11, the macro economy became more stable 
(Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p. 36). The positive outlook could be observed from the Rupiah 
exchange rate to US dollars, which was 12,000 rupiahs for 1 US$ during Habibie to 9,500 
rupiahs in the period of Gus Dur. The economy slowly recovered and the confidence for 
business had strengthened. The Indonesian debt ratio also dropped, following the fiscal 
reform (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p. 36-7). The other good news was related to the positive 
number of public consumption, the fall of the unemployment rate and poverty reduction to 
the pre-crisis time (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p.38).  
But the economic optimism not turned back until the direct general election in 2004. It was 
when the recuperation truly came into being. The international community, particularly 
investors, considered this an opportunity to invest (Lindblad 2015, p. 230). The economic 
outlook was boosted by investment rather than consumption. The investment sector this time 
emphasised infrastructure more. The old law was considered insufficient to boost the 
investment, thus the new law on investment and tax enacted to cover broader sectors 
(Boediono 2005, p. 311-12). In 2005, SBY initially planned to revise the legislation and 
restructure the role of the BKPM together with the reform of investment procedure (Lindblad 
2015, p. 229). The FDI Law 2007 stated that global economy changes and Indonesia’s 
participation in many international institutions urgently needed a conducive, certain, fair and 
efficient system for the foreign investors (Indonesia 2007b). However, the investment issued 
under SBY faced fluctuating interest. Despite the new investment law, the government listed 
more forbidden areas for foreign capital ownership. In 2009, the mining law was launched. 
As a surprise to the international community, Indonesia included a time limit for foreign 
companies’ operation and demanded that they implement more value-added activities 
(Acharya 2014, p.34). In practice, the financial crisis of 2008 had not affected Indonesia’s 
inward FDI as much as the crisis of 1998 (Lindblad 2015, p.231).  
In the SBY era, Indonesia had experienced political and economic stability after it struggled 
with the reformation transition phase. In SBY’s term, Acharya (2014) argued, Indonesia was 
at the turning point of a political and economic situation. According to Acharya (2014), this 
occurred due to three main reasons. First, it was the phase when Indonesia finally 
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transformed into a more solid condition after the political and economic crisis in the 1990s, 
particularly in the democracy context. SBY was elected directly in fair and open election for 
two periods. Second, due to the new model of democracy, political stability and economic 
growth, Indonesia slowly gained international recognition as an emerging power.
13
 It 
intensively and positively engaged with ASEAN, became a part of the G-20 and became the 
centre of the global summit. Third, SBY also vigorously worked on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. SBY was greatly concerned about Indonesia’s global image and influence (Acharya 
2014, pp. vii-viii).  
However, instead of transforming as an emerging power in the same way the BRIC had, 
Indonesia rose from an atypical direction. Instead of having a powerful military power and 
being economically prosperous at first, compared to its neighbours, Indonesia was considered 
a ‘weak’ state. However, the country possessed the capacity for being a regional and global 
mediator and facilitator outstrip China, India or even Japan (Acharya 2014, p. 2). Acharya 
might consider this a universal pledge. However, this thesis disagrees; it argues that, in the 
framework of Asia, cultural and historical matters greatly influenced how nations acted 
towards each other. Indonesia undeniably admitted being the ‘elderly’ neighbour that was 
respected. Contrarily, this had not occurred to other emerging powers, such as China or India, 
who had always been suspected by their neighbours. That is what makes Indonesia’s position 
a way different compared to them (Acharya 2014).    
Some scholars assert that the development of democracy and economy and Islam can occur 
side by side (Acharya 2014, p. 20; Roberts, et al. 2015, p. 69). Most (Acharya 2014, p. 1; 
Roberts, et al. 2015, p. 69), in contrast, were optimistic to that notion. Even so, in the case of 
Indonesia, it must be admitted that it is not ‘good’ for having authoritarian, but the 
consequence of being democratic also correlated with the slowness of the Indonesia 
economic condition after years of reformation that was juxtaposed with Malaysia or 
Singapore. Those who are pro-democracy might argue that democracy is parallel with 
economic growth. Although this may be true, this thesis retains some doubts. Indonesia has 
indeed managed difficult times of balancing democracy and economic prosperity. Basri 
(2013, p.2-3) acknowledged this too and contended that reformation was not an easy process 
                                                             
13
 The emerging power in Acharya’s explanation refers to recognition of the growing, primarily economic, 
but also political and strategic status of a group of nations, most of who were once categorised as (and in 
some accounts still are) part of the ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South’ (Acharya, 2014). 
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and that Indonesia had essentially moved on from an authoritarian system to democracy in 
the blink of eye. 
Pepinsky, in MacIntyre et al. (2008), also had a similar view. He believed that the political 
transition after Suharto’s fall hindered economic recovery. This was caused by the overly 
transitional costs combined with institutional re-equilibration. Those factors were 
compounded by the separatism movements in some of Indonesia’s provinces, such as Aceh, 
West Papua (MacIntyre et al. 2008). Lifted the needs and interest of millions of people, 
pulled and pushed between well-being as the number one goal or people’s aspiration above 
all, the solution to any given problem was not simple.  
The Global Financial Crisis, which began in the US in 2008 and spread to Europe, affected 
the global economy. However, the Indonesian economy remained stable compared to other 
emerging economies. Currently, the level of Indonesian GDP has climbed and remained 
steady (see Figure 3.1; OECD 2016b). In 2011, the OECD reported that Indonesia was one of 
the highest contributors of world GDP and that they accounted for about 30 per cent of the 
total (see Figure 3.2; OECD 2015b). The lesson learned from the crisis in 1997 and other 
supporting factors such as good policies and small export share to GDP, which is explained 
by Basri and Rahardja (2010), made Indonesia more self-reliant (Economist 2016).  
 
Figure 3.1: GDP Growth of Major Economies (%).  
Source: OECD (2016b). 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage Shares in World GDP in PPP 2011.  
Source: (OECD, 2015b). 
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008, crashed if possible - to point almost all of countries in 
the world. Indonesia was one of them. Nevertheless, as Basri and Rahardja (2010) stated, the 
overall growth remained over 6.1 per cent. This signifies that Indonesia still grew higher 
followed China and India. Indonesian resilience over economic setback indicated in Basri 
terms the good policy and good luck factors (Basri & Rahardja 2010; Roberts et al. 2015).  
It must be admitted that the effects of the 2008 crisis on the Indonesian economy was 
somewhat narrow and less influential (Basri & Rahardja 2010). There were at least four 
reasons behind those effects: the origin of the crisis, the exchange rate regime, policy 
responses and the national political economy factors (Basri & Rahardja 2010; Basri 2013). 
These four reasons rescued Indonesia from broader effects. Nevertheless, Indonesian national 
income revealed an upsetting outlook, with declining tax revenues and income from state 
enterprises (Roberts et al. 2015). 
Almost 20 years after phasing into the new democracy, the Indonesian political party still 
lacks an ideological platform and thus it reflects to their parties’ programs. This indicates that 
the Indonesian political economy can be more pragmatic. The pragmatic economy caused by 
the reality that transactional politics and systemic corruption still overshadow Indonesia’s 
governance (Roberts, C., et al. 2015, p. 61). The political cost of the elections had brought 
negative consequences to managing the country, which can be observed in the SBY 
administration, when many of his loyal and coalitions were involved in political scandals 
(Aspinall & Mietzner 2014, p. 349). It is almost impossible to win an Indonesia election 
when one is not renowned or wealthy. Whoever the president may be, he or she must have 
strong political and economic support (Roberts, C., et al. 2015, p. 100). This is witnessed in 
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the numerous cases during the former president SBY’s period and, later, in the presidency of 
Jokowi (Aspinall, 2016, p.79).  
Today, as the largest economy in the Southeast Asian region and as one of the leading 
economies in the world, Indonesia has demonstrated an impressive growth since overcoming 
the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Indeed, Indonesia has benefited from the international 
commodity price boom, the growing middle-income society, the upsurge of the working age 
group and the active millions of internet users (Acharya 2014, p.28; Basri & Patunru 2012, p. 
201; Roberts, et al. 2015, p. 40; Tijaja, & Faisal 2014, p. 21;). The country is at its peak for 
almost every development indicator.  
Under these circumstances, the economic development that Indonesia is experienced should 
be managed with a great leadership capacity. The Indonesian people have a higher 
expectation of their leaders. Social media became the most fashionable political instrument 
for aspirations and opinions, particularly for young voters. However, Indonesians are more 
polarised than any prior period of leadership. The most recent president, Jokowi, was elected 
in late 2014. His ability to step up from mayor to governor to president was new. Some 
believed that Jokowi appeared when many Indonesians started feeling hopeless in response to 
political affairs. His non-partisan background, even if he was eventually supported by the 
party under Megawati Soekarno Putri, was claimed as the main factor of his victory over the 
other candidates. Indeed, he bought a new hope for the old Indonesian leadership (Roberts, al. 
al 2015, p. 105, 123; Aspinall 2016, p. 73-4).  
In managing his economic targets, Jokowi’s past experience as a businessman let him focus 
on trade and investment issues. His prior export business activities helped him note what 
Indonesia needs, in a technical sense. Many anticipated his pro-market policies. Some 
highlighted his interventionist approach, which was suggested to be a consequence of his 
promise to his constituents during the election period (Patunru & Rahardja 2015). Further, 
Patunru and Rahardja (2015) noticed that the tendencies of Jokowi’s economic strategy 
follow after China and other key players in East Asia. The energetic industrial policy and 
supportive act towards domestic investment in strategic priorities is also demonstrated in 
Jokowi’s economic path. 
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3.2 Indonesia as a Source of FDI 
There is a puzzle about Indonesia’s FDI outward. The data for Indonesian OFDI was 
inaccessible before the crisis and available data provided by OECD started in 2004 (see 
Figure 3.3; OECD 2016c). During Suharto’s presidency, the outward investment was 
dominated by the Salim Group. Indonesia’s industry remarkably ran by Lim Sioe Liong 
under the Salim Group, which considered Indofood an international food brand. His close 
political connection to Suharto and his family placed him in a privileged and profitable 
position, particularly regarding his monopolies over the import of cloves and domestic flour 
milling (Dieleman 2007, p. 47). Under his monopoly in the Indonesian food industry (through 
noodles), Indofood totalled 90 per cent of domestic market (Dieleman 2007, p.70). In 1998, 
the firm claimed itself as the largest producer of instant noodles worldwide (Williamson 
2004; Aguiar 2007). Under his management, the Salim Group then expanded to the cement 
industry, steel, services and properties. The business survived and grew overseas, even after 
Suharto left (Lingga 2014). In 2004, the number of firms under the Salim Group were around 
75, which spread across 24 countries (Chen 2004). 
 
Figure 3.3: FDI Outflows of Indonesia.  
Source: (OECD 2016c). 
The history and trajectory of the controlling interest of foreign companies in Indonesia had 
begun even before the republic was brought into existence. It had and still shapes Indonesia’s 
economy. The investment between inward and outward most of the time is imbalance. The 
Indonesian economic bargain position has a way too powerless. Any policy to protect its own 
economic interest for the best of the society claimed as protectionism. However, the 
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emergence of Asian economies should be considered a good sign for national needs. Outward 
FDI from Indonesia was undeniably small and limited. Most of FDI posed by Indonesian 
conglomerates, particularly Chinese descents. However, as the country became more 
democratic, the reform spirit still exists with the government. The narrative of policy reform 
also displays a more dynamic optimism for having a prosperous economy in the future. 
3.2.1 EMMNC FDI Global Trends 
 
Figure 3.4: OFDI by Developing and Developed Countries from 2007–2011.  
Source: Marinov et al. (2012). 
Despite the effects of the GFC from 2007 to 2011, the OFDI from EMs compared to 
developed countries were higher, based on proportion (see Figure 3.4; Marinov et al. 2012). 
The percentages of EMs OFDI in general from 2000 to 2014 climbed gradually
14
 (see Figure 
3.5; UNCTAD 2019b). In 1999, developing-world companies only reported having 7 per cent 
of the world’s total outward FDI. However, EMs continued to rise gradually, while the data 
on developed countries FDI showed slow growth, even a decline over a period (see Figure 
3.6). As specified by UNCTAD (2019, p.6), the 2019 World Investment Report found that 
the China become the second largest investor of OFDI. In the previous period of 2013, 
UNCTAD outlined that EMMNCs bought significant foreign affiliates’ assets to developing 
countries through mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2014b, see Figure 3.7). 
                                                             
14 Not until 2015, the data revealed a decline from 35 to 28 per cent (UNCTAD 2016). 
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Figure 3.5: FDI Outflows and Share of Emerging and Transition Economies.  
Source: UNCTAD (2015). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: FDI Outflows and Share of Developed Countries from 2005-2018 in Billion 
Dollars and Percentage. 
Source: UNCTAD (2019, p.6) 
 
Figure 3.7: Percentage of FDI Outflows, Share from 1999–2013.  





Figure 3.8: Comparison of OFDI Outflows Percentage Developed and Developing 
Countries since 1970-2018.   
Source: UNCTAD (2019). 
 
Worldwide, the contribution of EMMNCs to outward FDI is increasing in a more advanced 
and solid manner, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008 (OECD 2015c, see 
Figure 3.8). The 2015 World Investment Report noted that the OFDI from EMs had been 
recorded as the highest compared to prior years or—nearly one-third of the total outflows 
(UNCTAD 2015). It grew from under 15 per cent of the total share in 2000 to 35 per cent in 
2014. However, the OFDI from Africa and Latin America countries dropped and Asia’s 
outward investment climbed (see Figure 3.9; UNCTAD, 2015). Asia EMMNCs have been 
thrilled to undertake foreign investment. Earlier data showed that the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan stand out in their OFDI quantities among other Asian economies. In 2015, Hong 
Kong ranked as the second-top investor after the US (UNCTAD 2015).  
EMs have generated the highest amount of OFDI for investors and recipients at once 
compared to other regions, such as Africa or Latin America. Traditionally, developing 
countries were the largest recipients of FDI. As mentioned earlier, the ‘south’ has depended 
on the ‘north’ for consumer and capital goods for centuries. The latest data indicate that, 
compared to all developing regions, Asia always ranks as number one in terms of inward FDI 
(UNCTAD 2014b, 2015, 2016). Asian industrialisers like China, Malaysia and Indonesia 
have plentiful raw materials, abundant semi-skill labour and shortfalls of domestic capital 
that are relative to development opportunities, large markets and more open and stable 
political systems compared to the other developing countries in Africa—which are 
considered the reasons behind Asia’s FDI inward flows. However, they can essentially catch 
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up in the global economy (Amsden 1992; Hill & Gochoco-Bautista, (eds.) 2013; Oberman, et 
al. 2012; Wilson 2015). 
After observing the phenomena, the current situation is much more complicated because of 
globalisation. First, the invention of the internet and other machinery goods brought so much 
more than just tools and multi-functional intentions. Since then any social and economic 
activities became efficient and effective in a greater scale (Steger, et al. 2014). Second, the 
multi-actors from local to global levels were involved and shared the same needs (Steger, et 
al. 2014, p.47). Third, the mode of transport started to connect people more in reality and 
facilitated international movement (Steger, et al. 2014, p. 104). Fourth, there has been change 
in the social, economic and cultural capacities of the society, including the habit of 
consumption. Society, distinctively those who lived from 10 or 20 years ago, spent 
extensively on health care, education and telecommunication rather than on goods 
(Economist 2014).  
However, unlike the old model of MNCs, in terms of look, pattern, behaviour and motive, 
EMMNCs are in many ways unusual.
15
 Their business attributes, motivations, trajectories and 
strategies have, even at minimum, something in common; however, they generally contradict 
the previous evolutionary trajectories of firms from North America, Europe and Japan 
(Yadong & Huaichuan 2009). There is no typical model for the operation of EMMNCs. Some 
have used alliances, acquisitions or joint ventures to build their market share. Some remain 
small and focused on product, while others take risks to diversify and operate on a larger 
scale (Guillen & Garcia-Canal 2009). This kind of process was not the typical mechanism for 
MNCs from developed countries, where most have concentrated on fully buyout investments.   
                                                             
15 Many scholars who are interested in MNCs theoretically and practically agreed that there is a novelty of 
being an MNC from EMs.   
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Figure 3.9: FDI Outflows 2012–2014 (Billions of Dollars).  
Source: UNCTAD (2015). 
3.3 Indonesian SOEs Governance Evolution from Directorate to 
Ministry 
SOEs have general and specific meanings in nature. At large, they are relevant to any 
institution that provides services and goods to the public. Specifically, they describe anybody 
that has commercial function (Gillis 1980).
16
 For the Indonesian context, in keeping with the 
principal philosophy and constitution of the SOE, they act in two roles: development agent 
                                                             
16 Cited from Gillis (1980), SOE generates under three main conditions:  
1) That the government is the principal stockholder in the enterprise, or otherwise has the exercise control 
over the broad followed by the enterprises, and to appoint and remove enterprise management. In most 
cases, the state is the only stockholder in the enterprise, so that the distinction between ‘public’ or ‘state’ 
and ‘private’ ownership is quite clear. But, in other cases, the government may have entered into a joint 
venture with private capitalists. As long as the government share 51 per cent or more, such a joint venture is 
clearly an example of a state enterprise. But majority ownership should not be viewed as essential. In some 
cases, the state may effectively control an enterprise with only a minority share of its equity, depending on the 
distribution of ownership of the other shares, and on any concordats established between private partner(s) at the 
time of the enterprise. (2) That the enterprise is engaged in production of goods and/or services for sale to the 
public, or to other private or public enterprises. (3) That, as a matter of policy, the revenues of the enterprises 
are supposed to bear some relations to its costs. For a state enterprise whose charter calls for maximization of 
profits (as with the nearly 100 PERSERO state or most government-owned hotels and airlines in several 
countries) this creation is clearly satisfied. 
Among the three conditions lies conditionality. If a firm fails to meet the first standard, then it will be a 
private enterprise. When the second or the third criterion is unavailable, the firm will be just a public 




 Conversely, which becomes the priority has been a long debate among 
government, scholars and society, including other business actors. As a developing country, 
Indonesia has greatly focused on its development plans and targets. The insufficiency of 
infrastructure, public goods and facilities, low-income people, population issues, other social 
problems and the lack of capital have been the cause of the state’s critical capacity to provide 
people’s needs (Acharya 2014; Warburton 2018; PwC 2017). As such, the foundation of 
SOEs in Indonesia found in the Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, states that ‘sectors of 
production that are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be 
controlled by the state’. Further, the next part read, ‘The land, the waters, and the natural 
riches, contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit 
of the people’ (Wicaksono, 2008).  
The past experience of colonialism, which made the narrative of autonomy, may have never 
faded away from Indonesia, either in society or in the government. It began as mentioned 
earlier, when the founding fathers of Indonesia influenced many of the Dutch companies to 
be nationalised
18
. However, during Soekarno’s term, the administration lacked feasible 
industrial development and export objectives (Indonesia, 2011). Indeed, it is justifiable that 
Indonesia’s earlier stage after independence was not too advantageous. Managing a country 
with thousands of islands and hundreds of ethnicities was surely not an easy task to do.  
Conversely, the mission of SOEs is to do business. In the light of this, it is naïve to neglect 
the nature of an SOE as a company. Making a profit is one of the key sources of funding for 
the country regarding SOEs, besides providing people’s basic needs (Ramamurti 1987, p. 
877). It has become a justification of many who insisted on privatising the SOEs. By being 
separated from the state power, SOEs intended to be more self-sufficient and effective in 
promoting the development process (OECD 2015c, p. 27-8; Wicaksono 2008, p. 146). 
Therefore, the two ideas manifested in the Indonesian political economy for about 71 years.  
                                                             
17 Indonesian Law No. 19/1960 clearly mentioned the nature of Indonesian SOEs. It said, ‘State company 
is a unit of production are: a. provides services, b. organize public service, c. foster revenue’.  
18 After a dispute over West Papua with the Dutch, the Indonesian government issued Law No. 86 1958, 
about nationalisation (Domke 1960). The act’s content included, ‘(Article 1) Dutch enterprises as 
“nationalized and full and free property of the State of the Republic of Indonesia.” Article 2 provides for 
compensation to be determined “by a Committee whose members are appointed by the Government.” The 
payment “will be further regulated in a separate Act…”’. 
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Unlike the Soekarno era, under Suharto’s control, Indonesia adopted a market-oriented 
economic policy that included the privatisation of SOEs. There were two remarkable periods 
of Indonesian economy under Suharto, in which the privatisation of SOEs was conducted. 
The first stage was in the 1980s (1982 and 1986), when the government reformed the 
economy—specifically the state monopoly. The second stage was in the 1990s (1997 to 
1999), when Indonesia faced the most destructive economic crisis ever experienced. This 
time, marketisation was more significant and extensive (Hadiz & Robinson 2005, p. 221). 
The ADB argued that the privatisation of SOEs would be beneficial for Indonesia’s economic 
efficiency and productivity (Asian Development Bank, 2009). In the 1990s, some SOEs that 
were privatised included PT Semen Gresik (Persero), PT Telkom (Persero), PT Indosat 
(Persero), PT Tambang Timah (Persero), PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) and PT Bank Negara 
Indonesia (Persero) (Irianto 2004, p.7).  
However, the concerted push for privatisation began after Suharto stepped down in 1998 
(Irianto, 2004). Western economic advisors had no doubt that unproductive SOEs were one 
explanation for the economic crisis (Hadiz & Robison 2005). It was not only by IMF the 
privatisation was suggested, in December 1998, the ADB advisory team advised for the 
corporate and privatisation of SOEs by Indonesian government (Asian Development Bank 
2009). As argued by Wicaksono (2008), SOEs at the time when Suharto still in the office 
were inefficient, mismanaged and cash cows for political groups and individuals. 
Table 3-1 Privatised SOEs List 1999-2005 
SEO % Sold Method 
Revenue 
(Rp trillion) 
PT Indosat 51.0 SS 4.3 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara 39.0 IPO 1.2 
PT Indocement TP Tbk. 16.7 SS 1.2 
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk. 30.0 IPO and P 5.4 
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia 45.0 IPO and ESOP 2.5 
Bank Centra Asia 95.0 SS 6.6 
Bank Danamon 100.0 SS 5.1 
Bank Internasional Indonesia 94.5 SS 3.4 
Bank Niaga 100.0 SS and P 2.9 
Bank Lippo 60.8 SS 1.4 
Bank Permata 71.0 SS 2.9 
Total Privatization Proceeds in 2002-2004 
 37.0 
 ($3.6 billion) 
Privatizations since 2005    
PT Jasa Marga 30.0 IPO 3.5 
PT PGN 5.4 P 2.1 
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Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) 12.2 P 8.1 
Total Privatization Proceeds in 2005 
 13.7 
 ($1.5 billion) 
ESOP = employee stock option plan, IPO = initial public offering, P = placement in the capital 
market, SOE = state-owned enterprise, SS = strategic sale. 
Note: In addition to the above, the Government raised Rp 120 billion ($13.2 million) from the sale of 
PT Pembangunan Perumahan, PT Bukitbara Asam, and PT Adhi Karya. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2009, p.26) 
Even after Suharto’s stepped down, privatisation remained on the ‘must do list’ for the next 
government (see Table 3-1; Asian Development Bank 2009). Help from the IMF in debt 
packages had brought Indonesia with no choice other than privatisation policy. Even though 
the privatisation has been the most sensitive issue for society, parliament and obviously parts 
of the government (Friawan 2007). In the era of Megawati, the SOE privatisation gained 
much public attention. The Megawati presidency was criticised for the selling out of an 
Indonesian communication company—Indosat. Among hundreds of Indonesian SOEs, 
Indosat stock was listed as the first Indonesian company on the New York Stock Exchange. It 
was officially handed over to Singapore Technologies Telemedia Pte. Ltd, which had 41.94 
per cent of the total assets. However, Jokowi stated earlier in his campaign that he will retake 
Indosat during his presidency (Ranggasari 2014). 
Apparently, despite the two opposing views of the advantages and disadvantages of SOE 
privatisation, Indonesian SOEs play a crucial role in the country’s development, even to the 
present time. In many years, SOEs control under a special ministry within the cabinet. After 
autonomous from the Ministry of Finance, in 1998 the Ministry of SOEs appointed. The 
ministry was responsible for the management of SOEs. Prior to that, the controlling task of 
SOEs had existed since 1973. From 1973 to 1993, the unit was a second echelon
19
 division 
under the Ministry of Finance. From 1993 to 1998, the unit was upgraded to the General 
Directorate or First Echelon before it was then changed into Ministry (Enterprises, 2014). 
 
                                                             
19 Echelon in Indonesia is the official’s level within the state civil structure. World Bank (2018) stated: 
The official echelon classification system is used to measure career progression. The echelon indicates 
the level of hierarchy an individual has attained in the civil service. Echelon levels for civil servants with 
management responsibilities (known as structural employees) range from the lowest level of V to the 
highest levels of Ia and Ib (which include heads of national agencies, director generals, deputy ministers, 
inspector generals, and deputy cabinet secretaries). 
80 
Table 3-2 List of Ministers of SOEs Based on Periodic Serving. 











      7. 
Tanri Abeng  
 
Laksamana Sukardi  
 
Rozy Munir  
(returned to Ministry 
of Finance) 
Sugiharto  
Sofyan Djalil  
Mustafa Abubakar 
Dahlan Iskan  













Suharto (March-May 1998) 
B.J. Habibie (May 1998 – October 1999) 
A. Wahid (October 1998 – April 2000) 
Megawati (July 2001 – October 2004) 
A. Wahid (April 2000 – July 2001)  




 term (October 2004 – May 2007) 
SBY (May 2007 –October 2009)  
SBY (October 2009 – October 2011) 
SBY 2
nd
 term (October 2011 – October 
2014)  
Jokowi (October 2014 – present) 
Source: Wicaksono (2008, p. 150) 
During the reformation, Indonesian SOEs had managed throughout some changes. It began 
by the issued of the Government Regulation of State Fully Owned Company Law 1998 
(PERSERO) and the Government Regulation Number 13 1998 about The State Company 
with Limited Liabilities (PERUM). A few months later, the first minister, Tenri Abeng, was 
appointed. He acted as the state shareholder for SOEs. Five years after, the other regulation to 
reinforce SOEs was passed—Law Number 19 2003 regarding SOEs and the Government 
Regulation Number 41 2003 on the role granting from Minister of Finance to the Minister of 
SOEs (Astami et al., 2010). From the later regulation, the scope of ministerial function as 
regulators and supervisor of Indonesian SOEs was being highlighted (see the list of SOE 
ministers Table 3-2).  
After being a separated ministry, the institution gained more trust in managing Indonesian 
SOEs, regardless of its cases and lawsuits
20
. It must be admitted that much progress had been 
observed within the institutions and SOEs themselves. The first SOE minister, Tenri Abeng, 
                                                             
20
 The latest scandals are the case of the ex-director of Garuda—the national airlines SOE on the purchase 
of aircraft engines and the foregoing accusation is Dahlan Iskan’s corruption case for the unlawful sale of 
national assets.  
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was the first to initiate the ideas of controlling SOEs under holding management (Wicaksono 
2008). However, at the same time, many SOEs were being sold for debt payment.  
When the former Minister of SOEs, Sofyan Djalil, was in office, many were optimistic for his 
breakthrough strategy. As a pure technocrat, he was considered ‘free’ of political agenda 
compared to the three previous ministers. His controversial innovation was a one-year 
probationary leadership for any SOE directors. Instead of electing SOE directors for five-year 
terms, he decided to examine their performance in the first one year (Wicaksono 2008). He 
also as initiated before by Tenri Abeng, eager with the master plan to create 25 SOE holding 
in 2015. After he was dismissed from the cabinet, the late minister, Mustafa Abubakar, 
continued the ambitious plan. He started with the 15 plantations firms’ re-structure into four 
holding companies. Abubakar claimed that it would be the biggest plantation company in the 
world (Jakarta Post 2010), even though the official holding creation was just executed under 
the Dahlan Iskan administration.  
Further, Indonesian SOEs have, as explained above, a dynamic but crucial function. The term 
‘dynamic’ refers to its progress and changes and ‘crucial’ means it is important in the 
Indonesian economic setting. In Indonesia’s early days, as an example, SOEs formed to 
provide the basic necessity of people’s life. Back then, the market barely produced kinds of 
products. The small businesses were run by Chinese descent, but some crucial sectors had 
with foreign companies, particularly Dutch made it was harder to gain national revenue and 
also to afford by Indonesians. Electricity, gas and urban transport were some areas that 
changed into SOEs. The first few foreign companies that were bought out by the Indonesian 
government were The Central Bank, national carrier (Garuda) and national shipping (PELNI) 
(Lindblad 2010).   
In 2008, Fitrianingrum from the Ministry of SOEs suggested that there was 153 trillion 
dollars (2,040.26 trillion rupiah) of Indonesian SOEs assets. It produced more than 1 billion 
dollars and contributed to approximately 26 million dollars tax revenue (Fitriningrum, 2008). 
One of the SOEs contributions in the development phase of SBY’s term was the investment 
in the master plan for acceleration and expansion of Indonesia economic development (MP3I) 
(see Table 3-3; Indonesia 2011).
21
 Throughout the national MP3I project, SOEs participated 
                                                             
21 The Sumatra Economic Corridor was just one of the MP3I’s projects across Indonesia. MP3I itself is 
aimed to implement the 2005–2025 Long-term National Development Plan, which is stated in the Law 
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in the acceleration of Indonesian economic transformation and the creation of an 
independent, well developed, equitable, and prosperous society (Indonesia 2011; see Figure 
3.10). 







Commencement Competion Location 
1 Tollroad Development of six 








Tanah Abang; Duri 
Pulo- Kp. Melayu) 
40,026 2011 2014 DKI Jakarta 
2 Power & Energy Development of new 
PLTU of Central Java 
2,000 MW 
26,000 2013 2019 Central Java 
3 Port Kali Baru Utara dock 
development (Phase 1) 
22,000 2011 2019 DKI Jakarta 
4 Tollroad Probolinggo – 
Banyuwangi (215 Km) 
13,960 2011 2019 East Java 
5 Power & Energy PLTU Pelabuhan Ratu 
1,050 MW 
13,650 2008 2011 West Java 
6 Power & Energy PLTU Indramayu Baru 
1,000 MW FTP II 
13,000 2011 2014 West Java 
7 Power & Energy PLTU Indramayu Baru 
1,000 MW 
13,000 2011 2016 West Java 
8 Power & Energy PLTU Jawa Barat Baru 
1,000 MW 
13,000 2015 2019 West Java 
9 Power & Energy PLTU Teluk 
Naga/Lontar 945 MW 
12,285 2007 2011 Banten 
10 Power & Energy PLTU Bojonegara 
1,500 MW 
12,000 2012 2015 Banten 
11 Power & Energy PLTGU Tuban/Cepu 
1,500 MW 
12,000 2015 2018 East Java 
12 Port Tanjung Priok Port 
expansion through 
11,700 2011 2014 DKI Jakarta 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
No.17 Year 2007. The vision of the acceleration and expansion of Indonesia’s economic development is to 







Rail Gantry Crane 
13 Road Waru-Wonokromo-
Tj.Perak (18.6 km) 
11,110 2011 2015 East Java 
14 Railway Monorail development: 
Green Line (14.7 km) 
with 15 stations 
9,100 2011 2014 DKI Jakarta 
15 Power & Energy PLTU Tj.Awar-awar 
700 MW 
9,100 2011 2013 East Java 
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2011, p. 197) 
During Dahlan Iskan’s service, in 2013, the Indonesian state firms were parts of Southeast 
Asia largest economy; they had an estimated $155 billion dollars (1,500 trillion rupiahs), or a 
fifth of the country’s GDP (Latul 2013).  
 
Figure 3.10: Investment in Sumatra Economic Corridor.  
Source: reprinted from Republic of Indonesia (2011). 
The performance of SOEs under Rini Soemarno also displayed a progressive outlook. The 
positive changes inside the SOEs could not be separated from the person behind it. The 
managerial capacity in managing SOEs like the national railway company, which were 
formerly led by Ignasius Jonan as CEO, who then chose as the ministry by Jokowi, had 
succeed to turn the inefficient into competitive and customer-focused company. By the end of 
2014, Indonesian SOEs had hired 800,000 people and contributed to 18 per cent of gross 
domestic product (Bland 2014).  
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Figure 3.11: SOEs Contribution to Indonesia's Economy in Trillion Rupiah during 
2015-2019.  
Source: reprinted from Republic of Indonesia (2015b, p. 65). 
In the first semester of 2015, the 119 Indonesian SOEs reported having $4.8 billion net 
income (64.2 trillion rupiah). It was expected to get the government target as it was already 
49 per cent out of total in a year (Sutianto 2015). At the end of 2015, the aggregate of SOEs 
assets surpassed the target with 405 million dollars (5.395 trillion rupiah). One of the success 
of SOEs in 2016 was PT Angkasa Pura II (Persero), which gained an income of 18 per cent 
or equal to $423 billion dollars (5,64 trillion rupiahs)—more than in 2015 (Hardjono 2017). 
The official data released by the ministry of SOEs showed that in 2015, the contribution of 
SOEs was 183 trillion rupiahs for national tax and 37 for dividends. It was predicted to reach 
347 trillion rupiahs in 2019 for tax revenue and 38 for dividends (see Figure 3.10, 3.11; 
Indonesia 2015b).  
The expansion of SOEs from Indonesia has been slightly scaled up. The most visible scheme 
that Indonesia enact is making the holding design come into play. The intention of forming 
holding system has been initiated by the former minister of Tanri Abeng in the late 1990s. 
The master plan was created during Sofyan Djalil’s term and the most success of making it 
true was Dahlan Iskan. Currently, Rini Soemarno intensively takes action to continue the 
goals. She pushed the draft and enactment of the new law, in which holding strategy has now 
a legal base. 
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Figure 3.12: Dividend Pay Out from Indonesia's SOEs to the Government in 1994 to 
2016.  
Source: reprinted from Katadata (2018). 
For Sofyan Djalil, the SOE holding was part of the privatisation of SOEs to become more 
profitable (Wicaksono 2008, p. 149). In Dahlan Iskan and Rini Soemarno’s periods, the 
holding aimed to be profitable and less bureaucratic, but in a ‘limited scale’ that was apart 
from privatisation’s long-term goal (Deny S 2017; Rahman 2016). A good sample and 
inspiration of holding companies in the region were Temasek from Singapore and Khazanah 
from Malaysia (Kim & Chung 2018). Even after reform as holdings, they are still at an arm’s 
length for state-run companies. The trend of building holding firms out of SOEs has been a 
long-time achievement of Indonesia’s neighbouring countries. The path of Indonesian SOEs 
unfortunately, was not run well. However, the opponents are strong in legislation and 
complicated bureaucracy; the pull and push interest inside and outside Indonesia makes the 
success difficult to follow. But it does not mean it is impossible.  
Under Rini Soemarno’s leadership, the ministry had a visible road map for SOE reformation 
and goals. Despite facing a strong opposition from many, Rini succeed to create more 
holdings. Before Rini assumed the office, Dahlan Iskan had created three holding 
corporations, which were for plantation, fertiliser and cement (Jakarta Post 2016). By the 
period of Jokowi’s first presidency, Rini planned to create six main holding companies from 
mining, oil and gas, food, financial, toll roads, housing and construction. It was expected to 
raise SOE assets of $492 million dollars (65.6 trillion rupiah) to $20.83 billion dollars (270 
trillion rupiah) (Winanti 2016). The holding’s ambition aimed to simplify the corporate 
system among 118 SOEs, as well as to support them to be value-oriented instead of staying as 
exporters of raw materials.  
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Today, more Indonesian SOEs are seeking potential markets and partners overseas, in which 
PT Semen Indonesia is the first to take the risk of internationalisation through overseas 
investment. Even though Pertamina, Telkom and other state-run firms were early exporters, 
none engaged in extensive overseas expansion through more extensive acquisitions prior to 
PT Semen Indonesia.22 PT Semen Indonesia’s venture into the ASEAN investment market 
started in November 2012, when it acquired 70 per cent of Thang Long Cement Company 
TLCC’s shares from Geleximco, with a total transaction value of $157 million (Lubis, 2014). 
Geleximco is the Ha Noi Export-Import Company, which run in many sectors from real 
estate to technology (Geleximco 2011). The investment of subsidiaries was taken as a part of 
the goals to become the leading cement company in the region (Global Cement 2014). Since 
it has been acquired, the TLCC is managed by PT Semen Indonesia in terms of financial 
capacity, management and trademark, making it one of PT Semen Indonesia Hanoi 
subsidiary-based (Thanglong Cement 2010). It produced 7.7 per cent of PT Semen 
Indonesia’s total annual production (Lubis 2014).  
By considering PT Semen Indonesia an EMMNC SOE that is headquartered in a country 
where the government still directly intervenes in market processes to guide economic 
development, PT Semen Indonesia demonstrated similar models of state-run companies with 
other EMs. As an emerging market, Indonesia has historically relied on the natural resources 
sector and on state ownership or control over key resource industries. Additionally, 
Indonesian SOEs have a significant scale of foreign affiliates and foreign assets that are likely 
other EMs (UNCTAD 2014a).  
The significance of PT Semen Indonesia as a regional player reflects the persistence of the 
developmental state in Asia. This in turn suggests the idea of the ‘Asian model’ or ‘Asian 
way’, which, although internationally discredited in the wake of the AFC, lives on and still 
represents a viable alternative to the economic liberalism that is advocated by global 
institutions (e.g., the World Bank and the IMF) and global advisory bodies (e.g., the OECD 
and World Economic Forum). PT Semen Indonesia is a strategically significant state 
investment, as it is the country’s largest building-material producer and exporter, especially 
                                                             
22 Oatley (2012) highlighted the difference between firms that are heavily active in international trade and 
firm that are categorized as MNCs. Even more so, exporting and expanding through FDI are two different 
terms. Both refer to market entry models, but measured by Dunning’s OLI model, exporting is not 
including location advantage, while FDI involves three advantages at once (Dunning 1988, 2001; Dunning 
& Lin 2007) . 
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within Southeast Asia. The available company performance indicators all point to a 
successfully managed firm that is rapidly expanding. Nationally, PT Semen Indonesia assets 
are accounted for the $4.3 billion expansion plan for the years 2015 to 2019 (Azizah 2015). 
Internationally, in line with the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
the company arranged expansion plans in Vietnam, Myanmar and Bangladesh to make those 
countries as its regional production-based (Rw & Putri 2014; Lubis 2014).  
Therefore, this thesis argues that Indonesia is carving out an independent economic 
development path, one that demonstrates the benefits of state interventions in market 
processes. It challenges the orthodoxies of free-market liberalism by examining the 
mechanisms and motivations of growth and expansion of PT Semen Indonesia and the global 
context that supports this growth. It adds an important case study to the growing body of 
literature on MNCs and EMMNCs in the field of international and global political economy. 
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Chapter 4: PT Semen Indonesia as an Agent of Development—
Continuity and Adaptation 
Goldstein (2007) contended that the literature for Asia’s EMMNCs has paid little attention to 
the role of state institutions in companies’ competitiveness. However, scholars like Haggard 
(1986) contended that the political choices behind development in East Asia are crucial to 
explaining their rise. Concerning the importance of the role of state institutions, this chapter 
provides data, findings and discussions about the correlation between the context of 
Indonesia’s development and the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia. The data and findings 
are gathered from semi-structured interviews and document archives. It will be expressed 
based on the topics of the research questions. The developmental state in the transformative 
model provides an explanation on how the indication of many countries, recently, including 
Indonesia, is becoming a new agent of economic power in the global system. In a more 
specific manner, this chapter questions if the management of Indonesian SOEs corresponds to 
the DSM or if SOEs are merely enterprises in which the state has a guiding interest. As will 
be discussed, instead of focusing on Indonesian private firms, this thesis concentrates on 
SOEs, specifically PT Semen Indonesia and its role as a developmental agent. 
Acknowledging the diversity of the DSM indicators and types, this thesis will examine the 
developmental state using criteria of national priorities, organisational arrangements or 
institutional hardware, institutional links with organised economic actors who have 
contributed to and implement state development policy, with reference to current thinking on 
these criteria by Thurbon and Weiss (2016).  
4.1 Positioning PT Semen Indonesia as an Indonesian SOE 
4.1.1 SOEs Governance Reform from Overlapping to Effective Bureaucracy? 
Organisational arrangements in the DSM could be found in the institutional hardware with 
which developmental agents are directed by the state. Indonesia is one of only a few 
developing countries that have a dedicated ministry or directorate for managing SOEs. It is 
debatable why Indonesia has a ministry instead of a super holding, like Singapore, or a 
special commission like the SASAC in China. The Indonesian ministry plays a pivotal role in 
managing more than 118 SOEs (Enterprises 2016b, p. 22-8, see Figure 4.1). It functions to 
oversee the long-term strategies of Indonesian SOEs, ensures that government policy is 
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implemented and seeks to ensure that companies are managed by competent and professional 
administrators and leaders. 
 
Figure 4.1: Indonesian SOEs, Quantity 2018.  
Source: Ministry of SOEs (2017,p. 6). 
The ministry itself was one of the newest ministries compared to other previous ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Finance and Bappenas. The beginning of the Ministry of SOEs started 
after its reformation following the 1998 AFC. It comprised a special organisational 
agreement
23
 with seven deputy ministers, two expert staff units (strategy and 
communications), a secretariat and an inspectorate (see Appendix 8; Indonesia 2015a, 2015b; 
Indonesia 2003). However, at start of Ministry of SOEs left the interpretation of ministerial 
roles very limited and vague in a sense that to what extent the ministry must deal with the 
SOEs and how distinctive its responsibility with the Ministry of Finance as the ‘controller’ of 
the national fund and assets. It was not until 2015 that President Jokowi clarified the job of 
the minister by issuing Presidential Regulation No. 41/2015 (Indonesia 2015a). This 
Regulation clarifies the duties of the minister and ministry and clearly emphasises the link 
between SOE direction and state policy: ‘the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises has the 
task of carrying the government affairs in the field of state-run firms to assist the President in 
performing statecraft activities’ (Articles 2, Indonesia 2015a). As can be observed from the 
extract of this new regulation, the Ministry was explicitly tasked with using state industries to 
achieve national development priorities. Indeed, the scope of the Minister for SOE’s 
responsibilities is broad:  
                                                             
23 Special organisational arrangement here refers to the limited structure the ministry has, which is 
responsible for the national assets under SOEs and their subsidiaries across Indonesia. 
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The Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises the following functions: a. formulation 
and establishment of policies in the field of preparation of the initiative strategic 
business, strengthening competitiveness and synergies, strengthening performance, 
the creation of sustainable growth, restructuring, business development, and the 
improvement of capacity building infrastructure business of state-owned 
enterprises; b. coordination and synchronization of policies in the field of 
preparation of strategic business initiatives, strengthening competitiveness and 
synergies, strengthening the performance, the creation of sustainable growth, 
restructuring, business development, and capacity building business infrastructure 
of state-owned enterprises; c. coordinating the implementation of tasks, coaching 
and administrative support in the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises; d. 
management of state property are the responsibility The Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprises; and e. Supervise the execution of duties in the Ministry State-owned 
enterprises. (Republic of Indonesia 2015a Article 3a–e, Position, Duties and 
Function). 
With this 2015 presidential regulation, there are particular fields in which the minister has his 
or her personal authority and also his or her authority over SOEs. While political transactions 
sit behind most Indonesian cabinet appointments, the Post of Minister for SOEs many times 
has always been based on merit or appropriateness of corporate background, at a very least it 
is not appointed from party members. Although some still believe it is not purely professional 
considerations. This indicates the importance that is attached by Indonesia’s political leaders 
to the competence of ministers and their deputies, and a clear intent to insulate such a 
strategically sensitive arm of government from corruption. For example, Tenri Abeng, Sofyan 
Djalil and Dahlan Iskan were professional figures with extensive experience in Indonesian 
business. Dahlan Iskan, as will be further detailed, succeeded in reforming PT Semen 
Indonesia and many other Indonesian SOEs (despite the lawsuit on what the state lost during 
his service as minister) (Sofyan 2012). He had a good business track record in transforming a 
bankrupt newspaper, Jawa Pos, into a major national news company. Historically, he was 
also one of the most innovative and independent president directors of PLN (an Indonesian 
state electricity company) (DetikFinance 2013).  
At the time of writing, the current Minster for SOEs is also from a business background and 
is liked politically by President Jokowi. Rini Soemarno is a well-known, successful 
Indonesian businesswoman. She was a former CEO of Astra International and held the 
position of Minister of Trade and Industry in 2001–2004, during the tenure of president 




 She has worked to professionalise SOE management, openly 
recruiting experts for the ministry and for SOEs. For example, Dwi Suciptjo was appointed as 
CEO of the state oil company, Pertamina, because of his effectiveness in leading PT Semen 
Indonesia through its structural reform. Yet, she also removed Dwi from the position in 
February 2017
25
. As reported by Antara, she stated, ‘Replacement of both (President and 
Vice President Director) related to personal problems. In leading PERTAMINA, if there is a 
mismatch, it could endanger the company’ (as cited in Sinaga 2017). Indeed, Rini has a 
reputation for firmness, as she replaced 12 CEOs of Indonesian SOEs during her time as SOE 
minister (Jatmiko 2017). She is also credited with pushing forward with the high-speed 
railway link between Jakarta and Bandung. Her choice to continue the project of rapid 
railways was brave, considering the strong opposition due to the land acquisition problem, 
(Dharma & Suryadinata 2018).
26
 Recruitment has followed the specific standard that was 
legalised by ministerial decree, with echelon-level officials
27
 who were elected based on open 
recruitment rather than direct appointment, thus reducing the scope for patronage (Idris 
2016). The activism of successive SOE ministers’ points to their position of power within the 
government, which is sufficient to remove well-connected people, and consolidate and 
reform ministry roles (Wahyuni 2013).  
This power extends to her role as a bridge between the state and SOE board. Under Article 1 
of the General Principles Law No.19/2003, the Minister is ‘appointed and/or authorised to 
represent the state government as a shareholder in the company’.  
As representative of the state, the Minister represents that largest shareholder in 
SOEs like PT Semen Indonesia and, as such, exerts direct authority over company 
affairs, subject to the General Meeting of Shareholders (AGM), which holds the 
highest authority within the company (Republic of Indonesia 2003 Article No.13).  
                                                             
24 Rini Sumarno, as argued by Eve Warburton, is a ‘royal enabler’ of Jokowi. She is a Jokowi right-hand 
woman with whom Jokowi shared strategic thinking (Warburton 2016, p.304). 
25 The of removal of Dwi Suciptjo was due to the internal conflict of Pertamina, in which there was a 
disagreement with his vice-director.  
26 The fast railway project is part of a strategic national program. This project aims to build massive public 
transportation in Java, Sumatera and Sulawesi without government funding but by a business-to-business 
scheme through SOEs (Enterprises 2016b, p. 105).  
27 Echelon-level officials in Indonesia’s context or a level or rank within the government’s structure.  
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Law No.19/2003 further illustrates the technical legal base through which the Indonesian 
government regulates the SOE sector. The law provides a mechanism by which the CEO of 
SOEs is regulated, as stated in Republic of Indonesia (2005):  
(1) Prospective members of the Board of Directors were confirmed as members of 
candidates who passed selection through fit and proper test conducted by a team or 
institution professional appointed by the Minister. (2) The provisions referred to in 
paragraph (1) shall not apply for reappointment Board members are considered able 
to perform well during the period office. (3) Prospective members of the Board of 
Directors who have passed the fit and proper test as referred to in paragraph (1) and 
a member of the Board of Directors were reappointed as referred to in paragraph 
(2), shall sign a management contract before set appointment as member of the 
Board of Directors…(Republic of Indonesia 2005 Articles 16 Indonesia). 
As can be observed in Figure 4.2 below, the Minister of Finance and Minister of SOEs share 
equal formal status with regard to SOEs. However, because of their control over internal SOE 
processes, the Minister of SOEs arguably holds a much more influential position in the 
implementation of economic development policy.  
 
Figure 4.2: The Institutional Architecture of PT Semen Indonesia.  
Source: summarized by the author 
Formally, then, professionalism is at a premium due to the considerable sums of government 
money that are risked in SOEs. The qualification for boards of directors is also stringent, as 
highlighted by Republic of Indonesia (2005):  
(1) What is to be appointed as members of the Board of Directors is an individual 
who meets the criteria of skill, integrity, leadership, experience, honesty, good 
conduct, as well as has a high dedication to promote and develop the company. (2) 
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In addition to meeting the criteria referred to in paragraph (1), which can be lifted a 
member of Board of Directors of Public Corporation is an individual who is able to 
carry out legal actions and have never been declared bankrupt or become a member 
of the Board of Directors or Commissioner or Board of Trustees declared guilty for 
causing a company or PERUM declared bankrupt or people who have never 
punished for doing criminal acts that harm state finances. (3) In addition to meeting 
the criteria referred to in paragraph (1), which can be lifted as a member of the 
Board of Directors Limited is an individual who meets the criteria as stipulated in 
the legislation in the field of company limited (Republic of Indonesia 2005 Article 
17). 
Dahlan Iskan, when he was the Minister of SOEs, also issued a ministerial regulation (PER-
01/MBU/2012) about requirements and procedure for appointment and dismissal of directors 
of SOEs. The ministerial regulation adds further stringency to qualifications of directors, 
including their evaluation by a professional independent agency (Enterprises 2012). The 
findings above tell us that the institutional architecture governing Indonesian SOEs and PT 
Semen Indonesia manifests in the power hierarchy of the Ministry of SOEs, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. There are clear and decisive links between the state and key sectors of the 
Indonesian economy in which state power is exercised. These links were not created through 
direct patronage, but through rules that have been established to preserve state interests while 
simultaneously allowing state enterprises to achieve economic efficiencies necessary to 
competing in a globalising economy.  
4.1.2 Managing the Developmental Mindset in a Complex Political Connectedness 
As explained in the previous chapter, the DSM requires, first, the state that is run by elites 
with a developmental mindset of political elites and, second, the ‘institutional hardware’ of 
developmentalism that establishes economic connectedness between state and economic 
agents as well as the institutionalised ‘software’ of policy formulation, negotiation and 
implementation. The findings in this thesis strongly suggest that the Indonesian state sustains 
a developmental ‘frame of mind’.  
It is not exaggerating to say that SBY and now Jokowi pursued definitive goals for achieving 
industrial maturity. Though Indonesia transformed into a ‘democratic country’ with the end 
to the Suharto regime, the longstanding state-led developmental paradigm has become rooted 
in the economic life of Indonesians. Born as the biggest country in terms of size and 
populations, Indonesia was once geographically positioned as the ‘big nation’ (negara besar) 
in the region (Fealy & White 2016). Today, Indonesians strongly feel that the country still 
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has leadership aspirations and a leading role in the region, as it had during the old and new 
order (Fealy & White 2016; Acharya 2014). Despite cases of corruption and abuse of power, 
religious intolerance and ethnic polarisation, it is acknowledged (e.g., by Sherlock) that 
Indonesia has the best-functioning democracy in the region (Roberts et al. 2015).
 28
 
Consequently, the government is trying to pursue what Acharya (2014) called an emerging 
power in Asia. However, although Acharya (2014, p. 19) claimed that Indonesians proud to 
their democratic country, most Indonesians articulate power from narrowed perspective, 
seeing emerging power is equal to economic power. Their expectation of the electoral process 
thus highly depends on the politicians’ and elite’s capacity to provide economic benefits 
which reflected through Prabowo’s vision (CNN 2019) and mission which placing economy 
as the priority sector and Jokowi’s economic programs (Warburton 2018). The medium and 
long-term plans (RPJM and RPJP) from the periods of SBY and Jokowi illustrate that, 
politically, the state maintains a strong developmental orientation. During SBY’s term, 
Indonesia had managed to generate a coherent extended strategy that looked 20 years into the 
future (RPJP 2005–2025).29 At his beginning of his term, SBY was focused on tackling the 
problem of the 2005 Asian Tsunami, which devastated west and south western Sumatra, then 
the GFC. Yet, in his eight years, SBY established a foundation for the country’s economic 
revival and stabilisation that his successor, Jokowi, has not sought to change.  
In the case of the industry in general and SOEs in particular, SBY’s term marked a period of 
recovery after the political and economic crisis of 1997 (Indonesia, 2010a). This allowed the 
government time to concentrate on national development, as opposed to ‘crisis management’. 
Poverty alleviation and unemployment were at the top of the agenda and, therefore, RPJMN 
2004–2009 aimed to develop employment and implement pro-poor strategies (Indonesia 
2010a). Starting in 2010 (SBY’s second term), the government’s attention turned to economic 
development in pursuit of SBY’s national vision for ‘just, prosperous and democratic 
Indonesia (Indonesia 2010b). In this vision, all economic resources were deemed national 
resources that should be developed for the benefit of society as a whole to maximise 
Indonesia’s ‘competitive advantage’ (Indonesia 2010b). The key word emphasised here is 
                                                             
28 Jokowi had attracted attention in his previous position as Mayor of Solo, Central Java, before he ran for 
president. By his local leadership, he succeeds in gaining a reputation for non-corrupt, effective 
government. He was also popular among the people of the city (Roberts, Habir & Sebastian 2015).  
29 The absence of GBHN, which was used as a fundamental national guidance before, was brought back in 
his era in a different model. 
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‘competitive’, which signals that the Indonesian state understood that to survive 
economically, Indonesia had to be better able to advance national economic interests in a 
globalised economy. As already stated, these concerns are also reflected in the economic 
development priorities of President Jokowi.  
Jokowi has placed greater emphasis on infrastructural improvement, promoting the urgency 
of the Sea Toll Road, seaports, roads, bridges and other physical infrastructures, and 
explicitly connecting infrastructure with national economic development.
30
 With this comes 
an emphasis on the significance of SOEs as agents of development. In Jokowi’s model, it is 
the role of SOEs to help feed, fuel and construct modern Indonesia. Part of this responsibility 
is to help keep the costs of development low, which entails the standardising of fuel prices 
across the country and, in relation to construction, keeping the price of cement within the 
bounds determined by the government rather than the market.
31
 The secretary of PT Semen 
Indonesia, Agung Wiharto, as quoted in the Jakarta Jakarta Post , acknowledges that ‘we are 
owned by the government and we do believe the move is made for the greater good of the 
country’ (as cited in Lubis 2015). Jokowi has taken a direct role in promoting professional 
competence among SOE CEOs. In January 2017, for example, all CEOs were invited to 
attend an executive leadership program (ELP) held at the State Palace (Istana Negara) that 
was designed to build a ‘global mindset’ based on the sense of nationalism (Perwitasari 
2017). Thus, the software of SOE governance remains tied to a national development agenda, 
which is tailored to suit the global challenge.  
Developmental software also refers to values within the policy making, which equal to policy 
strategy or output. In a lower level of the economic power structure, the president’s thought 
process must also be followed through the building of shared understanding and values. This 
approach is less authoritarian, but no less deliberate than that of South Korea under Park 
Chung-He or of Taiwan under the Kuomintang’s Chiang Ching-Kuo. Dahlan Iskan was 
selected as the Minister of SOEs by SBY because they shared a common perspective on the 
challenges that the Indonesian economy faced (Purwadi 2012). Arguably, this common vision 
                                                             
30 Interview with staff at Bappenas on 12 July 2016, in Jakarta. 
31
 Jokowi said that he had instructed State Enterprises Minister Rini Soemarno and state-run energy firm 
Pertamina to immediately implement the one-price fuel policy, which was also aimed at boosting 
economic growth in Papua and West Papua (Widyanita 2017). 
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ensured Dahlan Iskan’s success in transforming PT Semen Indonesia into a holding company, 
despite strong opposition from within.  
The new global mindset is manifested in changed official attitudes towards Indonesian 
foreign investment. The outward expansion of Indonesia’s economy was long hampered by 
the aspiration to create a large domestic market.
32
 Foreign expansion became a priority due to 
the increasing competition with foreign players and the need to increase market share and 
asset holdings.
33
 Dahlan declared, ‘the domestic cement market is still very large, but for the 
company of Semen Gresik [PT Semen Indonesia], regional expansion is necessary’ (Rh 
2012). During his visit to Thang Long‘s plant in Vietnam, Dahlan stated:  
After Semen Gresik, other BUMNs (state-owned enterprises) will follow. PT Timah 
will acquire a tin mine in Myanmar, while PT Telkom plans to buy shares in one of 
Timor Leste’s telecommunication firms. (Harsaputra 2012) 
In his mind, this was part of a national drive to export Indonesian investment to increase the 
scale of Indonesian enterprises.  
Value coherence is also evident in thr relations between Jokowi and Rini Soemarno. Jokowi 
choose Rini due to their similar ideas about national economic development. When Dahlan 
Iskan was a minister, SBY did not really intervene in technicalities. Although Rini Soemarno 
is also clear and determined on her work as SOEs minister, Jokowi’s influence is also strong. 
Jokowi is stated to his cabinet:  
The first thing I want to say, especially to new ministers, there’s no such thing as a 
vision or mission of a minister, we only have the vision and mission of the President 
and Vice President. All ministers must follow the vision and mission that we 
outline, and all policies decided during either plenary or limited Cabinet meeting. 
(Parlina & Halim 2016) 
Rini Soemarno is facing opposition from various parties for being a woman and too corporate 
oriented. Her ambition to build an Indonesian super holding company, like what Singapore 
and Malaysia had done previously, is considered too dangerous and it could result in the loss 
of crucial state assets. The biggest opposition comes from the parliament, despite the 
                                                             
32
 This economic view had arisen in the era of Suharto, but, as time went by, Hill described this as ‘the 
pendulum has swung back and forth’ (Hill 2014). 
33 Based on interview with Indonesian echelon staff in the Ministry of SOEs on 26 October 2016, in 
Jakarta, and with the PT Semen Indonesia Board of Directors on 28 October 2016, in Jakarta. 
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controversy that she is being kept as an officeholder for the ministry position (Soares 2016). 
To carry her duties as minister who must deal with the parliament, Rini Soemarno must be 
replaced by The Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani (Deny 2017). Conversely, Rini believes 
that only by becoming a holding company can Indonesian SOEs be made more professional, 
flexible and financially independent enough to compete with other foreign companies like 
Temasek and Khazanah, and thus it can be a lesser financial burden on the state (Supriyatna 
2016; Rahman 2016).  
The next step in considering the DSM of Indonesian SOEs is the relations between political 
and economic actors from the decision-making process to the policy implementation process. 
In the cement industry, the intervention of the state is not accidental. PT Semen Indonesia is 
also accountable to other ministries in the pre-production, production and Jakarta Post -
production stages of its business (Industry 2009a). The Ministry of SOEs is the institution in 
charge of day-to-day management. The Ministry of Finance has authority over financing 
while the Ministry of Industry has oversight of production processes, such as the permit area 
of production plants, product innovation and logistics. Other ministries with a say over PT 
Semen operations include the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry, the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education. In the nature of marketing and business expansion, the 
Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, National Standardization Agency 
of Indonesia (BSN) and The Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) are in 
charge. It also required the SOEs to work with Indonesia Cement Association (ASI), 
Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU), the Indonesian embassy and some 
related institutions and other economic actors or agencies, such as The Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (KADIN).
34
 Local government has authority over the granting of 
permits for mining activities and plant construction. The company was also required to 
comply with the national environmental standard of operation and forestry permit for mining 
activity that was issued by the Ministry of Environment, Mineral and Resources. PT Semen 
Indonesia enjoys the protection of the state. The Ministry of Trade plays a key role in 
regulating supply and demand in the cement market nationally, including the competition 
                                                             
34 There are more institutions and agencies that relate to PT Semen Indonesia. For instance, PT Semen 
Indonesia is also a member of KADIN, which is an organisation that accommodates all economics 
entrepreneurs in Indonesia. The links between KADIN and PT Semen Indonesia lie on its capacity as a 
forum to synergise Indonesian entrepreneurs from various sectors (Kadin 2017).  
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between cement producers and the market shares, to ensure a stable price and that it is 
empowered to limit import competition when deemed necessary (Industry 2009a; Trade 
2013). 
With the number of government agencies relating to the production and Jakarta Post -
production activities of PT Semen Indonesia, there is a clear and deep connection between PT 
Semen Indonesia and the Indonesian state. Though the company has not received special 
incentives in doing business
35
, it has always been suspected for gaining an ‘unfair’ privilege. 
This state and corporate network is crucial to PT Semen’s business operations, but its 
existence is no guarantee of absolute compliance. The beneficial network between the PT 
Semen Indonesia Board of Directors facilitated communication between the government as 
the majority shareholder and PT Semen Indonesia internally. Despite the long process for the 
company’s consolidation as a strategic holding, it was finally made possible by the capability 
of former President Director, Dwi Soetjipto.
36
  
The influence of government SOE networks, mediated through the Minister of SOEs and 
SOE boards, strongly suggests the persistence of an interventionist state in Indonesia. In the 
context of PT Semen Indonesia, the president director shared the vision of the minister (and 
president). During the early period of overseas expansion, Dwi Suciptjo and Dahlan Iskan 
had frequent consultation meetings. As Dahlan Iskan revealed:  
After the realization of corporate actions, I always ask for updates regarding 
conditions factory in Vietnam, concerning the existence of regulatory barriers, 
turmoil employees and product marketing. I get a picture, everything went well, 
even the corporate action also turned out to be direct give a good impact for the 
factory in Vietnam, given the prospect its development becomes more open, 
including in terms of restructuring obligations. If Semen Indonesia Management 
finally succeeds in doing it restructuring the obligations of Thang Long Cement, it 
will give tremendous impact of efficiency and will open greater opportunities for 
business development efforts in the future. So, I think The Corporation to Vietnam 
is very appropriate and very good for Semen Indonesia as well as for the Indonesian 
state in general. This step too, marked the increasing role of Indonesia in the Asian 
region, namely the role economics, in addition to the political role that has been 
                                                             
35 Interview with echelon staff from the Indonesian Ministry of SOEs on 26 October 2016, in Jakarta. 
36
 The interview findings on PT Semen Indonesia success led to the beneficial managerial skill of Dwi 
Soetjipto. Most interviewees agreed that the accomplishment of PT Semen Indonesia as a SOE depends on 
Dwi Soetjipto‘s performance in leading PT Semen Indonesia. While he controlled PT Semen Indonesia, 
much transformation had occurred. There was a protest and opposing attitudes inside the company, but he 
managed to solve the disagreement.   
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carried out well (as cited in, PT Semen Indonesia [Persero] SEMEN INDONESIA 
TBK2012, p. 57). 
The Indonesian Embassy helped PT Semen Indonesia negotiate with the Vietnamese business 
and government in dealing with the national policy.
37
 The engagement between embassy and 
PT Semen Indonesia demonstrates the economic connectedness to a more extended 
government and corporate network.  
 
Figure 4.3: Government and Corporate Networks of PT Semen Indonesia.  
Source: Interviews and Industry (2009a). 
Thus, when the expansion proposal was taken before the company’s board of directors, it was 
not difficult for Dahlan Iskan to agree as he represented the government as the majority 
shareholder. This level of communication between Dahlan Iskan and Dwi Suciptjo was not 
new. In practice, the state–business nexus was strong during Suharto’s term. There were 
monthly meetings for officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of 
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 This finding was taken from the interview with the PT Semen Indonesia Board of Directors on 28 
October 2016, in Jakarta.  
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Transportation and ASI long before the sector was opened for private investment (Plunkett et 
al. 1997).   
To further its interests and business operations, PT Semen Indonesia develops partnerships 
with other companies, with the same ownership structure (SOEs) from similar sectors or 
distinct sectors, such as PT KKA (Kertas Kraft, Aceh—an SOE in cement bag industry). The 
partnership was motivated by the government program to synergise the business activity 
between SOEs. PT KKA was considered important to maintaining business efficiency by 
providing the paper packaging of cement product (Enterprises 2015). The company also 
continued to engage with the ASI, which was established by the government. Even though PT 
Semen Indonesia is an SOE, positive connections with other business entities is important 
and best achieved through association membership. These complex institutionalised links 
between the state and PT Semen captures the dynamics of company and government strategy 
to diversify, strengthen and expand in the name of national economic development (see 
Figure 4.3).   
4.1.3 National Priorities: Infrastructure Catch-Up Agenda 
To meet Weiss’ DSM ‘requirements’, PT Semen Indonesia’s strategy and operations should 
reflect specific Indonesian state policies, rules and national priorities. State policy is an 
essential referent to assess the three core points of Weiss’s model: 1) Why state-led 
industrialisation? Did the government select specific sectors? Is the cement industry an 
Indonesian state priority, and, if so, then why? 2) What is the strategic industrial policy 
regarding Indonesian cement SOEs? Has the government picked winners based on merit, 
because of export performance or product quality and potential, rather than at random or 
closeness? 3) In answering these questions, the policies concerning the development of 
Indonesian SOEs should be examined, with a focus in this thesis on PT Semen Indonesia.  
Based on interview and document archives, national priorities are revealed through a mix of 
published government policies and strategies, legislation and the personal experiences of 
those involved in the restructuring of PT Semen. Consistent with the DSM, industrialisation 
in the developing world has been driven by state ambition to catch up and compete with 
developed countries. The industrial promotion strategies of developmental states offer an 
insight into their development blueprints. Indonesia, like the Republic of Korea, China and 
other countries in the world, follows a mid-term national development plan (medium term) 
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and a long-term national development plan (long term), which, in the Indonesian case, is 
designed and controlled by the National Development Agency–Bappenas. This is similar to 
the Economic Planning Board in Korea, which is under the control of the president. 
Indonesia’s long-term national development plan (RPJP) is accommodated within the Law 
No. 17/2007 and is set to run for 20 years (Republic of Indonesia 2007a). The government’s 
aim in crafting this law is to foster long-term development planning that will be pursued in 
several stages.  
The content of the document highlights the goals to create a ‘just and prosperous society’, as 
mandated by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia 
1945). This blueprint of the long-term plan was introduced during the SBY’s presidency 
(2004–2014). It acted as the ‘substitute’ for the former Broad Guidelines of State Policy 
(GBHN). By ‘replacing’ the function of GBHN, the RPJPN ensures policy continuity by 
making it difficult for an incoming president to terminate the previous national development 
goals and priorities. This has been intentionally generated to achieve its aims, which are 
stated within the RPJPN: 
(a) support coordination among development actors in the achievement of national 
objectives, (b) guarantee the creation of integration, synchronisation and synergy 
between regions, space, time, and function within the government and between 
central and regional governments, (c) ensure the relevance and consistency between 
planning, budgeting, implementation and supervision, (d) ensure the achievement of 
the use of resources in an efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable , and (e) to 
optimise participation (Republic of Indonesia 2007a, p. 9-10). 
There is also the RPJM, which is gazetted in President Regulations No. 7/2005, No.5/2010 
and No.2/2015. The goals written in this blueprint are the target that the current Jokowi 
government must attain during its term of office. The RPJM contains a broad policy direction 
for the government agenda during the five-year time line and its purpose is to be a guideline 
for sub-policies and regulations under any state institutions and agencies, including the SOEs.  
During the SBY presidency, economic priorities focused on how to handle the effects of the 
2004 tsunami and 2008 crisis. The export of Indonesian products was negative, but the 
domestic consumption became the reason behind the GDP’s continuous growth. In SBY’s 
second term, the industrial sector was highly supported. His second medium-term plan 
mentioned that efforts to improve industrial growth are made through policies that increase 
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the number of businesses in the industrial sector, strengthen the industrial structure and that 
improve productivity (Republic of Indonesia 2010a, p. 1–82). Further, it also highlighted that:  
The competitiveness of the nation is increasing through strengthening the 
manufacturing industry in line with the strengthening of agricultural development 
and the increasing development of marine resources and other natural resources in 
accordance with the regional potentials in an integrated manner; the increased 
development of science and technology; the accelerated development of 
infrastructure by further enhancing cooperation between the government and the 
business community; the increased quality and relevance of education; and the 
reforming of economic institutions that induce private initiative in economic 
activities. (Republic of Indonesia 2010b, p. 1–25) 
SBY’s focal point of the industrial sector manifested through the President Regulation No. 
28/2008 (which this thesis will discuss later).  
Currently, under Jokowi’s presidency, the principles of Pancasila are reflected in three cores 
of his presidency’s goals, which are called Trisakti (Sukarno’s former slogan). Trisakti means 
sovereignty in politics, independence in economy and self-expression in its own culture. The 
broad strategic policy in achieving the economic development objectives is reflected in the 
following quotation: 
Self-reliant in the economy manifested in the development of economic democracy 
that puts the people as sovereign in the management of state finances and the main 
actors in the establishment of production and national distribution. State policy has 
the character and authority of a strong leader and sovereign in taking people 
economic decisions through the use of national economic resources and the state 
budget to fulfil the basic rights of citizens. (Republic of Indonesia 2015b, p. 1-3). 
Jokowi situated industrial sector development as his top priority by just highlighting 
infrastructure targets. Jokowi considered infrastructure to be a bottleneck and the first 
challenge to Indonesia attaining economic acceleration. His medium-term program document 
stated that: 
Strengthening the economic structure by strengthening the primary sectors (natural 
resource-based sector such as forestry, agriculture, fishery, and mining), secondary 
sectors (manufacturing and industry), and tertiary sector (services) in an integrated 
manner with the secondary sector as the main driver of economic development. The 
manufacturing industry is still developing at a slow pace, whereas to achieve 
progress in economic development, the manufacturing industry should remain the 
main driver of the progress (Republic of Indonesia 2015b, p. 2-09). 
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To understand how the government selects sectors, in this section, this thesis expands on the 
interview findings and analyses statistical data regarding the Indonesian industrial policy 
context. There were eight crucial policies that were linked to the case of PT Semen Indonesia 
as SOEs, which concluded in Table 4-1. According to RPJMP and RPJMN, the 
manufacturing industry is the driving force of Indonesian economy (Republic of Indonesia 
2007a; 2010; 2015b). Yet, rather than becoming the manufacturing based on heavy 
industries, the Indonesian government believes that the competitive advantage of the country 
is based on natural resources and large market shares. Therefore, besides attempts to be a 
production based in the world supply chain industry, the Indonesian government also decided 
that the Indonesian manufacturing sector will heavily focus on natural resources, will be 
labour intensive and will have consumption and automotive economy (Antara 2016). The 
data from the International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2016 noted that manufacturing 
contributes to a quarter of Indonesian gross domestic product (see Table 4-2; Unido 2016). 




General   
Law No. 17/2007   RPJPN 2005-2025  
President Regulation No.7/2005 RPJMN 2004-2009  
President Regulation No.5/2010  RPJMN 2010-2014 
President Regulation No.2/2015   RPJMN 2015-2019 
Specific    
Law No. 19/2003 State Owned Enterprises  
Law No. 40/2007  Limited Liability Company (PERSERO) 
Government Regulation No.41 /2003  The authority of The Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprises for PERSERO and PERUM  
Government Regulation No. 44/2005 Procedures for Inclusion and Structuring State Capital 
Government Regulation 72/2016 about 
Amendment of Government Regulation 
No. 44/2005  
Procedures for Inclusion and Structuring State Capital 
President Regulation No.28/2008 National Industrial Policy  
President Regulation No.41/2015 Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises  
                                                             
38 There are still various policies and documents regarding Indonesian strategic industryial policy. It should 
be noted, however, that to give more specific and focused investigation, this research will only take some 
crucial, associated policies with the case study. By the time the interviews were conducted, the 
Government Regulation No. 72/2016 had not been issued. 
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President Regulation No.71/2015  Determination and Saving of Principal and Essential 
Commodities 
Ministerial Regulation No. 104/M-
IND/PER/10/2009 
Road Map of Cement Industrial Cluster Development  
Source: compiled and collected by the author from Bappenas (2017) and Rights (2014) 
To reach the national development goals, the Indonesian government included cement as the 
primary sector in the manufacturing industry. The primary motivation behind the cement 
business as the priority sector is its link to the national targets of infrastructure development 
and growth acceleration. Within the RPJPN and RPJMN, under both SBY and Jokowi, the 
greatest challenge to Indonesia’s development has been the lack of infrastructure. As an 
emerging economy, Indonesia’s development process requires physical infrastructure to boost 
the economic progress. This meant new roads, new port facilities, new buildings—
government buildings, schools and hospitals. In RPJMN 2015–2019, the government 
highlighted:  
The availability of infrastructure to support economic development is limited and 
should be improved. The limited availability of infrastructure is the main obstacle in 
increasing investments and it is the cause of high logistics cost (Indonesia 2015b, p. 
2-9). 
For the past 70 years, the cement industry has been a national priority. It demonstrated from 
the nationalisation of Padang Portland Cement Maatschappij (PPCM). The company which 
already operated since 1910 in 1958 when Ir Vander as the representative of Dutch officially 
handed over the company to J Sadiman as Indonesia representative (Indonesia, 2016). The 
Indonesian government itself had built cement SOEs on 7 December 1957, which it named 
PT Semen Gresik (Semen Indonesia Tbk2016b). In 1968, the Indonesian government 
established its third cement SOE in South Sulawesi, called PT Semen Tonasa (Tonasa 2015). 
At present, Indonesia has three cement industry SOEs, which consists of one fully managed 
SOE (PT Semen Baturaja, built in 1974) (Baturaja 2017), one partly owned SOE (PT Semen 
Indonesia) and one SOE that is owned by the Indonesian government but managed by an 
asset management company called PT Sarana Agro Gemilang (PT Semen Kupang, 
established in 1983) (Merdeka.com 2012–2016). PT Sarana Agro Gemilang finally saved PT 
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Semen Kupang from bankruptcy through a joint operation scheme (Antara 2011).
39
 Despite 
the slowing demand of national cement industry in 2015, in line with the physical 
infrastructural target, the industry’s policy significance has not diminished. At present, the 
cement industry remains one of the leading sectors in national production (see Table 4-2; 
Unido 2016) and one of the 35 priority industrial clusters in development (Unido 2016). 
Table 4-2 Indonesia Main Economic Indicators 
BASIC KEY INDICATORS 
(none exhaustive list) 
Population as of 2014:  
50% population is under 29 years,  
60% population is under 39 years 
52% population live in urban areas 
252.8 million 
GDP per Capita (US$), 2013 $3,500 
Income group MIC, lower 
Economic growth in % first 3 month 2015 
(BPS) 
4.72% 




Main natural resources 
Mining, oil and gas 
Fisheries and agriculture 
Main production 
Petroleum and natural gas, textiles, apparel, 
footwear, mining cement, chemical fertilizer, 
hardware and software, plywood, rubber 
Source: Unido (2016) 
As will be discussed, the cement industry in Indonesia is on an upward growth trajectory. But 
this growth is driven less by competition and more by the fact that the sector is 
oligopolistic.
40
 Despite the crisis, downturn of Indonesian economy and other problems 
cement SOEs faced, until today, the domestic industry has dominated the national market. To 
this accomplishment, the government has been taking part in advancing the development of 
the national cement industry, since the time of Dahlan Iskan, when the government 
amalgamated three cement SOEs and formed them into the strategic holding company, PT 
Semen Indonesia.  
                                                             
39 Semen Kupang and the investor agreed that the KSO cooperation format was based on the annual sales 
volumes. The scheme was given about 7.5 per cent of the sales for Semen Kupang, while the remaining 
ones were intended for Sarana Agro and to pay its debt to Bank Mandiri. 
40 Interview with Staff of Bappenas on 12 July 2016, in Jakarta. 
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After the crisis of 1997, the IMF and other international agencies provided financial 
assistance to Indonesia. The core aim of the assistance was economic deregulation and the 
privatisation of SOEs, in line with the structural adjustment package priorities. Consequently, 
massive privatisation was undertaken in the late 1990s, when PT Semen Indonesia 
commenced its major restructuring. In keeping with the recommendation, the priority of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Law No. 19/2003 was privatisation, but with ‘Indonesian’ 
characteristics. As will be discussed, the state was not prepared to sacrifice its levers of 
control over the economy and instead found ways to preserve its position through new 
regulations that were issued to govern SOEs. The regulatory context for PT Semen Indonesia 
is illustrated by the following key articles:  
 SOEs are business entities in which the state is the sole or majority shareholder 
through direct investments originating from state assets (Article 1, Republic of 
Indonesia, 2003). 
Explanation: 
In the Indonesian context, the stock owned by the government provides the state with a 
privilege to make a strategic decision regarding company affairs, both by majority 
shareholder or the golden share mechanism. This finding was confirmed by SOE echelon 
level staff who stressed that the Ministry of SOEs is the majority shareholder, so they 
determine the long-term strategy and company’s expansion41. In that respect, Widodo (2017) 
highlighted that Indonesia’s SOE corporate system adheres to two systems. The ‘golden 
share’ in the Indonesian context is called a Dwiwarna, or a series share. A Dwiwarna is a 
single share that gives the Indonesian government a privileged right regarding the agreement 
of increasing assets/capital, revising of corporate constitution, including incorporation, 
mergers and acquisitions, dissolution and liquidation and the appointment and dismissal of 
directors and commissioners (Hardiyan 2016; Praditya 2016). In the context of strategic 
plans, like expansion, an interviewee stressed that ‘we are the majority shareholders … so we 
decided the long-term strategy and policy for overseas expansion” (Assistant Deputy for 
Mining 2016). 
                                                             
41 Interview with echelon staff from the Indonesian Ministry of SOEs on 26 October 2016, in Jakarta. 
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There are four types of Indonesian SOEs that are distinguished by forms of state ownership 
(see Table 4-3). Among Indonesian SOEs, PT Semen Indonesia is categorised as Persero 
Terbuka (a listed SOE). This means that its shares are divided between the government and 
the public. As indicated, and as will be discussed further, public ownership in no way 
diminishes the degree of the state’s influence over company affairs due to the carefully 
crafted measures that ensure a continued state authority through the structure of shares issued. 
Restructuring ownership is guided by nationalistic principles and is adapted to accommodate 
new competitive realities. 
Table 4-3 Indonesian Type and Numbers of SOEs 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013   2014 2015 2016 
Listed/Public 
SOEs  
12 12 12 14 14 15 17 18 18 20 20 20 20 
Non-Listed 
SOEs  
119 114 114 111 111 112 111 109 108 105 85 84 84 
Special Purpose 
Entity (Perum)  
13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Total Number of 
SOEs  




21 21 21 21 21 19 15 15 13 12 24 24 24 
Source: Fitriningrum (2008), Enterprises (2017, 2010, 2012) 
 The restructuring effort made in the context of an SOE is a strategic step in improving 
the company's internal conditions to improve performance and increase the value of 
the company (Republic of Indonesia 2003). 
 Privatisation is the sale of shares of PERSERO, either partially or wholly, to the other 
party to improve performance and corporate value, increase benefits for the country 
and communities and expand share ownership by the community [emphasis added] 
(Republic of Indonesia 2003). 
Explanation: 
PT Semen Indonesia started down the path of part privatisation in 1991, when it was 
officially listed through public offering on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (from 2007, the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange). As mentioned in Chapter 1, after being restructured and partly 
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privatised by opening it publicly in 1991, ownership of the company is shared between the 
state and the private investors. It means that under Indonesian regulation, the company is 
managed by the government and public together. The reasoning was that part privatisation 
would lead to a better performance in operations and finance (PT Semen Indonesia [Persero] 
SEMEN INDONESIA TBK2012). The company has passed through several phases of 
management restructuring in 1995, during the period of 2003–2005 and again in 2012 (see 
Figure 4.4). Still, the Indonesian government retains a key strategic role in having 51 per cent 
of the company shares (see Figure 4.5). Therefore, even after ‘going public’, PT Semen 
Indonesia remained a state-run business entity.  
 
Figure 4.4: PT Semen Indonesia Holding Phases.  
Source: modified from Semen Indonesia Tbk(2016d). 
PT Semen Indonesia’s main subsidiaries (PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen Padang, PT Semen 
Tonasa and Thang Long Cement VN) were independent national champions prior to their 
incorporation into the PT Semen Indonesia group (Semen Indonesia Tbk2012, p.6; Semen 
Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2017, p. 142). Three had strong reputations among SOEs, 
because they dominated the national market.
42
 The problem was that SOE independence 
encouraged intense mutual competition, with consequences for economic performance and 
financial returns to the state. The Indonesian government realised that all four could work 
                                                             
42 Rightsising Indonesian SOEs through holding structure needs to fulfil some requirements that are 
similar: business activities, different market segment, competitive, good prospect and if they are wholly 
owned/majority shareholder. The holding company must change into a similar product company or area 
(Fitriningrum 2008, p. 7).  
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more effectively as one and, because the cement market was growing, the formation of a 




Figure 4.5: Ownership Structure of PT Semen Indonesia.  
Source: reprinted from Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012). 
As another form of state control, Indonesian SOEs have been given financial support through 
the granting of state assets. Although these assets are managed outside the state budget 
system and are noted as a split transaction
44
, they are still owned by the state. As stated in 
Law 19/2003, 
  State assets that are separated if the wealth of the country comes from the state 
budget (APBN) to use as the state capital equalization in the listed and / or special 
purpose entity company as well as other non-listed company (Republic of Indonesia 
2003 Chapter 1 of Article 1 Paragraph 1). 
Explanation: 
This provision means that assets that are given to the SOEs to be managed legally belong to 
the state and to the Indonesian people. Reaffirming the national development focus of 
market-oriented reform, the law stated that: 
Motive and purpose of the establishment of state-owned enterprises are contributing 
to the national economic development in general and state incomes in particular; b. 
The pursuit of profit; c. Organize public service in the form of providing goods 
                                                             
43 Interpreting the findings based on interviews with echelon staff of the Ministry of SOEs, the board of 
directors of PT Semen Indonesia and staff of PT Semen Tonasa (the subsidiary). 
44
 The split transaction in Indonesia budgeting system is the financial scheme that is categorized as 
separate transaction in the national budget balance of payment. It goes without going through state budget 
mechanism. Yet, it originally come from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget in the form of: a. 
fresh funds; b. state property; c. state receivables in BUMN or Limited Liability Company; d. state-owned 
shares in BUMN or Limited Liability Company; and / or e. other state assets (Indonesia 2016). 
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and/or services that are high quality and adequate for fulfilment of livelihood of 
many people; d. A pioneer in business activities that cannot be implemented by the 
private sector and cooperatives; e. Participate actively in providing guidance and 
assistance to businessman in economically weak groups, cooperatives, and society 
(Republic of Indonesia 2003 Article 2, General Principle No.1). 
Explanation:  
The obligation and role of SOEs in Indonesia are twofold: as an agent of the state and as a 
business market actor. An SOE acts on the behalf of the state to gain protection from the 
state, but it is also expected to create profits. For instance, cement plants have been built by 
SOEs in areas where infrastructure is limited, in Papua and other Indonesian provinces, in 
South Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara. Despite the high cost and lack of means of 
transport, the government chose to direct SOEs to generate income-earning opportunities for 
Indonesian people who are disadvantaged by distance from Java, the centre of Indonesia’s 
economic prosperity.  
Since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia lacked a specific and detailed industrial master plan. 
During SBY’s second term, Indonesia finally generated a visible road map for its industrial 
sector. Presidential Regulation No. 28/2008 reaffirms the role of the state in economic 
development and the direction of SOEs (Republic of Indonesia 2008, see Figure 4.6). Setting 
out a long-term strategic vision, the regulation stipulated:  
1) In 2025, the Indonesian national industry is expected to have the following 
characteristics: a) world-class manufacturing sector, b) the potential for a strong 
growth and structure, as well as a prime mover (priority) of the economy, c) the 
balanced and uniform ability across the business scale, d) ta high role and contribution 
to the national economy and e) the various aspects of industrial structure to support 
sustainable development (Indonesia 2008, p. 8). 
2) In the long-term development of the industry that is aimed at strengthening and 
deepening the cluster growth, the industry group priorities are a manufacturing 
industry base, which consists of industrial groups 
a) a material industry association, consisting of 
i) the iron and steel industry 
ii) the cement industry 
iii) the petrochemical industry 
iv) Industrial ceramics (Republic of Indonesia 2008, p. 14). 
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3) The merger or acquisition of an SOE is managed through incorporation with other 
existing SOEs. An SOE can take over different SOEs and/or other limited liability 
companies (Republic of Indonesia 2003 Article 63).   
4) Further provisions on merger, consolidation, acquisition and the dissolution of state 
enterprises are regulated by government regulation and 2) in performing the acts 
referred to in paragraph (1), SOE interests, shareholders/owners of capital, third 
parties and SOE employees must still receive attention (Republic of Indonesia 2003 
Article 65). 
The next key regulation that was identified as the manifestation of a state strategic policy 
over SOEs was the Government Regulation No.41/2003 (Indonesia 2003). This rule has not 
been changed in the 14 years since it came into effect, and it remains significant in the 
context of SOE governance. Below are some fundamental articles that clarify the role and 
function of Indonesian Minister of SOEs.  
 Position, duties and responsibilities of the Minister of Finance in the field of 
construction and SOE supervision is delegated to the Minister of State-Owned 
Enterprises (Republic of Indonesia 2003 Article 1). 
Explanation:  
According to its history, before 1998, the ministry of SOEs was under the directorate of 
Ministry of Finance. In 1998, after it became a separated ministry, the Ministry of SOEs had 
been transferred to a specific function, while still having a direct correlation to the state 
finance. It means that the minister of SOEs shared authority with the Ministry of finance in 
dealing with SOE equalisation of capital.  
 Position, responsibilities and authority that are delegated from the minister of Finance 
to the minister of SOEs, as defined in Article 1, is to a) represent the government as a 
shareholder or AGM, as provided by the Government Regulation No. 12/1998 on 
limited liability company (public listed), as amended by Government Regulation No. 
45/2001 and the limited liability company that is partly owned by the State Republic 




This second part explained the main role of the Ministry of SOEs in accordance to their 
capacity over the minister of finance. As a consequence, the regulations identifies the 
representation of the minister in the highest level of the firm’s structure. In this sense, the 
power of the minister of SOEs inside the company is substantial and tangible. As such, the 
distinction between the scope of the minister of SOE and the minister of finance is clear. For 
financial matters, the authority is with the ministry of finance. If related to operation and 
management matters, authority is held by the Ministry of SOEs (Ministry of State_wones 
Enterprises 2015, p. 10). 
 
Figure 4.6: Configuration of National Industry in 2025.  
Source: reprinted from Republic of Indonesia 2008, p. 7. 
The next two laws that govern the activities of PT Semen Indonesia as a SOE are 
Government Regulations No. 44/2005 and No.72/2016. These two instruments were 
consistent with previous policies regarding the role of SOEs, types of SOEs, ministers’ 
authority and source of SOE capital. Overall, the law addresses the method of capital 
equalisation of SOEs. The crucial part of this regulation is identified through its newest 
legalisation in Government Regulations No.72/2016. Strategic policy is guided by 
Government Regulation No.72/2016, which is the most recent rule concerning the 
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advancement of the holding model of SOE organisation and management. Before the 
expansion of PT Semen Indonesia, the Indonesian government had no legal base from which 
to create a holding company. While the restructuring of PT Semen Indonesia did not violate 
any legal code, the Indonesian government, led by the minister of SOEs—Rini Soemarno—
initiated the new Regulation to avoid future legal challenges. The regulation clarifies the legal 
basis for the holding mechanism. The article below highlights the continuing role and 
ownership of state within holding company structures. As the Article stated:  
Subsidiaries of state-owned companies as referred to in paragraph (2) shall be 
treated equally with state-owned for the following: a. obtain assignment of the 
Government or the carrying out of public services; and / or b. obtain country-
specific policies and / or the Government, including the management of natural 
resources with a particular treatment as applied to SOEs (Republic of Indonesia 
2016 Article 2A paragraph 7). 
As a new legal base, the Government Regulation No. 72/2016 not only demonstrated the 
government’s strong commitment to developing good corporate governance, it also 
manifested the beginning of Indonesia’s new phase of development, in which the 
developmental mission of SOEs is less hindered by factional political agendas.  
There were changes in the ministerial structure inside the Ministry of SOEs by the addition of 
Jakarta Post s regarding deputies and expert units. The newest presidential regulation indeed 
signified the importance of cement product in the Indonesian economy. The current law 
categorised cement as an essential commodity. Because of that, the government has the 
authority to set a price range—particularly during the religious holiday, when the demand is 
low, and in times of price volatility. The price setting is significant in assuring that the supply 
of cement and its price is controllable. In setting the prices, the government is more 
responsive to market demand. In 2015, for example, Jokowi instructed PT Semen Indonesia 
to lower its cement prices, which the government had the power to do, claiming that they 
were uncompetitive (Gumelar 2015). Private companies had no choice but to follow the 
instruction or lose business.  
In ministerial level- higher structure in policy making, there was also a road map concerning 
cement industry that was made by the ministry of industry during SBY’s term. The road map 
aimed to guide the development of the cement industrial cluster. It contained targets, 
strategies and policies, as well as an action plan within five years of the period. The 
document clearly presented the goals of the medium term (2010–2014), which were the 
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growth of production, realisation of national needs and the requirement of SNI. For the long 
term (2010–2025), the document intended to meet the national cement demand, the guarantee 
of coal in the long run, the availability if competent operator staffs, the chance to strengthen 
of competitiveness and the realisation of cement engineering and fabrication (Industry 
2009b).  
Meanwhile, the Ministry of SOEs specifically follows a special blueprint, defined and 
redefined since it was created as a separate ministry in 1998 (Table 4-4). However, there are 
only three recent iterations discussed here. In the first term of SBY’s second administration, 
the master plan of 2010–2014 was a ministry proposal for managing Indonesian SOEs. The 
2010–2014 master plan contained a specific design, scenario and aims of the restructuration 
program, which must be embodied the three cement SOEs altogether.
45
  




Master/Strategic Plan Vision 
State-owned Enterprises 
Master Plan 2010-2014 
Actualising the SOEs as instruments of the state to increase 
welfare of the people by the corporate mechanism 
State-owned Enterprises 
Strategic Plan 2012‐2014 
Being the supervisor of professional SOEs to increase the 
value of state-owned enterprises 
State Owned Strategic Plan 
2015-2019  
Being the supervisor of professional SOEs to increase the 
value of state-owned enterprises  
Source: Ministry of State Owned Enterprises (2010) 
Table 4-5 The Rightsizing Program of SOEs 2014 
No. SOEs Sector Quantity 
after 
Restructuring Model Quantity 
After 
SA L D H MK  
1.  DAMRI7 PPD, 
PT Jasa Marga 
3 PT JM  - - - Damri, & 
PPD 
2 
2.  PT Inti, PT 
Barata, PT LEN, 
PT INKA, 
PTKS, PT 










                                                             
45 There were three cement SOEs listed: PT Semen Indonesia, PT Semen Baturaja and PT Semen Kupang. 
In 2013, PT Semen Kupang was taken by PT Agro Industri, but it still acts as an SOE.  
46 The prior master plan was for 2002–2009. However, the document will not be the focus of analysis. 
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Pindad, PT 









Semen Kupang  







- PT Semen 
Kupang  
- - 2 
 Total  14      7 
Source: enterprises (2010) 
The reformation and progress within the Ministry of SOEs continued after Mustafa Abubakar 
was replaced, noting that the central objectives of the government are the transformation of 
Indonesian SOEs to be strong and active agents of development (Enterprises 2016a).    
The latest strategic plan of the Ministry of SOEs has been clear in defining and 
conceptualising the mission of what to do in the next four years to come. Central to the 
master plan is the notion of synergistic work. Rini Soemarno, the current minister at the time 
of writing, viewed that consolidation process (integrating SOEs) became the most pivotal 
plan in restructuring Indonesian SOEs. The integration meant that the SOEs asset and stock 
should be under one management (Enterprises 2016a, p. 101).  
Table 4-6 Holding Scheme Structure.  
Currently In the Process of Forming a 
Holding Company 
Super Holding Company  






 Cement holding  
 Fertiliser holding  
Improvement: 
 Plantation holding  
 Forestry holding  
Plan: 
































 Mineral and mining  
 Banking  
 Energy  
 Infrastructure  
Source: Enterprises (2016a) 
There are three model corporate forms that are planned by the Ministry of SOEs, but the 
holding model is the long-term target (see Tabel 4-6). The restructuring of the organisation 
essentially proceeds because it significantly affects the SOE corporate governance. As such, 
there are four challenges to having a productive SOE: large quantity of SOEs, time-
consuming bureaucracy monitoring, duplication in the similar area and internal competition 
(Enterprises 2016a). When the holding form has been fully undertaken, it will eliminate those 
challenges. Indonesian SOEs would be more flexible, efficient and productive.  
Despite the long exposure of findings relating to the national priorities on paper, the 
interview results showed inconsistencies with the explanation from the bureaucrats
47
. The 
official agreed that Indonesia has the development guideline, but he rejected the concept of 
prioritising the industry sector because he explicitly said that there has been a complex 
situation in the process of the RPJMN decision-making. On one side, the guideline was made 
due to a lack of resources and limited time, of which 60 per cent related to the president’s 
political promise/contract during his campaign. In the other side, they also included too many 
sectors as priorities, making the policy formulation and decision-making far from ideal.  
From the findings above, the national priorities part can be summarised in Figure 4.7.  
                                                             
47
 Interview with Staff of Bappenas on 12 July 2016 in Jakarta. 
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Figure 4.7: Indonesian National Priorities for the Cement Industry. 
Source: summarised by the author.  
4.2 The Persistence of the Neo-DSM through the Case of PT Semen 
Indonesia: What Remains and Is Missing 
 
Figure 4.8: DSMs.  
Source: Weiss (2000), Thurbon and Weiss (2016), Öniş (1991), Johnson (1999), Beeson and Pham (2012). 
This chapter considers the relationship between PT Semen Indonesia and the DSM. These 
research findings confirm the proposition given in Chapter 1 that PT Semen Indonesia’s 
expansion reflects the persistence of what this thesis named Neo-DSM. The findings suggest 
that the substance of DSM is only adapting and transforming—it never left East Asia, 
including Indonesia, even after the crisis in the region 20 years ago. That persistence, as this 
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Indonesia’s ambition of developmental catch up. It becomes crucial to linking the two 
because it establishes how the elements of an Indonesian DSM persist in the globalised world 
and their implications for a successful SOE, like PT Semen Indonesia. The implication here 
refers to what element has survived and what element has been missing. However, the 
elements of DSM were placed on the state strong intervention. As such, this thesis offers a 
modification to the classic model that defines Neo-DSM.
48
 The word ‘neo’ in the context of 
developmental state here refers to Indonesia adjustment in adapting the model which was 
influenced by the national condition, the structural adjustment program and global context 
after the AFC. Most importantly, an Indonesian Neo-DSM today is situated in the shift of 
developmental agent, from private conglomerates to SOEs (see Figure 4.8).  
Through the lens of Neo-DSM, there are some crucial questions that were asked earlier in this 
chapter. The first substantial question that was asked: does the state still play a major role, or 
is it a part of the solution to Indonesia’s economic development, just like Thurbon and Weiss 
(2016) identify from the earlier DSM version? The answer to this is clear when considering 
that the role of the government persists, yet in a more dynamic and flexible way than before, 
which is once again emphasised as Neo-DSM. The second question asked regarding the case 
study of PT Semen Indonesia is, is the cement sector that the government selected a priority? 
If yes, then why? The findings of this study suggest that it is more complicated, that the 
Indonesian government has been focused on many industries despite the national road map 
and development plan (Unido 2016), making it hard to claim that the cement industry has 
been the priority industry. It is true, however, that cement has benefited from the 
infrastructural projects. This infrastructural target has been pursued with broad support from 
the citizens, despite the push and pull of short-term interests—which is the core ingredient of 
the transformative capacity of any DSM (Thurbon & Weiss 2016). This is because the 
previous and current government understood from the studies conducted by Indonesian and 
international experts that infrastructure is the key to Indonesia’s economic development. 
Therefore, cement product has been pivotal for Indonesia as an emerging economy because it 
                                                             
48 During the time this thesis was written, the study of Indonesia’s political economy has focused on the re-
emergence of developmentalism. However, the studies are using the word ‘new’ like Warburton (2016), 
which referred to the development process in Latin America instead of Indonesia, or Aspinall (2016). 
Patunru and Rahardja (2015) and Robison and Hadiz (2017). Apart from those studies, there was an article 
by Wilson (2015b) that shared a close analysis to this thesis. Wilson’s work confirmed that Indonesia 
resource nationalism has been driven by developmental strategies. His arguments were based on 
Indonesian economic policies on export and tax regime.  
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is the foundation for other sectors and the growth of Indonesian economy (Plunkett et al. 
1997). Cement demand has a direct correlation with infrastructural development, in which the 
core elements of the developmental state are situated (Roberts et al. 2015). 
Therefore, the Indonesian government had to lead and play an active role to close the gap. 
This is consistent with Aguiar’s (2007) argument that the state played an important role in the 
development, including the infrastructure. This is because there has been lack of private 
participation in national economy, especially because the old conglomerates like Salim Group 
have relocated. Hill (2007) claimed that the Indonesian government failed to attract the 
private business to tackle the problem of Indonesia’s economy. However, making private 
business to actively support the government’s projects is not an easy task. The market 
mechanism is not working well in Indonesia. As Hill (2007) highlighted, the problem with 
pricing and land acquisition would create challenges for the private to take the infrastructural 
projects. The case of pricing and land acquisition is also influenced by other fundamental 
problem, in which the Indonesian government has no choice but to take an active role. The 
fundamental problem here applies to the sector for financial benefits, for example. In 
developed countries, the profit margin for any business activities is high; in Indonesia, it is 
not. Thus, it is no wonder that SOEs were unwilling to take non-commercial projects (World 
Bank 2017).  
The next question to address is if the cement industry was categorised as a priority sector, 
then how has Indonesian government managed the sector (Thurbon & Weiss 2016)? There 
are two methods that the Indonesian government could have used, regarding the strategic 
industrial policy of the cement sector. First, the government directly intervened by 
establishing more cement SOEs. The government also kept them as state-run entities and 
created a cement holding to strengthen the business capacity of cement SOEs to build a 
monopolistic cement industry. Out of six Indonesian cement SOEs in the present day, five are 
owned by the national and local government (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2017d). Second, the 
government supports the industry through indirect control of regulations and a mix of 
policies, including the creation of a holding, giving away infrastructural projects and helped 
them go global. Wilson (2015a) described this as a resource nationalist policy. In an indirect 
way, the Indonesian government had already issued several regulations, such as distribution 
quotas (Plunkett et al. 1997), local market reference prices (Harga Pedoman Semen) 
(Plunkett et al. 1997) and a list of current policies and regulations, as explained in the above 
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section. Although it is not identical, this has been in line with Wilson’s (2015a) argument on 
resource nationalism; he recognised the government intervention to achieve a set of national 
benefits. However, the indirect and direct supports were not necessarily provided for free. 
After the 1997 crisis, state support was conditioned by performance requirements, and this is 
in line with Thurbon and Weiss’s (2016) argument of incentives conditionality. 
With respect to direct government intervention, in countries using the DSM, like Taiwan and 
Singapore, the SOEs play a bigger role in their economies (Amsden 1995). Although SOE 
was not a popular agent compared to the private conglomerates, such as Chaebol in Korea in 
the period of Asian Miracle, countries continue focus on their SOEs. Countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and China maintained to have their SOEs even after the AFC (Kim & 
Chung 2018). In the context of Indonesia, the role of the SOE is still highly significant, but 
not as strong as in the case of South Korea or Singapore. This is due to Indonesia’s SOEs 
continually aiming to accelerate national strategic projects (World Bank 2017). Therefore, it 
is unsurprising that Indonesia has 118 SOEs in various sectors, including PT Semen 
Indonesia (SOEs 2017). Thurbon and Weiss (2016) have explained that there has been a 
policy mix in developmental states, which varied over time and place. 
The latest findings on Indonesia’s SOEs have been in accordance with a few of the current 
studies. Warburton (2017, p. 15), for example, stated that: 
The government continues to expand and empower its state-owned enterprises and 
appears committed to cultivating a domestically owned and value-added resources 
sector. This indicates that perhaps a permanent transition is underway. 
One may ask, how could this happen in the country that has been patronised by the neoliberal 
international regime? The answer is obvious. Indonesia still depends on its state-run 
companies for its development agenda because the government knows that, in the Indonesian 
context, the invisible hand does not work as the theory argued. Many suggested that this is 
due to the bureaucracy’s reluctance for change (Mallarangeng & Tuijl 2004; Friawan 2007; 
Latul 2013; Muhtadi 2015). This thesis, in contrast, suggests that the challenge for reform 
was due to the mindset of the elites, and that the bureaucracy was strongly shaped by its 
perception of the state’s role. In Indonesia, the concept of state is fundamental. One must not 
forget that everything has been under state responsibility in Indonesia—from religion to 
family issues. Therefore, the duty to manage the strategic industries or sectors is given to the 
government.   
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Like telecommunication and electricity (Latiupulhayat 2010), cement became a strategic 
industry for Indonesia, in which the government was highly invested. Since the cement sector 
became the Indonesian government’s priority, the sector has been subjected to special 
treatment. Consequently, the cement sector was one of the latest sectors to be deregulated 
(Plunkett et al. 1997). During the period of Suharto and Sukarno, the cement industry was 
highly protected. Though the protection is no longer as strong as it was then, the findings 
above demonstrated how the state still has power over its SOE. This situation is quite 
inconsistent with many scholars. For example, Amsden (1995) suggested that the presence of 
SOEs were caused by the weakness of key state assets that form the entrepreneur skills of 
indigenous people—or, in Indonesia context, pribumi. Even when the cement private 
businesses are growing, PT Semen Indonesia keeps expanding. 
The inconsistency between Amsden (1995) and Indonesia’s reality may have related to the 
fact that the company has been a part of the Indonesian strategic sector, thus the state 
continues to play key role in it. Cement sector become strategic because it links to other 
sectors and influences the economy (Iqbal & James 2002). This is apparent from the national 
policies and regulations, in which the cement sector was considered the base of the national 
industry. However, because Indonesia is a member of international organisations, it is bound 
by liberal rules. Therefore, the industry does not protect through direct instruments like 
subsidies or tariff barriers, as it had done in the period before crisis. However, the national 
interest of the cement sector is protected by the state’s control over the SOEs, through 
exercising foreign policy and diplomacy goals and social and financial objectives (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2014). By this strategy, the Indonesian government exhibits dualism in its 
economy. It showed favour over liberal principles by removing direct interventions to PT 
Semen Indonesia, but it conversely demonstrated state-led economy through its industrial 
policy over SOEs and infrastructural sector.  
The market’s failure then became the justification for Indonesia to rely on its SOEs. The most 
important goal of any SOE, including PT Semen Indonesia, from the state’s perspective as a 
shareholder is certainly not focusing on making profits (Ramamurti 1987). If it does, then 
there is no point to keeping PT Semen Indonesia as state-run entity. This thesis argues that 
maintaining cement SOEs and making them run collectively under one holding must be 
aimed beyond cost calculation. Indeed, holding—though it helps increase the company 
assets—strengthens the company’s political power, in the sense that it can be isolated from 
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the complex bureaucratical riddle (especially from the House of Representative’s control). 
That conclusion may be an arguable point because the government (of Sri Mulyani and Rini 
Soemarno) has asserted that the proxy of the House of Representatives will continue to work 
(Ardhian 2017; Sawitri 2017), though the new law contradicted this. Kim (2018) has affirmed 
this conclusion by highlighting Indonesia (2016), which stated that the state capital transfer 
does not have to go through a state budget mechanism.  
For the purpose of the state’s power over the companies, within and beyond golden share 
status, the long lists of laws and regulations on Indonesian SOEs in general and on the 
cement industry—and on PT Semen Indonesia in particular—have been vague and unclear. 
Warburton (2017) had come to the same conclusion, yet she believed that it demonstrated the 
push and pull between policymakers and business elites. Therefore, this thesis objects that 
what happened with Indonesia’s industry particularly in cement sector is solely controlled or 
shaped by oligarch. In contrast, this thesis argues that the government is the main actor in this 
context, both that of SBY and Jokowi. It is unsurprising that in the Indonesian context, 
despite the privatisation, the state still plays the role of owner, operator and regulator. In the 
cement sector, which has now been privatised, the government has all three roles, to the 
extent that it still effectual. However, the regulations regarding SOEs—especially those 
which were issued under Rini Soemarno—are in line with Latiupulhayat’s (2010, p.68) 
explanation on how the government maintains its control in the privatisation through golden 
share mechanism. He argued that there are two main reasons behind this. First, golden share 
aims to protect the national interest. In cement context, the national interest relates to 
infrastructure and housing sector. Second, it appears to be reasonable for foreign investors in 
doing business in cement sector, given the fact that Indonesia still rely on foreign capital. By 
protecting the national interest and respecting the foreign investor share, the Indonesian 
government has a winning solution to the advantages and disadvantages regarding state 
ownership (Latiupulhayat’s 2010, p.68).  
In the market, PT Semen Indonesia is facing a difficult situation with intense competition and 
the existence of WTO as the international regulator. However, this does not imply that the 
state lost its method of controlling the situation. The interview revealed that, in practice, the 
Indonesian government has been going underground, covered by a complicated policy that 
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was enacted to protect the national interest
49
. This thesis argues therefor that the holding 
formation was one of government methods to secure the national interest. The other strategy 
is by opening the moratorium of business licences in the cement sector—though the Ministry 
of Industry ultimately decided to cancel that plan. Although the cancelation of cement 
moratorium was not clear (Nurfadilah 2018). Afterwards, those findings clarify that the state 
role is not only present to as regulator to only comfort the market and let it alone works.   
The second point to note to examine Neo-DSM through the case of PT Semen Indonesia is 
the institutional hardware or organisational arrangement of PT Semen Indonesia. This 
includes the bureaucratical nature of the company. Bureaucracy is a major problem in 
Indonesia (OECD 2009) and Indonesia’s complex bureaucracy has been given political and 
business interests that protect the national economy from foreign competition (Robison & 
Hadiz 2017). However, the SOE has always been accused for being inefficient, poorly 
managed and unproductive (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti 2014; Kim & Chung 2018), 
particularly due to the presence of red tape and an oligarch interest. To that end, the reform of 
the Indonesian SOE’s corporate governance was pushed, especially after Suharto’s stepped 
down. Indonesia has transformed the SOEs management into one more accountable and 
cleanly governed. Nonetheless, it is still limited in the context, such as ownership and 
national policies. However, it was not accurate to accuse oligarchs as the only factor or even 
as the dominant factor of this structural change. This thesis’s findings deny that the reform 
did not work at all, as Robison and Hadiz (2017) concluded. The problem is that the 
difference among DSM lies on their state capacity- a concept that depends on the institutions, 
rather than policies or economic structure (Thurbon & Weiss 2016). However, the concept of 
Neo-DSM emphasises the consequence of globalisation, which is impossible to dislodge, and 
as a result changing the nature of Neo-DSM policy strategies from a monolithic and 
unnegotiable to a flexible and dynamic policy making and output. Against the pessimism and 
distrust over Indonesia’s economy, the country, or its SOEs, managed to grow rapidly and 
continue expanding—that is to say that the Neo-DSM is working. Khan and Jomo in Hill and 
Gochoco-Bautista (2013) had supported this view by saying that the existence of rents allows 
economic development to occur.  
                                                             
49 Interview with Staff of Bappenas on 12 July 2016, in Jakarta. 
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Following the institutional hardware, the last element of DSM to be examined is the 
institutional software. The presence of national priorities and bureaucracy would not be 
maximised and effective if one country is missing a developmental mindset elites and 
bureaucrats. It also will not work effective without close relation between state and market 
(industry) meaning that political and economic actors have intense communication in the 
policy input, negotiation and the policy implementation. In the past, close relations between 
the state and market formed through regular consultation meetings between the Ministry of 
Industry and cement companies.  
Regarding the state–market nexus, the intriguing question to ask is, how Semen Indonesia 
was able to expand when the situation is not so ideal for Indonesian SOE? The answer rests 
in the ‘mutual interaction’ of PT Semen Indonesia and the government. The company’s 
ability to connect with elites and bureaucrats in a positive light has built a trust and reciprocal 
nexus between the state and market. This in the DSM is known as public–private cooperation 
(Weiss 2000). Just like other private companies, PT Semen Indonesia must keep the business 
running. To do so, it depends on government support. Additionally, the government relies on 
this sector to run for the purpose of national development. The mutuality thus allows both 
sides to coexist. Given this fact, it is clearly possible for the two contrary actors work well 
together, while the political intervention remains.  
However, in the context of giving a social mandate to PT Semen Indonesia, it is necessary for 
the government to ‘repay’ the company. This is in line with Ramamurti’s (1987) research, 
which indicated that when the government ‘directives’ towards SOEs for instance in price 
control, then it must compensate the SOE financial losses. That is to say that, to be fair, the 
Indonesian government may need to give the company additional support. However, the 
support does not have to be preferential access to finance; it could be supportive policies, 
such as easier access to forest utility permits.  
Given the three indicators for examining the case of PT Semen Indonesia and the cement 
industry, the national priorities and the institutional software and hardware, the findings 
suggest that Neo-DSM maintains a new legitimate strategy to sidestep the 21st century 
political and economic challenges that are exported by hegemonic powers from the developed 
world. Putting it differently, the case of PT Semen Indonesia demonstrates that it is 
inaccurate to judge Indonesia either as a liberal state or a predatory state. The findings above 
reveal that the Indonesian government exercises the overlooking analysis of Indonesia’s Neo-
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DSM by reviving private economic interest. As Robinson argued, this was even until today 
not intended to weaken the ‘hegemony of the politico-bureaucrats’ in Indonesia (Leftwich 
1995). A review by Aspinall (2013) also found that it would also be wrong to exaggerate the 
decline of the state. Indonesia, under Suharto as well as SBY and Jokowi, has demonstrated 
similar characteristics.  
It can be thus be assumed that the argument by Stubbs (2009) on the evolution of Neo-DSM, 
even before the AFC, was matched with this thesis’s results. Stubbs (2009, p.9-10) stated: 
However, against these forces for change can be arrayed a number of factors which 
tended to promote the continuity of the DS. Most importantly, ideas and institutions 
have a ‘stickiness’ or resilience, usually referred to as ‘path dependency’, that 
ensures that they continue to be influential in terms of policy making even after the 
circumstances that elevated them to prominence have changed. The ideas and 
institutions that were associated with the period of the emergence of the DS became 
highly entrenched because they were associated with the transformation of the 
economy from poverty and social dislocation to a measure of prosperity few had 
dreamed could be attained. 
In the future, the trajectory of Indonesia’s development path cannot be simply comprehended 
as in or out of the global capitalistic system, either by being a weak or strong state. It is a way 
of balancing its position in the competing world or be mentioned by Thurbon and Weiss 
(2016, p. 641)   as ‘security imperative’. 
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Chapter 5: PT Semen Indonesia’s Global Expansion—Build the 
State’s Power 
The previous chapter has explained the connection between Indonesia’s development context 
and the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia in general. This was included in the infrastructure 
and cement industry as a part of the national priorities, which are discussed in Chapter 5. The 
chapter sets out how the Indonesian bureaucracy (organisational architecture and mindset) of 
SOEs worked and how the institutional links between the SOEs and the state (ministries and 
government institutions) should be managed. Therefore, to appreciate the background to this 
expansion process, this chapter will address the findings of research into the growth phase of 
PT Semen Indonesia and examine the implications of its strategic direction.  
The Company’s expansion exemplifies the interrelationship between objectives, phases and 
supporting factors in the expansion activities of an EMMNC. This interrelationship is crucial 
to understanding PT Semen’s internal capacity, its role in Indonesian national economy 
specifically and its role in the global economy in general. There are strong correlations 
between company growth and state–business relations during the Suharto term. The success 
Indonesia company for decades must therefore be an integral part of the Indonesian economic 
growth story as a whole.  
This chapter argues that the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia is reflected in at least three 
major changes: in share ownership, management structure and performance. The 
transformation began when the company decided to become an independent publicly listed 
company in 1991. Autonomy has influenced the company’s ability to adapt and innovate. 
Past experience with private and foreign companies’ partners also affects how the company 
was run; this was reflected by the change of the company’s ownership to now be a public 
company. Privatisation fell short of creating a wholly market-oriented corporation. However. 
there was a huge opposition from those on the inside to extensive reform, especially foreign 
share ownership by Cemex
50
. On this issue, economic nationalists succeed in preventing the 
state company from being sold to foreign shareholders. PT Semen remained mainly owned by 
the Indonesian government, which regards it as a strategic asset.   
                                                             
50 The Mexican cement company which was previously described in Chapter 3.  
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On the management side, the issue of holding the company together and facilitating internal 
and external cooperation was a challenge. It takes gradual transformation in decades to build 
a strategic holding, as PT Semen Indonesia has today. The achievement is attributable to ex-
director Dwi Suciptjo’s capacity to handle the internal conflict between subsidiaries and to 
create the conditions for production and market share to increase. PT Semen Indonesia is one 
of the most successful Indonesian SOEs due to its innovation and growth in terms of its 
production capacity and its ability to adjust to dynamic markets at the national and global 
levels. This is evident from the company’s competence to survive as a key player in the 
national cement industry, its acquisition in Vietnam and its growing market in the region. 
 
Figure 5.1: PT Semen Indonesia Evolution from Independent Company to Strategic 
Holding Company.  
Source: Semen Indonesia Tbk(2011, 2016a, 2016d, 2018) 
5.1 PT Semen Indonesia: An Indonesian Successful, State-Owned Holding 
Company  
Today, PT Semen Indonesia is the biggest cement holding group (Young 2016, p. 7) in 
Indonesia and one of the top five in Southeast Asia, after Siam Group and Holcim (Soetjipto 
2014), especially after its recent acquisition process of Holcim Indonesia (Jakarta Post  
2018). At its establishment as a strategic holding group in 2012, PT Semen Indonesia only 
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consisted of four subsidiaries: PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen Padang, PT Semen Tonasa and 
Thang Long Cement (TLCC). Today, with the addition of PT Semen Kupang and PT Semen 
Indonesia Aceh, there are six affiliates of the group (Semen Indonesia Tbk2016d, see Figure 
5.1). Among cement companies in the country, PT Semen Indonesia is considered the most 
successful based on its productivity, market share
51
 and management structure. In recent 
years, its production capacity has risen along with its market share, making it one of the top 
cement producers in the Southeast Asian region (HN Chandra, Ambari 2018). The 
management is likewise more synergised, internal conflict like spin off has been minimised. 
Meanwhile, the company is likely to continue growing as Indonesia’s cement consumption 
still one of the lowest in the region. Therefore, this subsection will compare and contrast the 
condition of the company before and after the expansion to understand the nature, context 
and process of its transformation. 
5.1.1 Indonesia’s Top Cement Producer 
To understand the business capacity of PT Semen Indonesia as a cement producer, there must 
be a comparison between its production and market share before and after expansion to note 
the company’s competitive advantage and assets. Before expansion refers to the period when 
PT Semen Indonesia was still an independent company (from 1957 to 1991), whereas the 
period after commenced from the time when it became an operating holding (since 1995). 
From Figure 5.2, it is clear that there was a significant rise on the period of pre and post 
consolidation subsidiaries.  
PT Semen Gresik’s production size alone was once the highest in Indonesia in the decades 
before its incorporation into PT Semen Gresik Group in 1995 (Soetjipto 2014; Plunkett et al. 
1997). Gresik’s capacity production was 500 thousand tonnes from 1957 to 1974, which is 
five times larger than another cement SOE, PT Semen Tonasa. However, the privately-owned 
company, Indocement
52
, surpassed PT Semen Gresik to win 42 per cent of the total domestic 
market in the early 1990s (Soetjipto 2014) and 40 per cent in 1994 (see Figure 5-7).  
                                                             
51 Market share is the percentage of total sales (volume or revenue) that is claimed by a supplier in a 
particular market (Times 2018).  
52 PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa (a Salim company) was a private company established in 1985 (TBKP 
2019) and owned by Liem Sioe Liong. It enjoyed privileges from Suharto before he stepped down in the 
late 1990s. There were at least two controversial government policies over the cement company. The first 
was when the government decided to rescue the bankrupt company by taking 35% of the shares for 
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Gresik’s relative decline was influenced by at least two main factors. The first related to what 
has been explained in the Chapter 1, that PT Semen Gresik lacked capital to expand while the 
government could not provide sufficient financial assistance. Second, while PT Semen Gresik 
suffered financially, the private company Indocement enjoyed a privileged position by virtue 
of being owned by members of President Suharto’s family (Plunkett et al. 1997). Thus, it had 
much financial and political support from Suharto, including being given a prominent role in 
the national construction project. PT Semen Gresik sometimes had to face intense 
‘favouritism’ competition with Indocement.  
Table 5-1 Cement Companies in Indonesia 1994. 

























Private/Public/Govt 9 Citereup, 




Private/public 3 Narogong , 




Private  1 Cilacap, 
















Govt  1 Kupang, 
NTT  
0.12 1 
 Total  27  23.60 100 
Source: Plunkett, Morgan and Pomeroy (1997, p. 82). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
US$325 million in 1985 (Dieleman 2007). The next one was when the government issued a ministerial 
decree to let the company sell its share in the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1989 (Dieleman 2007).  
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Figure 5.2 PT Semen Indonesia Before and After Consolidation with Subsidiaries. 
Source: Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012, p. 10). 
Following the initiation of the operating holding process in 1995, which was approved by 
Suharto himself, the production capacity of the expanded PT Semen Gresik Group (PT 
Semen Gresik, PT Semen Padang and PT Semen Tonasa) made the group the largest 
producer in Indonesia (see Figure 5.3, Semen Indonesia Tbk2010, p. 3). This marks a 
significant reorientation of state power since the end of the Suharto era, away from private 
patronage to regulated state direction. The latest data indicates that PT Semen Indonesia was 
still the top cement producer in Indonesia, with 40.8 per cent of Indonesia’s market share 
(Semen Indonesia Tbk2018, p. 29). Technically, since the principle of ‘ready to change’ was 
a part of the gradual transformation process, in 2007, the group started implementing an 
integrated scheme in five aspects: production report, total productive maintenance, security 
parts, best practices and safety health and environment (Semen Gresik Tbk 2008). The five 
aspects became the baseline of the group formation and management consolidation, ensuring 
that production by each member company was regulated and consistent with the strategy (see 
Table 5-1). Each company in the group remained responsible for its own management. Each 
had its own board of directors and commissioners who worked by following the rules and 
standards set by PT Semen Indonesia, including the kind of product it produced and the 
quality of products, the quantity, what raw materials it used and what kind of technology and 
human resources it needed. 
Table 5-2 PT Semen Indonesia Cement Production 2016-2017 
Million tonnes Jan-17 Jan-16 Change (%) 
Indonesia    
Semen Indonesia 1.23 1.20 2.7% 
Semen Padang 0.44 0.52 -16.0% 
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Semen Tonasa 0.45 0.43 3.3% 
Total domestic 2.12 2.16 -1.7% 
Exports 0.07 0.03 91.7% 
Total volume from Indonesia 2.18 2.19 -0.3% 
Vietnam    
Domestic Vietnam 0.11 0.11 -4.2% 
Exports 0.12 0.03 258.6% 
Total volume from Vietnam 0.22 0.14 56.3% 
Total volume 2.41 2.33 3.2% 
Source: Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk(2017) 
 
Figure 5.3: PT Semen Indonesia Subsidiaries (Functional Holding).  
Source: Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk(2010, p. 3). 
Like the production strategy that integrated and improved after the holding group was 
established, the distribution was also transformed significantly. Every sub-company’s 
distribution and market structure became controlled by the parent—PT Semen Gresik 
Group—and each was restricted to servicing the market within distinct territorial zones. The 
west part of Indonesia was covered by PT Semen Padang, the central part by PT Semen 
Gresik and PT Semen Tonasa in Eastern Indonesia (see Figure 5.4, Semen Indonesia Semen 
Indonesia Tbk2010, p. 3). This meant that the market share was divided based on its 
proximity. The closest market will be served by the closest subsidiaries. The quality of 
management system was improved, the coordination between elites in each company were 
intensified and there was a more conducive and reliable company group. This was considered 
a positive change because it managed an internal competition between subsidiaries (OpCo). 
This is explained by Dwi Suciptjo as a strategic business management, which successfully 
managed internal conflict and maximised efficiency. It also helped the government control 
the domestic market. In that respect, we can observe the guiding interest of the Indonesian 
state in this gradual evolution of PT Semen Indonesia.  
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PT Semen Indonesia and the Indonesian government believed that the national cement 
capacity must be upgraded. The company’s blueprint thus required the group to raise its 
production capacity to meet the market demand and stabilise the market share, especially in 
the domestic area (Semen Indonesia Tbk2009, p. 36). Specifically, PT Semen Indonesia’s 
business expansion was designed based on certain considerations, as follows (Persero 2013, 
p. 62): 
1) the huge demand for cement product that was driven by Indonesia’s population 
growth 
2) government spending on infrastructure projects through the MP3I  
3) the opportunity for increasing cement consumption, which has been \low in Indonesia 
compared to countries in the region  
4) Indonesia’s stable economy, even during the GFC downturn of global economy, 
which fed optimism on domestic cement growth  
5) Indonesia’s attractiveness as an investment destination, which creates further 
economic development opportunities and leads to an increased demand for cement 
6) Identification of many new potential markets, especially in Southeast Asia. 
 
Figure 5.4: Indonesia’s Domestic Cement Consumption and Installed Capacity.  
Source: Ernest and Young (2016, p. 6). 
Table 5-3 PT Semen Indonesia Domestic Total Sales 2015-2017.  
No  Area   
 






2017 2016 2015 
1 Sumatera   6.006.918 5.753.818 5.699.370 0.96 4,4 
2 Java   14.041.432 12.721.644 13.035.935 -2,48 10,5 
3 Kalimantan   1.720.449 1.748.593 2.145.828 -18,51 -1,6 
4 Sulawesi   3.397.508 3.374.169 3.031.851 11,29 0,7 
5 Bali Nusa Tenggara   1.175.822 1.228.192 1.295.451 -5,19 -4,3 
6 East Indonesia   749.600 864.727 760.355 13,73 -13,3 
 Total   27.091.728 25.682.143 25.968.789 -1,1 5,5 
Source: Semen Indonesia (2017a, p. 103) 
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Figure 5.5: Global Cement Consumption in Kilograms Per Capita.  
Source: reprinted from Semen Indonesia (2010, p. 9). 
For these reasons, cement production has continued to grow in Indonesia (see Figure 5.5). 
Meanwhile consumption has increased steadily year after year since 2011 and, although 
capacity now far outstrips demand, demand is variable by region (see Table 5.2). If the 
Indonesian state continues to support infrastructure growth and the economy expands as 
anticipated, then demand can be expected to catch up. Indonesia’s cement consumption is the 
lowest in Southeast Asia (see Figure 5.6 above). The data from Table 5.2 also indicated how 
cement sales fluctuate in other parts of Indonesia outside Java (see Figure 5.7), especially 
since 2017. However, the low growth in cement consumption has been related to the global 
downturn economy after the 2008 crisis affected the property sector and the infrastructure 
bottleneck. There has been an imbalance in Indonesia’s development between its needs for 
physical infrastructure and the data in reality. When the domestic consumption was lower 
than predicted, oversupply threatened the national industry. The government has predicted 
this oversupply condition as a problem before, when it noted massive Chinese exports to 
Indonesia. Unfortunately, instead of reducing the domestic production, the government kept 
offering new foreign companies business trade licences and permits due to multilateral and 
bilateral deals that would open Indonesia’s cement industry. However, this unfortunate 
condition raised internal concern. According to ASI, the establishment of foreign companies 
was not fair to the existing companies and the government must thus conduct a cement 
moratorium (Indonesia 2018). At present, there has been 15 cement producers in Indonesia’s 
domestic market. In the early 2000s, there were only nine, including the three that were 
folded into PT Semen Indonesia (see Table 5-3 Semen Indonesia 2017, p.2; Ministry of 
Public Works 2012). This indicated two causes: first, it can be viewed as over-confidence by 
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the Indonesian state or, second, a determined push by the government to drive down the cost 
of cement to encourage infrastructure development and thereby stimulate national economic 
growth. Whichever the truth may be, the oversupply has been unfavourable for Indonesia’s 
cement industry, at least in the past couple years.  
 
Figure 5.6: Indonesia's Cement Consumption, 2011–2015.  
Source: Ernst & Young (2016, p. 11). 
Table 5-4 Cement Companies in Indonesia.  
Cement Companies in 2017 Cement Companies in 2008 
Semen Indonesia Semen Gresik 
Indocement TP Indocement TP 
Lafarge Holcim Indonesia Lafarge Holcim Indonesia 
Semen Merah Putih Semen Padang 
Semen Bosowa Semen Bosowa 
Semen Anhui Conch Semen Tonasa 
Semen Baturaja Semen Baturaja 
Semen Pan Asia Semen Kupang 
Siam Cement Group Semen Andalas Indonesia 
Semen Jui Shin  
Semen Serang (Haohan)  
Semen Jakarta  
Semen Hippo (Sun Fook)  
Semen Kupang  
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Semen Puger  
Source: Semen Indonesia (Persero) (2017, p. 2); Umum (2012) 
For PT Semen Indonesia, this increasingly competitive market environment has been a main 
concern. Market share has come under intense pressure and there has consequently been 
renewed focus on the rationalisation of management functions and better coordination of 
distribution to not only remains competitive, but to increase market shares overseas (Semen 
Indonesia Tbk2016a, p. 1; Persero 2017, p. 109). The effectiveness of PT Semen Indonesia’s 
response can be measured by its record of consistent market share both in domestic and 
international. Despite the presence of new competitors, PT Semen Indonesia successfully 
increased its assets since 2015 (see Table 5-4 Semen Indonesia Tbk2018, p. 27). PT Semen 
Indonesia also used an inorganic strategy to manage the fierce competition, even before it 
happened. The group had secured its traditional market by acquiring cement plant in North 
and South Vietnam in the period of AEC launching. Early this year, the company also 
surprisingly decided to take over of Holcim Indonesia as a part of its national expansion 
program (Semen Indonesia Tbk2012, 2019). Both of those two strategic decisions helped the 
company be closer to the market and find new potential business areas across the region, 
while also broadening its area to its southern neighbour, Australia. This can be observed in 
the flow of PT Semen Indonesia’s cement products to several countries that were previously 
not recorded (see Table 5-5). 
Table 5-5 PT Semen Indonesia's Assets.  
Description Unit 
Reporting Period 




5,356 5,902 6,196 

















Quantity of Product 
Sold 
Million Metric Ton 
29.60 27.60 27.68 
Total Assets Million IDR 48,963,503 44,226,895 38,153,118 






Table 5-6 PT Semen Indonesia’s Overseas Total Sales 2015-17.  
Negara Tujuan 2017 2016 2015 Growth 2017 (%) 
Australia 20.067 - - 0.0 
Maldives 81.656 61.386 - 33.0 
Myanmar 8.005 - - 0.0 
Philippines 45.500 35.613 - 27.8 
Srilanka 696.557 299.207 397.446 132.8 
Taiwan 25.000 -  0.0 
Timor Leste 155.601 94.781 - 64.2 
Yaman - 19.000 84.497 -100.0 
Total Ekspor 1.032.386 509.987 481.984 102.4 
Source: not including clinker sale reprinted from Persero (2017, p. 104) 
5.1.2 International Standards: We Are Ready 
Some scholars suggest that the organisation of a company tends to be influenced by cultural 
factors, including the cultural identity of employees and their values (Burton, Cross & 
Chapman 1999, p. 100). It is argued that there is a stronger community orientation among 
people from Asian countries and that extensive evidence exists of a different form of 
corporate culture in Asian EMMNCs, which are family-owned businesses. Dicken (2011) 
highlighted the economic virtues of Asia, including strong work ethics and social contracts, 
national teamwork for the good of the nation and family, and a strong government, rather 
than strong individuals. Confucian values in Japan, Korea, China and other East Asian 
countries were popular as instruments of developmental success, including self-discipline, 
hierarchy and pragmatic ends (Kim, AE & Park 2003, p. 38). Economic nationalism, which 
was identified in the context of ownership and control for developmental legitimacy, was also 
regarded as the inspiration of NICs (Amsden 2001, p. 191; Weiss 2003, p. 307; Wilson 
2015b, p. 404).  
Developing countries’ business in general is conventionally regarded as hierarchical and 
bureaucratic—or inefficient and dependent on interpersonal business networks instead of 
skills and professionalism. Therefore, political scientists like Aspinall (2013), Athukorala 
(2010), Hadiz, VR and Robison (2013, p. 14) and Quah (2017), or economists like Hill 
(2014), regard the ‘Asian way’ as prone to corruption, nepotism and collusion. 
Unsurprisingly, the 1997 AFC marked the beginning of corporate governance transformation 
in Indonesia, which was influenced by a Western liberalisation agenda. However, this process 
of ‘Westernisation’ by international regimes such as the IMF and the World Bank has been 
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slow to progress in Indonesia and, as discussed in Chapter 3, privatisation was not uniformly 
pursued by successive governments Jakarta Post -AFC.  
As previously explained, this slow progress of implementation was deliberate because 
Indonesian governments sought to retain a direct influence over strategic sectors of the 
economy. The semi-privatisation of PT Semen Indonesia has prompted reforms to the 
company’s management, but only over a long period of time. Simply put, it took almost 10 
years after the privatisation for PT Semen Indonesia to establish its own model of corporate 
governance. PT Semen Indonesia did not have any corporate governance guidelines until 
2006, although this does not mean that the company lacked accountability before then. The 
company has a more rigorous and explicit corporate governance mechanism today, and its 
reforms have been much more progressive compared to other SOEs.  
Even so, the problem with successfully establishing reform is connected to the notion that the 
mechanism of business best practice in emerging economies like Indonesia is not 
standardised. Put differently, company or government agency policies often do not have a 
well-defined and clear legal base. When PT Semen Indonesia adapted a basic corporate 
governance system, Indonesia still lacked a specific regulation on corporate governance. 
However, by being semi-private, the company was forced to gradually transform to be more 
accountable to its shareholders.
53
 These market pressures have been supplemented by recent 
good corporate governance (GCG) regulations, with which PT Semen Indonesia must comply 
(BUMN 2016). These regulations include: 
1) Ministerial Regulation of Minister of SOE No.PER 01/MBU/2011—about the 
Implementation of Good Corporate Governance in SOE  
2) Ministerial Regulation of Minister of SOE No. PER 21/MBU/2012—about the 
Guideline of SOE Financial Accountability Implementation  
3) Circular Letter No.SE-07/MBU/09/2014—about SOE Obligation to Announce 
Summary of Financial Statement  
4) Ministerial Regulation of Minister of SOE No.PER-02/MBU/2013—about Guidelines 
for SOE’s Development of Technology and Information Management  
                                                             
53 Interview with Staff from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 25 October 2016, Jakarta. 
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5) Decision of Secretary Ministry of SOE No.SK-16/S.MBU/2012—about Assessment 
and Evaluation Indicators/Parameters for SOE Good Corporate Governance 
Implementation. 
The process of forming a strategic holding company over the past five years was also the key 
factor that impelled the adoption of GCG. The company believed that to accelerate the 
integration within the group, it was crucial to have a corporate culture that encouraged greater 
intra-group cooperation (Persero 2017, p. 262). For PT Semen Indonesia itself, GCG is more 
than just rules and practices because the company’s competitiveness depends on efficient and 
effective management processes throughout the production cycle (Persero 2017, p. 43). While 
many could build a cement plant if they had the capital, the intangible competitive advantage 
of corporate culture is harder to acquire because it must be built over time. Even if aspects of 
the so-called ‘Asian way’ live on in Indonesian corporate life, the statistical evidence of PT 
Semen Indonesia’s growth and competitiveness suggests that espoused principles have been 
implemented. The company’s code of conduct and GCG rules in the areas of openness, 
independence, accountability and fairness communicate a different kind of corporate culture 
and indicate a company that is undergoing cultural change. Exemplars of performance 
initiatives include: 
1) CHAMPS—PT Semen Indonesia aims to strengthen its human resources through the 
application of two methods: a regulated corporate culture and the company’s 
remuneration system. The corporate culture of PT Semen Indonesia—known as 
CHAMPS—is an acronym for ‘compete with a clear synergised vision’; ‘have a high 
spirit for continuous learning’; ‘act with high accountability’; ‘meet customer 
expectation’; ‘perform ethically with high integrity’; and ‘strengthening teamwork’. 
The CHAMPS culture for PT Semen Indonesia includes values that build and reflect 
an employee’s identity (Persero 2013), while the remuneration is implemented based 
on the key performance indicator (KPI) and employee performance management 
system (EPMS) (Persero 2013). 
2) Whistle Blowing—Whistle blowing is an important mechanism for corporate reform. 
The company’s reporting system works for three categories of GCG violations: 
corruption and economic crime, general crimes and violation of the company’s policy. 
The process of this whistle blowing system consists of several steps. The whist blower 
may report the misconduct that she or he witnessed with proof by email or by letter to 
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the report team called Tim Pelaporan Pelanggaran Perseroan. If the report is proved 
true, then the whistle blower will be protected and granted a reward. Otherwise, the 
person will be punished through dismissal or demotion (SEMEN INDONESIA 
TBK2016a). However, the decision will be made by the board of commissioners or 
directors, depending on the category (Persero 2017, p. 262). In 2016, there were seven 
cases reported, two of which through letter and five through emails (SEMEN 
INDONESIA TBK2016a).  
3) Code of Ethics/Conduct—This code of ethics became a guideline and code of conduct 
for all parts of the company, its employees, subsidiaries and affiliates, as well as other 
stakeholders. To assure that the code of ethics is applied, the company requires a 
statement letter that must be signed each year by all staff, including managers and 
executives. The statement affirms that the signatory is free from receiving or giving 
anything that may raise conflict of interest and/or descent public trust in the 
company’s integrity (Persero 2017, p. 261) In 2014, the company reported 16 
gratification cases to Indonesian Commission for Corruption. There were 11 cases 
executed by the gratification unit, one of which was returned to the receiver and four 
were taken by the state (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2014).  
How have the values of the company been reshaped? The answer is that Western and 
Indonesian values have become hybridised through a gradual process of negotiation. PT 
Semen Indonesia has adopted a performance-based culture as part of its identity and as part 
of its internal disciplinary regime of governance. The internalisation of GCG involved a 
significant culture change. The catalyst was the 1995 crisis, when Cemex became a part of 
the company. From Dwi Suciptjo’s perspective, a lack of clear principles in the company’s 
rules had created an opportunity for certain parties to take advantage of the company. The 
demonstration and protest of PT Semen Indonesia’s employees, due to the ensuing conflict 
discussed in the previous chapter, was harmful for the company. The company’s stock went 
down, as did production. With divisions between subsidiaries and between employees and 
management, there were fears that the company could be going bankrupt. PT Semen Padang 
did not send its financial report to parent company, PT Semen Gresik, as a part of its protest 
against Cemex’s presence. As a consequence of PT Semen Padang’s disobedience, the parent 
company—PT Semen Gresik—had to replace the management boards to keep the company 
under its control. Dwi Suciptjo mentioned in his book that Mr Satriyo, PT Semen Gresik 
group president director at that time, stated: 
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From the beginning we actually did not expect a change of board of directors. Hope 
that the company is managed well and professionally. Good management, in the 
sense of not neglecting the element of society who lived around it. (Soetjipto 2014, 
p. 41) 
He responded with his new management approach, believing that by having a defined code of 
conduct within the company, any future conflict could be minimised. He understood that it is 
crucial for PT Semen Indonesia to have procedures of transparency and accountability, 
especially to its investors, to survive. The performance-based culture was adapted and 
became the basis for human capital assessment. After years of GCG implementation, PT 
Semen Indonesia has hundreds of awards, such as the company’s achievement on GCG 
practice, the most trusted company in 2012 by SWA magazine and for GCG from the 
Indonesian institute for corporate directorship (Persero 2017, p. 74).   
PT Semen Indonesia’s implementation of GCG has been driven by the motivation to build 
public trust and increase business performance. Those good intentions were observed by the 
staff as a better method for adjusting to the globalised business environment. This is because 
with GCG, the workers are provided with incentives, promotions, transfers to foreign or 
better positions and other interests if they have a high performance based on KPIs (PT Semen 
Indonesia [Persero]; Semen Indonesia Tbk 2012). The Western-adopted paradigm was then 
respected, if not approved, by the company’s entire element. This was because Dwi Suciptjo 
openly communicated and recognised everyone’s opinions. Still, the performance approach is 
impossible to distance from the social context in Indonesia. To some extent, PT Semen 
Indonesia was ‘born’ and ‘lives’ in the community. Employees are attached to their 
Indonesian identity and social norms. Collectivism is important for them and they are not just 
co-workers to each other. Internally, cooperation is more valued than competition. The value 
of respect to authority and elders, loyalty and solidarity is entrenched, but not to the extent 
that employees are subservient. Soetjipto (2014, p. 232) acknowledged that these values 
would remain as PT Semen Indonesia’s identity and that this method was the key to ending 
the internal conflict of the company that is discussed in Chapter 6. By building a culture of 
mutual trust and by building personal relations between workers through music and sport, he 
forged an identity for the company that was founded on principles of harmony and kinship 
(Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2016, p. 29). This was at once traditionalist but also 
resonant with modern culture management techniques that are advocated by business 
progressives and leading management thinkers. 
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The above exemplifies how PT Semen Indonesia modernised its internal management 
processes to conform to contemporary global business management techniques, while also 
remaining within the political and economic governance structure of the Indonesian neo-
developmental state. The foundation laid by Suciptjo has been instrumental in the company’s 
success; the company has been able to increase the value of its stock. The early beginning of 
GCG implementation has contributed to the company’s durability and helped it avoid any 
corruption scandals. However, the new president director, Rini Soemarno, has sought to 
further modernise PT Semen Indonesia. In an open letter about the new management style, 
Soemarno has indicated that the sociocultural approach of Dwi Suciptjo is less important. 
This is indicative of an even less-personalised mode of management that is more akin to the 
ideal of a company as a collection of detached contractual obligations on the part of its 
employees, which is akin to the contractual model of the firm in Western business literature. 
This should not, however, detract from the observation that SOEs remain integral to 
economic developmentalism in Indonesia and that state-run firms are amenable to efficiency 
reform in the long term.  
Many have suggested that SOEs can be improved with programs to reform corporate 
governance (Musacchio & Lazzarini 2012, p. 44). Even though a company must have sound 
legal infrastructure, as Hoskisson et al. (2000) claimed, to have effective corporate 
governance, as the legal supports for good governance only evolved slowly in the Indonesian 
context. Nevertheless, the company proved to be highly adaptive to its changing, competitive 
environment. The success of PT Semen Indonesia in dominating the market share was also 
due to its capacity to catch up to the newest technology. Unlike high technology products that 
have a dynamic market and short life circle, cement product used high technology, but the 
dynamic is more moderate because it uses more complex and heavy appliances. PT Semen 
Indonesia has been innovative compared to its competitors in terms of technology. However, 
the company still relied on Europe for its main machinery
54
. Nevertheless, that disadvantage 
contrarily became an advantage because it suited their FDI host countries’ condition better 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti 2014).  
EMMNCs are too often searching for cost efficiency but lack research and development 
quality. However, this is not the case for PT Semen Indonesia, even before it expanded 
                                                             
54 Interview with Echelon Staff, Indonesian Ministry of SOEs, 26 October 2016, Jakarta. 
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abroad. The company ensured that it has updated technology to have efficient and eco-
friendly production activities (Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2015, p. 49). This was 
accomplished by placing research and development as one of the company’s priorities. By 
using sophisticated equipment and building advanced clinkers, PT Semen Indonesia produced 
the best quality for cement products. It also supported the company to save material and 
energy resources. There have been many achievements based on its capacity to harness new 
technologies. By way of illustration, in 2015, the company built a partnership with Japan and 
constructed a waste heat recovery power generation in some of its subsidiaries to change 
from being energy based to being a sustainable power plant (Semen Indonesia Semen 
Indonesia Tbk2015, p. 149). Since then, PT Semen Indonesia has been one of the most 
efficient SOEs in Indonesia because it could reduce its dependency on energy from PLN.  
The company’s capacity to innovate was evident even before the plan to expand 
internationally and it has been advantageous for growth in the long run. Practically, cement 
plants need fuel and coal to operate and most of the production costs were spent on this 
variable cost. For this reason, the company had switched to alternative fuel. Succeeding in 
minimising the risk of relying on oil and coal in production, the company succeeded in 
raising its profits. As the company stated:  
The growth in profitability is a result of the company’s accomplishment in 
controlling the trend of production cost increase, through cost management strategy 
implemented through a range of efficiency programs. Even though encountering 
fuel price escalation in the middle of the year, the cost control management had kept 
the cost of revenue and operating expenses. (PT Semen Gresik [Persero] Tbk 2008, 
p. 32) 
The innovation became one of the key sources of competitiveness for the company, 
especially from Dwi Suciptjo’s time in office. As highlighted in the company’s 2012 annual 
report (PT Semen Indonesia [Persero] Tbk, p. 43): 
The company used innovation as intellectual capital to enhance competitiveness and 
achieve sustainable growth. In order to foster the spirit of innovation, the company 
continuously explores creative ideas which are in line with the company’s strategy 
and provides awards for the best innovations. 
Suciptjo was a moderniser, and his leadership had brought many positive changes to the 
company, especially the adoption of new technology and the encouragement of innovation. 
He pushed for PT Semen Indonesia to be a centre of excellence, an Indonesian SOE 
143 
‘powerhouse’, and facilitated the Semen Indonesia Center of The Champs (SICC) to promote 
managerial change in the wider Indonesian economy. In line with the establishment of SICC, 
Suciptjo also fostered an internal innovation competition in OpCo and employees’ levels 
called Semen Indonesia Award on Innovation (SIAI) with five categories: raw materials and 
products, technology and production process, management, subsidiaries and company 
affiliates. As a result, the competition has boosted the company’s innovation because the best 
idea in the competition was then learned and applied as part of the company’s strategy (PT 
Semen Indonesia [Persero] Semen Indonesia Tbk 2012, p. 43). Suciptjo has been influential 
to the company’s innovation culture, even until today. However, some of the corporate 
culture which he has created has been diminished by the new management. For instance, 
Hendi Jakarta Post poned the overseas expansion in Bangladesh and other targeted countries, 
focuses on the national projects instead, changed the management structure of PT Semen 
Tonasa and PT Semen Padang and made some controversial decisions, such as hiring experts 
outside the company (Jakarta Post  2018; Wahyudianto 2018; Nasional 2018).  
5.1.3 Indonesian Share Ownership 
This chapter explained the special status of the Minister for SOEs in the architecture of SOE 
governance. The Indonesian government has more than a 50 per cent of the total share if PT 
Semen Indonesia, which entitles the Indonesian government to control the crucial decision-
making in the company. However, Indonesian corporate law (Law No. 40/2007—about 
Limited Liability Company), until 2017 did not explicitly distinguish types of shareholders 
based on the quantity of shares owned (either majority or minority). According to Indonesian 
Law No 40/2007, in Listed Company under article 53 paragraph 4, shareholders are 
categorised based on their rights instead of the amount of the share (Pramono 2012, p. 7). 
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This also clarifies the difference between Indonesia’s stock regulation and that of other 
countries (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 1). The existing business law (including the Law No. 
40/2007—about Limited Liability Company) only acknowledged stock based on five 
categorisations, which are:  
1) shares with voting rights or without 
                                                             
55 In Indonesian Corporate Law, the ownership does not define by the amount of stock. This is in line with the 
fact that there are differences of corporate law across the world, based on four broad ‘families’ of law: English, 
or common, law, French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law. In accordance with this, 
Indonesia has been refereed to French Civil Law, which was adopted from the Dutch (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 2). 
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2) shares with a special right to nominate members of the Board of Directors and/or 
members Board of Commissioners  
3) shares that, after certain time, are withdrawn or exchanged with classification of other 
shares 
4) shares giving the holder the right to receive more dividends formerly of other 
classification holders of cumulative dividend distributions or noncumulative 
5) shares giving the holder the right to receive first of the other classification of 
shareholders in the distribution of the company’s remaining assets and liquidation. 
The running of Indonesian SOEs was instead based on a majority or controlling share 
mechanism, known as Series A Dwiwarna Share. However, the term was not directly used or 
explicitly stated in the law, including in Law No. 19/2003 (as explained in the previous 
chapter). The law only revealed the government rights related to the share it owned. The 
absence of specific legal mention of a majority or controlling shareholders left important 
gaps, and questions thus had to be answered, in the Articles of Association of Indonesian 
Listed SOEs, particularly on the issue of shareholder’s rights. In the formation of PT Semen 
Indonesia as a strategic holding company, it was decided that a clarification of shareholder 
rights was necessary. The Ministry of SOEs sent recommendation letters to state-owned 
companies in which the definition of Series A Dwiwarna Share was clearly explained.
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Overall, the letter pointed out that Series A Dwiwarna Share is a share that was exclusively 
owned by Indonesia, which grants its holders the privileges of being a shareholder.  
In reference to the letters, listed SOEs then proposed the agenda to revise their articles of an 
association were to follow the new standard. The Article of Association of PT Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia might become an example. It confirmed on the website that the Series A 
shareholder has the privilege, as explained below (PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia [Persero] Tbk. 
2017):  
 to nominate members of the Bank’s Board of Directors or Board of Commissioners 
 to approve the appointment and dismissal of members of the Board of Directors or 
Board of Commissioners 
                                                             
56 The accessible data found applies only to the Banking sector; however, the staff of the Ministry of SOEs 
confirmed that such a recommendation was given to all SOEs (Letter of the Ministry of SOEs No. 
116/MBU/03/2017; Letter of the Ministry of SOEs No. 163/MBU/03/2017) Due the letters not being 
available to the researcher, information about their content was gleaned from the internet.  
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 to approve the amendments of the Articles of Association, including capital 
amendment 
 to approve merger, consolidation, acquisition and divestment of the Bank; file for 
bankruptcy; and liquidation of the Bank 
 to request and/or receive reports from the board of commissioners 
 to request reports and elaboration on certain matters from the Board of Directors 
and/or Board of commissioners by taking into account the prevailing laws and 
regulations. 
Further, it is essential to note that a Series A Dwiwarna share is also a powerful category of 
financial instrument because it is not transferable, but held by the owner in perpetuity: 
The regulations of the Stock Exchange in Indonesia where the Company’s share are 
listed and the prevailing laws and regulations including the regulations on Capital 
Market shall apply to the transfer of shares listed in the Stock Exchange, except for 
the transfer of Series A Dwiwarna share which may not be transferred to anybody 
whomsoever (PT Bank Mandiri [Persero] Tbk 2018, p.34). 
The relationship between a Series A Dwiwarna shares and ownership is strong because it 
draws a line between what is possible in terms of share transfer. The Series A Dwiwarna 
share effectively cements state control because the share is non-transferrable, thereby placing 
a limit on privatisation. At stake in this is the power of the Indonesian parliament to exercise 
oversight over companies that were once wholly owned SOEs and in which the state still 
holds a major financial stake. This highly technical legal–commercial mechanism is a key to 
understanding the nature of state power in Jakarta Post -Suharto Indonesia and the strength of 
the desire among parliamentarians to preserve the nationalist orientation of Indonesian 
economic policy.  
Rising political concern over privatisation is also related to the fear that a holding company 
could theoretically allow the transfer of state shares without a need for approval from the 
House of Representatives, as stated by the newest law on Government Regulation No 
72/2016—about the Procedures on State Capital Administration and Equalisation of SOE and 
Limited Liability Companies.
57
 Opponents of the strategy to create strategic holding 
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 Before the law was issued, it had been mentioned during the interviews of staff from the Ministry of 
SOEs. The staff argued that the regulation was made to facilitate and provide a legal base for the holding 
creation. The interview with echelon staff, Indonesian Ministry of SOEs, 18 October 2016, in Jakarta.   
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companies for Indonesia’s SOEs argued that the legal process could automatically weaken 
the Indonesian government’s position (Jakarta Jakarta Post  2017). To the proponents of the 
holding company, policy argued that Series A shares guaranteed a role of the state in the 
governance of all SOEs. Moreover, it is argued that the government retains a strategic role in 




To address these concerns, PT Semen Indonesia’s Articles of Association were amended to 
define the rights of the majority shareholder. In the case of PT Semen Indonesia, in which the 
state is the majority shareholder, the same rules of state ownership should be applied, 
especially in terms of the rights and responsibilities of the majority shareholders. 
Unfortunately, the previous Articles of Association in 2015 and the latest document of 2017
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did not mention the Series A Dwiwarna share. Approval of the amended Articles was on the 
agenda at the shareholders’ meeting on 31 March 2017 (Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia 
Tbk2017). There were 11 privileges of the Series A Dwiwarna share proposed, as follows: 
1) an approval of amendments to the Articles of Association 
2) an approval of changes in capitalisation  
3) an approval of appointment and dismissal of the Board of Directors and Board of 
Commissioners 
4) an agreement regarding mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, segregation and 
dissolution 
5) a request and access of company data and documents 
6) an approval of remuneration of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners 
7) an approval of transfer of assets based on the Articles of Association, which shall be 
subject to the approval of the GMS 
8) an approval on the participation and reduction of the percentage of equity, 
participation in other companies based on the Articles of Association shall be subject 
to the approval of the GMS 
9) an approval of profit use 
                                                             
58 Today, the Indonesian government has 14.3 per cent of PT Indosat’s shares (Gosta 2015).   
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 However, until this thesis is finalised, none of PT Semen Indonesia (the old and the new articles of 
association—Akta Anggaran Dasar PT Semen Indonesia (Persero), which explicitly mentioned Series A 
shareholder’s right. This may due to PT Semen Indonesia’s position as a public company.  
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10) an approval on long-term investments and financing based on the Articles of 
Association, which shall be subject to the approval of the GMS 
11) proposing the GMS agenda. 
PT Semen Indonesia’s Articles of Association had not been clear on the rights and 
responsibilities of Series A shares. However, at the extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders in September 2017, there was discussion on the majority shareholder’s position. 
The upshot was that changes would be made in PT Semen Indonesia’s Article of Association 
(see Appendix 9): 
To grant power and authority to the State Shareholders of the Republic of Indonesia 
to amend and/or to amend the provisions of the Articles of Association of the 
company. (PT Semen Indonesia [Persero] Semen Indonesia Tbk 2017). 
Although the latest article of association (akta anggaran dasar PT Semen Indonesia Nomor 
69, 26 April 2017) has been approved by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, it cannot be 
accessed, even on the company’s website.   
Despite the difficulty of accessing the data of PT Semen Indonesia, it is possible to observe 
how powerful the majority shareholder is in the Indonesian corporate context, including 
within PT Semen Indonesia. Importantly, this has parallels with business laws in other 
countries, some of which are European Union members, such as Belgium and Germany, that 
specify the rules of majority ownership (Laprade 2012). It means that for strategic decisions 
within the company, including the amendment of an article of association, required an 
approval from a majority of shareholders. Though this content regarding articles of 
association might be different in other countries and companies, in which the control of a 
majority shareholders is limited to the general meeting of shareholders, it still illustrates the 
capacity of the shareholders outside the matter of dividends or profits. This has been 
implemented in continental European countries, who based their economy on ownership 
(Gelter 2009, p. 130).  
However, throughout its growth as a company, PT Semen Gresik/Indonesia has experienced 
changes in the terms of their share ownership. Taking this into account, the shift is significant 
in explaining the complexities of market and industrial reform in emerging economies like 
Indonesia, in which the debate over nationalism and liberalism remains unresolved. The first 
major shift occurred in 1991, when the company decided to publicly list its shares on the 
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Jakarta Stock Exchange. This was the first privatisation of an SOE by the Indonesian 
government. The company was determined to sell 27 per cent of its shares, equivalent to 
US$140 million, which were acquired by foreign institutions (Broadman 1995, p. 53). Most 
privatisations in Indonesia have been a response to economic crisis. The privatisation of PT 
Semen Indonesia was a consequence of declining oil prices in the 1980s, which severely 
affected state revenues. In March 1987, the Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial, 
and Industrial Affairs found that PT Semen Gresik (the prior name of PT Semen Indonesia) 
was the only SOE considered fit, in terms of economic performance, and financially ready to 
enter the capital market (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Departemen Hukum dan HAM 
RI 2005, pp. 16-7).   
The public offering was claimed to have been positive. For example, it prevented the SOE 
from rigid government supervision and monitoring and helped the company receive more 
funding in a flexible way. It also improved the company’s performance due to the new 
mechanism of public and private shareholder review. The company also called for frequent 
public reporting and audits by international audit companies (Broadman 1995, p. 53). These 
changes, argued by the proponents of privatisation, had contributed to transparency and 
efficiency and had helped to control rent-seeking behaviour. These changes also reflected the 
incorporation of the logic of privatisation into Indonesian economic policy. Profit, as much as 
public benefit, became enshrined in law as the purpose of state-directed businesses.  
The challenge for the state was to maintain control over the strategic sectors of the economy 
while allowing market and corporate governance processes to direct corporate decision-
making. It needs to be remembered that the cement industry is a national strategic sector in 
terms of natural resources and infrastructural development (Industry 2009b, p. 39). This is in 
line with the statement from Indonesia’s Minister of Industry:  
Investment assurance of strategic industrial development such as cement plant to be 
maintained because it brings multiple effects to the regional and national economy, 
such as the absorption of labour and the growth of cement-based small industries 
that can be develop for the people of Rembang and surrounding areas. (Industry 
2016) 
Further, the Director General of Chemical, Textile and Various Industries of the Ministry of 
Industry stated that ‘about 80 percent of cement consumption is used by the society’. By 
keeping the cement producers state run, or state directed, the Indonesian government is able 
to control the price and the supply demand of cement products. Hence, as this thesis asserts, 
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Jakarta Post -Suharto Indonesia retains the nationalistic orientations of the developmental 
state, but with important changes, including the complex matter of state shareholding that 
was discussed above. The technicalities of state regulation through various ministries, the 
legal ambiguities created by under-developed corporations’ laws and the amendments to 
articles of association to accommodate majority shareholder rights highlight the importance 
of institutional links between the state and economy through the medium of SOEs. 
For the neo-developmental state, then, economic governance is not a matter of patronage, but 
of finely nuanced administrative and legal manoeuvres to ensure that national and state 
interests remain paramount in the operations of semi-privatised companies. Regardless of the 
first public offering explained above, the most challenging ownership change occurred during 
the late Suharto to Megawati period and took the form of a seven-year dispute between the 
Indonesian government and Cementos Mexicanos (Cemex). The dispute started in 1998, 
under the Habibie government, which invited Cemex after it won the negotiation to be PT 
Semen Gresik Group’s strategic partner over Heidelberger and Holderbank. However, the 
political turmoil in consequence had limited Cemex to purchase 14 per cent of the shares for 
US$122.1 million of PT Semen Gresik (see Figure 5.8), although it was entitled to 25 per 
cent (Prasetyawan 2006, p. 55). Ultimately, Cemex succeeded in obtaining a 25 per cent 
stake, with the possibility to gain more shares of PT Semen Gresik in the future. The long-
term target for the government was to let Cemex become a majority shareholder by having 51 
per cent of the shares in 2001 (Ewing-Chow & Losari 2015, p. 7). The other privilege the 
Cemex could enjoy based on the contract was that it also had the right to appoint one vice-
director and one vice-commissioner (Detikcom 2006). This deal was considered 
disadvantageous for Indonesia because it weakened the government’s status within the 
company. 
 
Figure 5.7: Privatisation Process in 1995.  
Source: Professur für BWL (2007, p. 30). 
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The Indonesian state was, at the time, highly vulnerable to pressure from outside economic 
interests. The driver of part-privatisation in the case of PT Semen Gresik (see the time line) 
and other SOEs, was the 1998 AFC and an ensuing agreement between the Indonesian 
government and the IMF, based on the Letter of Intent in 1998
60
 (Irianto 2004 2004, p. 1) to 
introduce further market reforms. This agreement was not only about the part-privatisation of 
PT Semen Gresik (Indonesia) (see Table 5-6), but also about the broader structural 
adjustment on almost every part of Indonesian economy, including the abolishment of the 
cement price system and the privatisation of many SOEs (see Figure 5.9) (Professur für BWL 
2007, p. 7). It was all started when Habibie tried to find funding to overcome the state’s 
deficit (fiscal problem) (Prasetyawan 2006). The purpose of the privatisation was to obtain 
funding as quickly as possible for paying the foreign debt. IMF also suggested privatising the 
state asset because it believed that state intervention was the cause of Indonesia’s economic 
crisis.   
The actions of Cemex and the Indonesian government over PT Semen Group provoked 
public outrage, which was part of a general nationalistic reaction against the perceived unfair 
foreign interventions since the Mexican company took over the company in 1998. First was 
the dissatisfaction of workers regarding the massive termination of employment, which led to 
a protest of 3,000 workers (Professur für BWL 2007, p. 33). Second was the conflict of 
interest between the government and Cemex, because the international merchant bank, 
Goldman Sachs, also worked for both sides in the negotiation process (Professur für BWL 
2007, p. 32). Third were the suspicions among the workers and some Indonesian stakeholders 
of insider trading in the light of unusual trading volumes in PT Semen Gresik shares towards 
the end of the negotiation phase. The other explanation for this dispute was about the public 
objection. This was related to the larger implication to many interest groups like the local and 
national elites, the local and national society, and the workers who directly became a part of 
any reform inside the company. From the national elite, there was Azwar Anas,
61
 who was an 
influential figure in West Sumatera (where the PT Semen Padang is located). 
                                                             
60 A part of the SOE’s privatisation was included in part 3b of the document, ‘Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies’, which stated, ‘The review will be completed in six months and will result in a 
comprehensive program to improve fiscal efficiency and restructure state-owned enterprises and strategic 
industries. It will be the basis for an accelerated program of privatization’ (IMF 1997).  
61 Azwar Anas was a strong supporter of Ikhdan Nizar, who was the director of PT Semen Padang and 
Titik Nazif Lubuk, a local Golkar politician. At that time, Golkar was the most powerful political party in 
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Table 5-7 Indonesian Enterprises Slated for Privatisation  
State-Owned Company Industry Financial Adviser 
1. Telekomunikasi Indonesia Telecommunications Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers 
2. Indonesia Satellite (Indosat) Telecommunications Goldman Sachs 
3. Semen Gresik Cement Goldman Sachs 
4. Tambang Timah Tin mining Morgan Stanley, Banque Paribas 
5. Aneka Tambang Gold mining Morgan Stanley, Banque Paribas 
6. Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam Gold mining Morgan Stanley, Banque Paribas 
7. Jasa Marga Toll road operator Lehman Brothers 
8. Pelabuhan II (Pelindo II) Port operator Goldman Sachs 
9. Pelabuhan III (Pelindo III) Port operator Credit Suisse First Boston 
10. Angkasa Para II Airport manager UBS/SBC Warbug Dillon Read 
11. Perkebunan Nuisantara IV Plantation Jardine Fleming 
12. Krakatoa Steel Steel Salomon Smith Barney 
Source: Professur für BWL (2007, p. 26). 
The strongest resistance to foreign ownership came from local elites and communities. The 
most serious objection to Cemex’s involvement came from Semen Padang. Since PT Semen 
Padang was part of the PT Semen Gresik Group
62
, the sale of shares to foreign interests 
directly affected local shareholders and employees. Local interests thus asserted the 
nationalistic view that the raw materials of PT Semen Padang were owned by the provincial 
government and that the company was also a part of their local identity (Prasetyawan 2006, p. 
52).  
Political tensions made it impossible to reach a consensus and Cemex’s involvement thus 
ended in 2007. The minister responsible for SOEs at that time, Laksamana Sukardi, felt that 
he had no choice but to nullify the contract, even though the Indonesian government knew 
that cancellation would have consequences (Prasetyawan 2006, p. 54). Cemex objected to the 
Indonesian government’s stance and submitted their case to international arbitration at the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. They insisted that the Indonesian 
government broke the Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement, dated 17 September 1998. 
They also argued that the Indonesian government had violated the 1987 ASEAN Agreement 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investment in 2003 (Ewing-Chow & Losari 2015, p. 7). 
However, Cemex finally came to a settlement after the company decided to sell its 25 per 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the country. The three people were the defenders for keeping PT Semen Padang a state-run company and 
they thus insisted to separate the subsidiary with PT Semen Gresik if the privatisation plans continue to 
proceed (Prasetyawan 2006).  
62
 Suharto ordered the Ministry of Finance to unify the three biggest cement companies under one parent 
company, PT Semen Gresik. Thus, the Ministry of Finance Decision No. S-326/MK.016/1995 was issued. 
This will be explained later (Prasetyawan 2006, p. 54). 
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cent share to an Indonesian private company, the Rajawali Group or Blue Valley, for US$337 
million (Donnan 2006). The Indonesian government actually opposed the sale because the 
price of the shares was considered low compared to the actual previous sale price, which was 
US$500 million, and because Cemex did not notify the Ministry of SOE before entering into 
negotiations with Rajawali Group (Detikcom 2006). Despite that, the conflict officially came 
to end after the team created by the Indonesian government under SBY had an intense 
negotiation with Cemex to discuss Cemex’s share. The case closed before it proceeded 
further due to the settlement agreement on February 2007, based on Arbitration Rule 43 part 
2 (UNCTAD 2013).  
In the case of Cemex versus the Indonesian government, the ownership shift did not 
substantially turn the position of PT Semen Gresik Group from being state owned to being 
foreign owned. This is because those who stood against the privatisation process were 
influential (from the company’s insider to the elites and parliament members in both local 
and national level). Therefore, their resistance received substantial public support. The 
Indonesian public rejected the selling of state assets to foreign investors and underscored the 
popular suspicion of privatisation. The government had underestimated the nationalistic 
dynamic within Indonesia’s political economy, and this lesson influenced how the state 
subsequently pursued the marketisation of SOEs. Importantly, the saga helps explain why the 
state has moved to retain strategic control over strategically significant companies and 
resources. 
5.2 Indonesia’s Cement Conglomerate 
There are four stages of PT Semen Indonesia’s emergence as a holding company. The time 
line of the process showed that there has been a gradual transformation taken by this 
Indonesian cement SOE (see Figure 5.9). 
PT Semen Gresik came into existence in the early years of Indonesian independence. It was 
established on 7 August 1957 by President Sukarno as the first national cement company, and 
its role in the establishment of other cement SOEs was crucial. This is because most cement 
SOEs were at first managed under the control of PT Semen Gresik. Sukarno, an economic 
nationalist, aimed to meet Indonesia’s infrastructure needs, following the departure of Dutch 
and Japanese companies. The aspiration to build a cement factory in Java had begun when a 
Dutch geologist discovered limestone in Gresik in 1935. Plans to build a factory were put on 
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hold at the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941. With credit from a US bank, PT 
Gresik was officially launched in 1957 and survived the major changes to Indonesia’s 
political order to become a limited liability company in 1969 (Soetjipto 2014, p. 13-14). 
 
Figure 5.8: PT Semen Gresik/Indonesia Holding Company Formation.  
Source: Persero (2017). 
However, PT Semen Gresik was not the cement producer. The first was PT Semen Padang in 
Sumatra. It was established in March 1910 by the Dutch under NV Nederlandsch Indische 
Portland Cement Maatschappij (NV NIPCM) (Persero 2017). Ownership changed with the 
end to the Dutch colonial rule. During the Japanese occupation, it was named The Asano 
Japan Cement and was controlled by the Japanese government. The company was destroyed 
during the war and it was then rebuilt, after which Sukarno placed the company in Indonesian 
state hands. The nationalisation of NV NIPCM was accomplished based on Presidential 
Decree No. 10/1958 on 5 July 1958. In 1996, the company was officially recognised as an  
Table 5-8 Typology of Indonesian SOE. 
Description PERJAN PERUM PERSERO 
Rules  6/1969 replace by 
6/2000  
19/1960 replace by 
13/1998 
12/1998 replaced by 45/2001 
Ownership 
structure  
Part of ministry as 
bureau enterprises  
Wholly owned by 
government  
Government ownership 
through share ownership  
States Finances  Not separated  Separated  Separated  
Duties/Objectives  Vital and strategic 
sector focus on 
community service  
-Provide public 
utilities  
-profit oriented  
-acquiring selected business 
activities  
-profit oriented  
Board 
Appointment  
Ministry  Ministry  General shareholders meeting  
Source: Fitriningrum (2008, p. 3). 
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The expansion of cement production in Indonesia after independence illustrates the 
importance attached to the Indonesian state’s development of national capacity. With support 
from the Czech government, Indonesia built the third cement company in South Sulawesi, 
called PT Semen Tonasa, on 2 November 1968. In 1971, the company was appointed as 
Perum (Limited Liabilities, owned by the state) and then became PERSERO (Limited 
Liabilities Company) in 1975 (see Table 5-7). The change from Perum to PERSERO has 
changed the company’s management from fully owned by the government to government 
ownership through share ownership. This company was the third-largest state-run enterprise 
after PT Semen Gresik and PT Semen Padang, with the capacity for 110,000 tonnes per year. 
The company was intentionally established to cover the cement demand in the eastern part of 
Indonesia. Economic growth and the national development plan of Suharto were also the 
reason behind the establishment of PT Semen Tonasa Indonesia (Soetjipto 2014, p. 15-7).  
In East Timor, Suharto launched PT Semen Kupang in April 1984. This cement company was 
made as a joint venture between PT Semen Gresik, Bank Pembangunan Daerah and local 
government investment (Umum 2012, p. 141). The establishment of PT Semen Kupang 
aimed to expand the investment in the East Part of Indonesia. Having PT Semen Tonasa was 
not adequate to cover the market share in the eastern region. However, unlike the other fully 
owned cement company that had good performance, PT Semen Kupang in East Nusa 
Tenggara (NTT) suffered from bankruptcy (Antaranews 2010). One of the reasons was the 
unproductivity of the cement company. In 2005, the company had a high debt that reached 
12.5 billion Rupiah from PT Sumberdaya Sewatama to 364 million Rupiah from PT 
Jamsostek. Thus, the company was out of operation in 2008 (Detikcom 2005). 
Until the end of 1980s, full control over cement companies was held by the Indonesian 
government until budget pressures caused by declining oil prices forced a change of policy. 
However, the SOEs operated separately as operating companies under individual 
management, which meant that they operated as competitors (Persero 2013). The situation on 
ownership then changed in 1991, as previously discussed, when PT Semen Gresik turned 
from fully owned by the Indonesian government into an independent company. However, 
from the 52 SOEs that were planned to be privatised, only PT Semen Gresik became a public 
company (partly privatised), even though the Pusat Data Bisnis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Business Data Center) categorised the three cement SOEs as financially ready (Badan 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Departemen Hukum dan HAM RI 2005, p. 18).  
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This ownership restructuring had two important consequences. First, as a public company, PT 
Semen Gresik (Indonesia) did not receive government funding as in the past. Second, because 
the company could not rely on the state, it was forced to seek alternative funding through the 
issuance of more stock or bank credit. This in turn increased the regulatory and market 
pressures to which it was subject. As a publicly listed holding company, PT Semen Gresik 
(Indonesia) was required by commercial law to open its organisation structure, marketing, 
financial reports and management to scrutiny (Irianto 2004, p. 54). Day-to-day operations 
needed to meet the expectations of professionalism and the accountability on which depended 
the share value of the company that is now partly owned by public. This meant that the 
interests of private shareholders were now of much greater importance. 
5.2.1 The PT Semen Gresik (Indonesia) Group 
In 1995, Suharto ordered PT Semen Gresik (Indonesia) to acquire PT Semen Padang together 
with PT Semen Tonasa. Based on the Ministry of Finance Decree No.S-326/MK.016/1995 
(Irianto 2004, p. 54), PT Semen Gresik (Indonesia) turned to be the parent company for the 
other two cement SOEs. Suharto claim to merge companies into one was motivated by his 
plan to make an efficient cement group. According to Dwi Suciptjo, as its former president 
director, this operating holding was a part of ‘financial engineering’. Technically, this merger 
was a positive step because, during the 1990s, private cement companies grew larger and 
expanded rapidly (Soetjipto 2014, p. 21). They even dominated the national production by 
producing 64.4 per cent of the national total production (see Figure 5.9). Therefore, the 
cement SOEs had to catch up through a rights issue (public offering). That was the most 
visible plan to follow because the government did not have funding to support the expansion 
program. However, the state ownership of PT Semen Gresik (Indonesia) made the process 
more complicated. To avoid diminishing state power within the cement industry, the capital 
equity that was gained by incorporating PT Semen Padang and PT Semen Tonasa into PT 
Semen Gresik expanded the Indonesian government’s market share and ownership control.   
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Figure 5.9 Market Share of Cement Players. 
Source: Young (2016, p.7). 
Conversely, some viewed this acquisition as Suharto’s ‘order’ to create a family cement 
monopoly (Irianto 2004, p. 54-55). A Suharto family business—Indocement—in which his 
children were shareholders, stood to benefit from the government’s increased capacity to 
influence cement supply and price by reducing the number of market players. However, the 
acquisition process undeniably made the production capacity of the new holding company 
larger than its private competitors. For those who supported the acquisition process, this 
merger strengthened the business power of Indonesia’s cement SOEs (Persero 2013, p. 68).  
 
Figure 5.10: Operating Holding Structure.  
Source: Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012b). 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of PT Semen Tonasa and Semen Padang as part of the PT 
Semen Gresik Group created friction on both sides due to the change of business structure. 
The two subsidiaries became structurally equal under PT Semen Gresik’s management (see 
Figure 5.10). PT Semen Tonasa and PT Semen Padang considered this unfair (Soetjipto 2014, 
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p. xxii) because they had not been involved in the decision-making (Soetjipto 2014, p. 2). In 
general, this sudden acquisition changed the position of the three cement SOEs from equal 
relations to be one leader and subordinate subsidiaries, with a diminution of decision-making 
power for the management of Tonasa and Padang. 
Apart from the dissatisfaction with the process of incorporation, Tonasa and Padang 
management felt that they were better than other competitors, such as PT Semen Bosowa or 
PT Semen Baturaja, as they were the ‘giant’ businesses in their respective regions. There was 
a strong sense of localism or local pride within each company that fuelled a reluctance to 
share management of local resources under their control. Additionally, employment 
conditions were different, including salaries and other staff privileges. Employees of PT 
Semen Gresik enjoyed greater privileges than their counterparts at Tonasa and Padang. 
Gresik staffs were afraid that rights and benefits would diminish after the merger. These key 
factors made the management transition fraught (Soetjipto 2014, p. xxx).  
Internal discord within the PT Semen Gresik Group was the consequence. There was a lack 
of trust, a spin-off obsession, localism issues, rivalry in the marketplace and equality issues 
among all. They were worried that each of them would ruin the other companies. All made 
synergy within the business group difficult to achieve. For example, the data and information 
access was hard to obtain and thus made the process of business collaboration obstructed. PT 
Semen Gresik’s financial report then qualified as adverse due to the missing financial report 
from its subsidiaries (Soetjipto 2014, p. 39). There was also a memo sent by the House of 
Representative of West Sumatra to Gresik to cancel the merger of PT Semen Padang into PT 
Semen Gresik Group (Soetjipto 2014, p. 24). As a result of this internal conflict, the 
company’s performance after the acquisition declined and it was categorised as poor 
(Soetjipto 2014, pp. xxxii–xxxiii). 
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Figure 5.11: PT Semen Indonesia Functional Holding Structure.  
Source: Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012b, p. 6). 
This conflict persisted and became even larger after Cemex became a significant shareholder 
in 1998, with Tonasa and Padang seeking to break away. The dominance of Cemex was 
viewed as a threat by the group’s board of directors. Cemex played the role of majority 
shareholder by intervening in PT Semen Gresik’s management. The most remarkable change 
after the foreign company joined was the presence of two people from Cemex in the top 
management level (Irianto 2004, p. 59). However, as explained above, Cemex ceased to be a 
shareholder in 2006, which heralded a new era for the Gresik/Indonesia holding group. 
5.2.2 Functional holding, 2003–2005 (PT Semen Gresik Holding Group) 
It took almost a decade for PT Semen Gresik Group to end the conflict, both internally 
(among subsidiaries or Opco-operating holdings) and externally (with Cemex). The key 
person in relation to the success of internal consolidation was Dwi Suciptjo. He first reached 
his high career when he was appointed President Director of PT Semen Gresik Group by 
former SOE Minister Sugiharto. He was chosen because of his prior track record as President 
Director of PT Semen Padang. Despite strong opposition from the internal workers and 
boards of PT Semen Padang at first, Suciptjo struggled to build cohesion and enable Gresik 
Group to survive because he was judged as a traitor due to his decision to support the 
government’s decision. This decision placed him to lead the subsidiary company—PT Semen 
Padang. However, he was eventually able to establish equilibrium. Sugiharto stated: 
Mas Dwi is able to defuse every conflict even on a small level. And during his 
leadership, Semen Gresik was able to improve the company's performance 
significantly, as we see now (Soetjipto 2014, p. xxii). 
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PT Semen Gresik Group embarked on a new era even before Suciptjo took the lead in 2003. 
The parent group, PT Semen Gresik, finally introduced a new system called functional 
holding (see Figure 5.11), a new management system in which ‘synergy’ was much 
emphasised. There were three main aspects to this synergy or integration: procurement, 
marketing and project development. Suciptjo believed, as he argued to Sugiharto even before 
he was appointed, that the biggest concern for the group was making a good synergy among 
subsidiaries. With synergy, the subsidiaries with different capacities and advantages that were 
harnessed in a planned and integrated way would boost productivity and efficiency. He 
believed that this was crucial for the future competition and group’s business development 
(Semen Indonesia Tbk2008, p. 36).  
Energy and time were spent more on internal growth. The group also encouraged each 
company to use their superior capacity to have better operational and marketing 
performances. In terms of operational activity, maintenance, spare parts, fuel supply and 
supporting production materials were managed by a joint procurement system (Persero 2013, 
p. 69). The marketing consolidation was done by optimising each company’s geographical 
advantage to make the distribution and transportation run efficiently.  
When Suciptjo undertook his job, the synergy process was also the biggest challenge. The 
same outcome like what Suciptjo had experienced in PT Semen Padang occurred—the 
resistance. However, he had a willingness to make the consolidation work. For that reason, he 
started from employees’ interest, including their carrier, emotional bonds and external 
pressure. He believed that to transform, the company should have a readiness to change. 
Therefore, he assured that there must be a clear vision of what benefits would be attained if 
the functional holding was implemented. He thus created two points to prove. First, the 
synergy could work. Second, the synergy process gave value, which was beyond expectation 
and created more benefits. These two goals being applied to the company’s operation was 
based on four principles: revenue management, cost management, capacity management and 
competitiveness advantage (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2008, p. 31).  
The group’s synergy finally worked. Under Suciptjo’s leadership, there were gradual but 
fundamental changes. There had been some group strategic initiatives created by the board of 
directors and commissioners, such as restructured financial structure, business unit and 
subsidiaries, that developed the human capital master plan and implemented the information, 
communication and technology master plan (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2008, p. 27).  
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In regard to the company’s structure, the group released a long-term plan for 2010–2030 
terms. This blueprint related to corporation restructuring and management structure, as well 
as to the implementation plan for GCG to achieve the long-term goal of being the leading 
cement company in Southeast Asia (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2010, p. 34). By this document, 
the company had a clear vision for its future (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2009, p. 28). Overall, 
there were six main targets for the group:  
12) continuing to increase production capacity to meet the market demand and stabilise 
the domestic market share of the group holding 
13) expanding its operation activities in the domestic and regional market  
14) ensuring the availability of sufficient energy for operational continuity 
15) proactively increasing commitment to the environment and society 
16) creating jobs and opportunities for human capital development 
17)  increasing the market capitalisation of the company.  
To achieve them all, the initiative that was implemented is directed to critical areas: capacity 
growth, energy security, corporate image, consumer needs, supporting factors and risk 
control (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2009, p. 36). 
In addition, the six targets implementation will be accomplished based on all three 
companies’ potentials.   
From the management side, Suciptjo created a ‘sense of crisis’ among the employees or 
desire to fell challenged. Suciptjo also made a strong effort to integrate the group not only 
through what he called ‘applied science’, but also ‘art’ (Soetjipto 2014, p. xxxxvi). He 
developed a synergy of the company through a benchmarking program, built trust and better 
communication with his employees and applied GCG (Soetjipto 2014, pp. xxxxv–xxxvi). 
Through the benchmarking program, there was a visiting program from one subsidiary to 
another subsidiary. Suciptjo also made an effort to meet the staff from highest to the lowest 
level. He also applied a bonus mechanism to improve the group synergy based on group 
performance rather than individual achievement. If the holding target was reached, then the 
bonus will be given. As a result, employees prioritised the group target over the individual 
company’s target (Soetjipto 2014, p. 89).  
Additionally, human capital slowly became the focus of Suciptjo and the management. To 
stay innovative and competitive, the group also needed excellent human capital. 
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Consequently, the group drafted the human capital master plan to have a standard, integrated 
and applicable set of human development goals. This scheme encouraged the employees in 
any level of the group to have globally-orientated minds, to be reliable in strategic ways, to 
be enthusiastic to innovate, to accord in harmony, to have good business ethics and to 
become a ‘concrete’ leader (Semen Indonesia Tbk2010, p. 45). In the field, there has been the 
implementation of performance-based management system throughout the operating 
company (Opco), either to assess the employees’ achievement or to provide managerial and 
leadership training (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2010, p. 47).  
After PT Semen Gresik applied the functional holding from 2008 to 2011, a review was 
undertaken to observe the result of functional holding implementation (Semen Indonesia Tbk 
2008, p. 26). The outcome of the review showed that the functional holding had positively 
affected the group. The business integration then succeeded to raise the group’s 
competitiveness and made the cement SOE the national key player. The group’s income 
increased 261 per cent, from 5.45 trillion to 19.6 trillion Rupiah, as did its net profit from 930 
million to 6.181 billion Rupiah from the period 2003 to 2012 (Soetjipto 2014, p. 92). The 
company also earned 27. 9 per cent of return on equity and 18.2 per cent of return on assets, 
which showed its substantial contribution to the state’s income compared to other SOEs.63 
However, there were still some parts of the group that did not perform well (Persero 2013, p. 
69). 
 
Figure 5.12: PT Semen Indonesia’s Strategic Holding.  
Source: Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012a, p. 6). 
                                                             
63
 Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) (Times 2018a, 2018b) 
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5.2.3 Strategic Holding 2012 (Establishing PT Semen Indonesia) 
The review made Dwi Suciptjo, as President Director, realise that the key point to cooperate 
was assuring that everyone’s interests were included. But it was impossible as he believed to 
remodel the group by putting PT Semen Gresik position lower than before. Still, it was 
crucial to accommodate the two other subsidiaries’ demands. Therefore, Dwi resolved to 
create new holding company concept in which unlike before PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen 
Padang, and PT Semen Tonasa this time would be equals and subordinate to a new entity, PT 
Semen Indonesia (see Figure 5.12). By this new formation, the interests who pursued were no 
longer the interests of each region but the interests of the nation. Dwi argued that the group 
employees should see this strategic holding as the national pride rather than business with 
benefits for particular group or individuals.   
In 2012 the strategic holding company officially launched (see Figure 5.12) after several 
years of preparation. As making a holding company was one of the hardest parts that Dwi 
Suciptjo tried to achieve. As a public company, PT Semen Gresik Group supposed to be 
careful to make the decision due to the source and financial support needed for the holding to 
launch. In 2011 general meeting based on public accounting review, finally recommended to 
the Board of Director to (Semen Indonesia Tbk 2011):  
1) Review the stipulations of the Company’s Article of Association related to the 
limitation of material transaction in order to improve the Company’s management 
more effective in accordance to the rules and regulations, and report the results of 
study in the next General Meeting of Shareholders. 
2) Maintain, optimize, and improve the Company’s performance and value, including its 
subsidiaries, and give more priority and attention in the implementation of investment 
and synergy amongst State Owned Enterprises/other companies, its subsidiaries as 
well as inter-subsidiaries, in order to provide optimum results for the benefits of the 
shareholders.   
3) Maximise the profit earned, especially from the Company’s core business through 
optimization of well-planned resources and cost efficiency in order to minimize 
deviation that may affect the achievement of Company’s performance.  
4) Give attention in the development of organization system based on competency, 
including the making of integrated and comprehensive corporate strategy between 
holding and its subsidiaries from upstream to downstream industry, thus all resources 
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can be optimized in order to improve a consistent and sustained productivity and 
efficiency.  
5) Give priority and more attention, both in the implementation of investment, synergies 
between subsidiaries and its holding, as well as improve the competence of its human 
capital in order to the construction of cement plants, packing plants and power plants 
in several locations. 
The recommendation of general shareholders meeting above later being executed and the 
strategic holding officially came into being on 7 January 2013 (Persero 2013, p. 9). Further, 
the reorganisation made the crucial change in creating a separate strategic holding group 
leader. Common corporation law in Indonesia stipulates that a parent company within a 
holding group cannot be itself also be part of a subsidiary company. Therefore, the old PT 
Semen Gresik was transformed into PT Semen Indonesia (hereafter PT SI) and a new 
executive leadership established for PT Semen Gresik which became a subsidiary. 
Henceforth, the new lead entity would focus only on managing and controlling subsidiaries 
policies and management as well as business development. There were 12 departments which 
ran in the parent holding including (Semen Indonesia Tbk2012a, p. 15): 
1) Production 
2) Marketing  
3) Business development and investment (Capex) 
4) Human capital management  
5) Procurement  
6) Finance and accounting  
7) Information technology  
8) Internal control  
9) Communications 
10) Legal and risk management  
11) Research and development  
12) Social environment of society. 
The new strategic group positively supported by the minister of SOEs – Dahlan Iskan. 
Dahlan, who was very open to any SOE innovation, also a former businessman, knew very 
well that the cement holding was a crucial state asset. In the future, cement demand would 
continue to increase especially in Indonesia where the economy keeps growing (Rh 2012). He 
164 
also was very optimistic to see the company’s achievement in terms of size, source and 
innovation made the holding group was able not only to be a national but also a regional key 
player. But as Dwi, Dahlan Iskan also understood that in order to be a strong competitor, all 
cement SOEs should work together under one-roof (Purwanto 2013).  
The ambition of holding creation then not only became solely Dwi Suciptjo’s plan but also a 
part of Dahlan Iskan’s ministerial target for Indonesian SOE’s management. Dahlan was very 
enthusiastic with the concept of strategic holding by Dwi Suciptjo (Soetjipto 2014, pp. 168, 
72). Therefore, Dwi and Dahlan had mutual goal. Then they could have easily worked 
together to make the holding possible. Dwi in fact had few meetings with Dahlan to discuss 
about the holding plan. The two finally found their shared- interest on making PT Semen 
Indonesia-a holding SOE which never existed before.  
In a further development, significant also in the context of Indonesia’s political economy, 
prior to its launch as PT SI, the group acquired a 70 per cent share in the Vietnam based-
cement company, Thang Long Cement. This was a part of a business internationalisation 
strategy to lift the company’s competitiveness by ‘moving closer to customer’, in this 
instance moving closer to foreign customers. In so doing, PT SI evolved into Indonesia’s first 
EMMNC (Persero 2013, p. 12). Dwi Suciptjo sent some of the group’s best human capital to 
lead in Vietnam. The majority share made the group was able to control the company 
including to place the top-level managers from Indonesia to manage the newest subsidiary. 
Thereby the company’s structure likes the President Director, Production Director, 
Marketing, Strategic Plan and Procurement, along with the Director of Finance occupied by 
Indonesian employees. In the Jakarta Post  –acquisition, PT Semen Indonesia sent its staffs to 
assisted local employees in Vietnam to accelerate the process. However, this structure still 
adjusted with the local condition (Soetjipto 2014, pp. 213–214).  
Finally, the strategic holding was not only an ambition of Dwi Suciptjo and Dahlan Iskan, but 
also the general shareholders, after careful review done by internal and external team. The 
decision to form strategic holding was taken based on three main principles, as follows 
(Soetjipto 2014, p. 176): 
1) By forming the strategic holding, the company will be able to improve its synergy or 
collaboration.  
2) The implementation of making PT Semen Indonesia holding group is applicable  
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3) It is beneficial for company’s marketing and growth  
Besides the reasons behind its formation, the strategic holding had also given significant 
benefits which are (Persero 2013, p. 10):  
There is a clear separation between Holding Company (Holdco) and Operating 
Company (Opco) affirms roles, responsibilities and functions respectively, so that 
the Holding Company is better able to determine the strategic direction of the 
Company; it increases the synergy to be more solid and strengthens cooperation 
between Operating Company; It maximizes the group potency and competence in 
various operational areas, including: production, marketing, procurement, R & D 
and engineering to drive operational improvements and optimized the company’s 
performance. 
In line with the target of becoming a “world class engineering company” based on its 2030 
long term plan, PT SI has a plan to expand nationally and internationally through merger or 
acquisition. If the global expansion had started through the acquisition of TLCC, nationally 
the group also undertook similar or even massive projects. On that account, Dahlan Iskan had 
briefly suggested it buy PT Semen Kupang’s share in 2013 (Agustiyanti 2013). This 
particular cement SOE was bankrupt, though at the same time it was considered too a 
strategic a national asset to be allowed to fold. In the beginning, PT SI objected the idea 
especially because the debt issue. But finally, the holding took over PT Semen Kupang and 
made a new expansion project in Eastern Part of Indonesia as well as to facilitate the export 
market in Timor Leste (Newswires 2016). This was also consistent with Dahlan Iskan’s wish.  
In 2016, the group officially expanded its business to Sumatra’s market by establishing PT SI 
Aceh in Pidie, in a joint venture with PT Samana Citra Agung. This western expansion was 
actually planned earlier than the Vietnam venture but had been blocked by the regulations 
(Supriadi 21st March 2016). The distribution problem became the main reason to build this 
new subsidiary in Aceh. It also helped to connect PT Semen Indonesia inside and outside the 
country. The location of Aceh which is closed to Southeast Asia including the prior foreign 
subsidiary in Vietnam would be advantageous for cement distribution. But the subsidiary has 
not been operated and still under construction. 
Today, there are six official subsidiaries under PT Semen Indonesia and eleven portfolios 
(see Figure 5.13). The group is growing and even bigger than what Dahlan and Dwi were 




Figure 5.13: PT Semen Indonesia Holding Structure.  
Source: PT Semen Indonesia (2017). 
 
Chapter 6: PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) Transformed into EMMNC 
As previously acknowledged, PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik)
64
 is the biggest cement producer 
in Indonesia and its rise is a direct consequence of its transformation into a holding company 
and its shift from complete state ownership to being a publicly listed company with the 
Indonesian state as majority shareholder. This chapter examines connections between the 
empirical data on PT Semen Indonesia and the conceptualisation of EMMNCs. The key 
question is whether theories about the expansion of EMMNCs is reflected the case of PT 
Semen Indonesia’s expansion into Vietnam. In so doing, it seeks to highlight instances where 
the company’s evolution can offer fresh insights into the dynamics of EMMNC development. 
The chapter explores and assesses PT Semen Indonesia from four determinants; motivation, 
types of FDI, country specific advantage (CSA) and firm specific advantage (FSA). It is 
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 This name recognizes the ‘rebadging’ of PT Semen Gresik as the strategic holding company, PT Semen 
Indonesia, in 2012. While not the official title, it is felt to be useful in helping to emphasize continuity in 
this grouping of SOEs since the 1990s.  
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evident that a combination of those four drivers is responsible for the company’s growth and 
expansion. 
Before understanding the key factors of expansion from PT Semen Indonesia’s motivation 
and the structure of the FDI, it is important to draw attention on how the ownership 
advantages (CSA and FSA) have given long term effects to the company’s growth. The 
findings on this chapter suggest that even when there have been challenges and imperfect 
factors within the home country’s such as high of corruption, lack of legal framework, 
infrastructure deficiency, and cultural collectivism, PT Semen Indonesia has been able to 
become a national champion in Indonesia’s cement industry. The company was willing to 
find its way to use them as opportunities instead of setbacks. The same thing applied in terms 
of FSA. Regardless of it being part-owned by the government as the majority shareholder, PT 
Semen Indonesia has followed a dualistic mode of operation. As a state-owned company, it is 
influenced by political actors and policy change. But, in its commercial activities, the 
company out of necessity had to respond to market pressures. The production and market 
share of SOEs have been growing fast along with Indonesia’s economy, and, in the case of 
PT Semen Indonesia, this has been aided by government policy to build it into a large 
strategic holding company through the incorporation of smaller competitors. PT Semen 
Indonesia’s emphasis on technology modernisation, product innovation and corporate 
governance have however together helped elevate the company to a position of dominance 
where it can compete internationally.  
Country and firm specific advantages do not alone predict that a company will 
internationalise. There must also be the motivation to invest offshore. In that regard, this 
chapter will discuss PT Semen Indonesia’s goals to widen their market in Asia. For the 
purpose of expanding, the best way to invest was through horizontal acquisition, given the 
fact that PT Semen Indonesia has limited capital to build green-field investment projects and 
the nature of cement product as heavy industry which has higher trade cost and inflexible 
were the reasons for the company to take over existed TLCC in Vietnam.  
Following the findings and analysis of PT Semen Indonesia individually in part one, second 
part of this chapter assesses the distinction between PT Semen Indonesia and its counterpart – 
Cemex- the Mexican private cement company and the diversified Singaporean super holding 
company – Temasek. The comparison between PT Semen Indonesia and Temasek, as later 
explained, first, illuminates SOE governance in neighbouring countries. Second, it is useful to 
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explain the motivation of Indonesian government to replicate the same corporate 
management of Temasek by drawing from the comparison between them two, as the success 
of the super holding mostly inspired countries in the region. Whilst, the PT Semen Indonesia 
- Cemex comparison can illuminates similarities between dominant market players in two 
world regions, and although Cemex is private owned company, such comparison has 
explanatory value especially due to its past partnership as shareholders.  
In the last section, the analyses of this chapter will not going to end on explaining what has 
been happening with PT Semen Indonesia and now it can be theoretically valuable. In fact, 
the puzzle on how the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia in Vietnam will be managed after 
the expansion and how it may inspire other SOEs to take the same path will be crucial to ask. 
Among other things, the answer for how that achievement of going global may continue or in 
contrast stops by the regime change and economic slowdown underlines the importance of 
non-market mechanism in the case of EMMNCs.  
6.1 Explaining the Transformation of PT Semen Indonesia 
In this first part of Chapter Seven, there will four subsections which going to assess the 
transformation of PT Semen Indonesia as EMMNC, starting with the analysis of CSA and 
finishing with perspective on horizontal acquisition.  
6.1.1 Country Specific Advantage 
Country specific advantage such as natural resources, market size, government policies, legal 
and regulatory, as well as infrastructure and social-cultural, have been pointed by many 
studies of Gammeltoft, Filatotchev and Hobdari (2008, p. 5); Rugman, Nguyen and Wei 
(2014, p. 207); Marinov et al. (2012, p. 138); Todd and Javalgi (2007, p. 171) as the 
macroeconomic factor of MNC to invest overseas. This theoretical base allows us to see the 
exogenous factors within the home country which have uncontrollable impacts to the 
company (Todd & Javalgi 2007, p. 171) and help us to understand the bigger picture of the 
expansion (Marinov et al. 2012, p. 315). As discussed in Chapter Four, PT Semen 
Indonesia’s placed in a complex circumstance is hardly separated from the fact that the 
company is owned by the EMs government. This basically tells that the company has strong 
links with the political and regulatory environment as well as economy of its home country-
Indonesia, which has common thing in the study of EMMNCs.  
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To start with, as explained in Chapter Three, Indonesia’s specific advantages in political and 
legal aspect need to be acknowledged. Like most studies argued about EMMNC, having 
weak government institutions is not usually a disadvantage for the latecomer countries 
(Marinov & Marinova, 2013), because the term ‘weak’ is truly come from Western standard 
of corporate governance value which they understand with different context. By contrast, the 
benefit of political and legal condition in country like Indonesia, basically comes from the 
strong government or state. In most EMMNC cases both private like Salim Group or public 
such as Temasek, the non-market variables like state intervention outweigh the lack of 
institution capacity in driving companies to invest overseas. It means that the lack of 
institution capacity which perceived hinders business best practice like rising monopolistic 
and created crowding out economy are indeed positive for SOE like PT Semen Indonesia.  
At the same time, the market failure in Indonesia cement industry as a result of incapable 
institution system was being compensated by the presence of state in supporting or even just 
promoting the company internationalisation. In short, that state intervention and guidance 
outweigh the institutional weakness by facilitating the internationalisation through close 
connection and financial support. But that is not to say that the process of rent seeking is not 
happening in Indonesia particularly SOE context, although in this cement case study there is 
no indication of such illegal activities.   
Based on that premise, we need to draw some backgrounds to clearly understand PT Semen 
Indonesia’s expansion based on country specific advantage. Firstly, Indonesia, just like other 
Emerging Economies, is criticised for having an inefficient bureaucracy (Robison & Hadiz 
2017, p. 896). Transparency International reported that perceptions of Indonesia’s corruption 
among foreign executives placed the country 100
th
 out of 182 countries on its annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 (International 2011). However, Indonesia’s ranking 
has been improved to 37
th
 from 180 countries as of 2018 (International 2018). Indonesia’s 
global competitiveness ranking is also improving with the country placed 37
th
 out of 137 
countries by the World Economic Forum (Klaus Schwab 2017, p. xi). In 2011, Indonesia was 
ranked 46
th
 from 142 countries (World Economic Forum 2011, p. 15). Though there have 
been positive changes within Indonesia’s democracy and legal system compared to the 
Suharto Era, state institutions remain a drag on economic development, especially business 
growth. This thesis finds that the policy environment remains one of the biggest challenges 
for PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) to deal with. For example, it took years for the company to 
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secure permits, likes Forest Area Permit (IPPKH-Izin Usaha Pinjam Pakai Kawasan Hutan), 
to open new subsidiaries.
65
 Because Indonesia relied heavily on inward FDI, outward FDI 
was either ignored or viewed negatively as capital flight. Thus, investment-related bodies like 
the Investment Coordinating Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BKPM) was not aware of 
PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) plans for internationalisation
66. However, based on BKPM‘s 
document, it was found that there has been a regulation on OFDI -the Presidential Regulation 
No. 90/ 2007 Article 21
67
. Otherwise speaking, there has been a legal base to any Indonesian 
company to be facilitated by the state to do internationalisation. Nevertheless, public and 
other stakeholders have not been fully aware of this kind of specific regulation as the legal 
base for overseas expansion. Yet, this finding could be crucial for another Indonesian 
company to go global.  
PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) remains a state-controlled agent of development. Under the 
neoliberal model of economic governance however, greatest efficiency is gained from 
conformity with market processes and minimal state-direction (Hobdari et al. 2017, p. 3), In 
Indonesia, the opposite can be said to be the case. Notwithstanding the Asian Crisis of the 
late 1990s, what this thesis terms ‘neo-developmentalism’ does not lead to debilitating 
corruption but instead creates the conditions in which strategic business entities can thrive. 
Emerging economies like Indonesia illustrate that market and the interventionist state can co-
exist, successfully. Although PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) has encountered bureaucratic 
obstacles, this regulatory disadvantage did not stop its internationalisation. As an SOE, the 
company benefitted from government intervention to increase its domestic market share and 
enjoyed government diplomatic support to operate overseas. The limitations of politically 
compromised and inefficient bureaucratic institutions did not hold back PT Semen Indonesia 
from being competitive.  
The second point to note when looking at its CSA is the fact that Indonesia is the world’s 
fourth most populous country, ranked the 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power 
parity, and is a member of the influential G-20 group of leading economies (World Bank 
2018). The Indonesian economy, from the time of SBY’s second term, was growing more 
                                                             
65 Interview with BKPM Director of Business Cooperation 27 July 2017 in Jakarta. 
66
 Interview with BKPM Director of Business Cooperation 27 July 2017 in Jakarta.  
67 Interview with PT Semen Indonesia Board of Director 28 October 2016 in Jakarta.  
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strongly than any time since the AFC. In past five years, Indonesia become one of the fast-
growing economies in the region by having around five percent GDP growth when many 
countries were dipped into under two percent (Indonesia 2017).  One in every five 
Indonesians are middle class according to World Bank statistics (World Bank 2017). Like 
many Emerging Economies, Indonesia’s economic growth is driven by national consumption. 
There is a circular link between the cement sector, infrastructure development and economic 
growth (Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales & Sy 2017). Infrastructure development is also key to 
fairer distribution of wealth and opportunity across the nation as a whole. 
The fast-growing economy brought two substantial consequences; first, the urgency of 
infrastructure development and second, high demand for housing. There is enormous 
potential for market growth in Indonesia because of the underdeveloped nature of the 
country’s road networks, ports, and other economically vital physical infrastructure. In 2009-
2010, Indonesia was ranked 96
th
 from 148 countries in terms of infrastructure 
competitiveness based on World Economic Forum. Despite an improved ranking, to 56
th
 in 
2014-2015 (Industry 2016) and 52th in 2017 (Klaus Schwab 2017). Indonesia still faces 
major infrastructure shortfalls. About 7.6 million Indonesians face a housing backlog 
(Housing 2015, p. 11). The government embarked upon its ‘A Million Houses’ program to 
address the housing gap as a part of Jokowi national programs. The World Bank estimation 
revealed that Indonesia needed at least 820,000 to 920,000 new housing units every year to 
meet the demands of population growth (World Bank).   
Infrastructure inequality is an impediment to national economic development. For years, 
Indonesia focused on the development of Java, where the country’s capital and most big 
cities are located, where more than one billion inhabitant or where around 58% of the 
country’s population live (Quincieu 2015). The Outer Islands, where most natural resources 
are located, had only limited economic output by comparison.  A study by Gibson and Olivia 
(2010) found that for rural households in Indonesia, experienced both lack of access of public 
facilities and poor quality of infrastructure, especially roads and electricity, negatively 
impacted non-farm enterprises. Since SBY’s time in office, the government has been 
mapping infrastructure needs and launched the MP3I Program in 2011
68
 (Indonesia 2011, p. 
                                                             
68 This program has been mentioned earlier. It stands for Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of 
Indonesia’s Economic Development, a national program under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency 
and has been claimed an integral part of the national development planning scheme (Tijaja & Faisal 2014). 
Industrial Policy in Indonesia: A Global Value Chain Perspective. 
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15). Lack of support and corruption were blamed for the poor progress of this Program 
(Roberts et al. 2015) but, at the time of writing, the current President, Jokowi, is committed to 
prioritise investment in infrastructure development above all other development targets 
followed the targets of MP3EI  
 
Figure 6.1: Indonesia’s Domestic Cement Consumption and Installed Capacity.  
Source: reprinted Young (2016, p. 6). 
Despite the slow growth of cement consumption over the past five years (refer to Figure 6.1), 
the Indonesian economy will continue to grow in size in the following decades boosted by a 
growing population. Around 32 million of the consuming class will move from rural to urban 
areas and affected to the increasing of urban sprawl live in the city (Housing 2012, p. 11; 
Oberman et al. 2012, p. 4). The former president director of the company Dwi Soetjipto 
(2014, p. 205) has identified that demand for cement would keep increasing around 8 to 10 
per cent for the foreseeable future. This is in line with a McKinsey Company report that 
around ninety million Indonesians will be the consuming class in 2020 (see Figure 6.2). 
McKinsey also forecasted that in 2030, 70 per cent of that population will be of working age 
(between 15 to 64 years old) making economic expansion even more imperative if Indonesia 
is to avoid an unemployment crisis along with the political challenges that it would bring 
(Oberman et al. 2012, p. 23-25). Besides, the latest data showed that Indonesian government 
has allocated trillion rupiah to address the problem of infrastructure from roads to housing 




Figure 6.2: An Estimated 90 million Indonesians Join the Consuming Class by
69
 2030.  
Source: Oberman et al. (2012). 
 
Figure 6.3: Indonesian National Infrastructural Projects.  
Source: Winarno (2017). 
In broader context, economic growth relates to economic capacity. Naturally the higher level 
of development a country has, the bigger its economic size and tendency to invest abroad. 
This is line with Dunning Investment Development Path Theory, which argued that the 
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 Consuming class is individuals with an annual net income above $ 3,600 at 2005 Purchasing power 
parity standard OBERMAN, R., DOBBS, R., BUDIMAN, A., THOMPSON, F. & ROSSÉ, M. 2012. The 
archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s potential. McKinsey Global Institute..  
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capability of country to undertake outward FDI is determined partly by its economic 
development (Dunning & Lundan 2008; Pananond & Zeithaml 1998). Although, Indonesia 
has the capital and technical capability, many politicians and their supporters still insist that 
the domestic market is big enough to support growth, which, as explained, presents an 
impediment to the internationalisation of Indonesian SOEs. 
6.1.2 Firm Specific Advantage 
The second determinant which must be considered is the firm specific advantage (FSA). This 
determinant is crucial because it brings out the internal factors of the expansion. The findings 
presented in Chapter Five also has been covered the data on PT Semen Indonesia. Thus, this 
section will take further job on examining PT Semen Indonesia’s FSA in relations to the 
internationalisation of the company to Vietnam.  In the study of FSA, experts emphasised the 
company’s strength to explain why it is possibly to success (Rugman, Alan & Verbeke 2001, 
p. 238). To understand about PT Semen Indonesia transformation to be a global player, the 
evolution of the company in terms of ownership, business capacity, performance and 
technology are crucial to study. Those elements have strong impact to company’s growth as 
we have seen today. In regard to ownership, the findings and analysis discussed here will be 
directed towards the benefits and costs of being state company. This discussion draws on 
Dieleman and Boddewyn’s (2012) work on the case of Indonesian conglomerate, the Salim 
group, which is also applicable to PT Semen Indonesia.   
The vast majority of MNCs in the world are private-sector companies, which are either 
publicly listed or privately-owned entities, and which are not subject to any state direction. In 
contrast, EMMNCs tend to exhibit high degree of state direction, either as wholly owned 
SOEs or through indirect influence in the form of significant state shareholdings or strong 
centrally driven industrial policy (Aguiar 2007, p. 24; Yadong & Huaichuan 2009, p. 52). In 
Indonesia, the Salim and Lippo Groups were well-known privately-owned conglomerates 
with strong informal ties to powerful politicians. The trend among multinational companies 
from Ems, in recent years, is towards greater overt state direction, with China leading the 
way. Indonesia is also following this trend as, one by one, Indonesian SOEs
70
 look to expand 
overseas, with PT Semen Indonesia being a first mover.  
                                                             
70 The latest internationalisation were planned by three SOE in public railways (Aldin, 20 August 2018)  
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Just like other SOE EMMNCs, in Indonesia’s context, it is hard to make a clear distinction 
between an SOE’s commercial and non-commercial roles. Although there are two kinds of 
SOEs as explained in the previous part; the publicly listed company (Persero Terbuka) and 
public enterprise (Perum), in which the prior one is to pursue profit (Indonesia 2003). 
However, both rely upon state assets, and thus, in return are expected to satisfy state political 
or policy needs. Most of the time, profit-earning (economic function) comes second to the 
national interest and service to the greater good (political duty). This political duty is simply 
understood an being an agent of development (Hill 2000, p. 107). PT Semen Indonesia has 
strong political ties with the state through the Minister of SOE who is the sole representative 
of the controlling shareholder on the Board, under Dwi Warna shares, with strategic 
oversight. In regard to that, under the Minister Regulation of SOE PER-03/BU/2012, the 
Minister of SOEs is responsible for appointing the Board of Directors and Commissioner, to 




Formally, the power of the Minister to exert authority through the General Meeting of 
Shareholders is limited in the context that he/she is not able to make the day to day decision 
or intervene the Boards.  
The General Meeting of Shareholders or a Shareholder cannot intervene in the 
duties, functions and authorities of the Board of Commissioners and Board of 
Directors with prejudice to the GMS’s authority to exercise their rights in 
accordance with the Statutes and Legislation. […] Shareholders will give 
consideration to decisions that are in favour of company’s long-term interest 
(Semen Indonesia Tbk 2012a, p. 203). 
However, the government is still able to manage SOEs through the General Meeting of 
Enterprises, and other forms of public monitoring (SOEs, 2017). The informal meetings by 
Yusuf Kalla the vice president and Suparni as well as Dahlan Iskan and Dwi Suciptjo in 
person, reflecting the company’s strong attachment to good state-business relations ( Semen 
Indonesia 2016a, p. 18–19). In a more substantiated way, the company for instance was given 
direct mandate to be a part of Indonesian government projects. In 2016, Jusuf Kalla invited 
the former President Director of PT Semen Indonesia – Suparni to meet him in his office. 
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Kalla assured Suparni that the company would be given bulk contracts to support government 
infrastructures project (Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2016, p. 18–19). 
Being an agent of development allows PT Semen Indonesia to gain from ‘government 
backing’ (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014, p. 924). The decision to create a strategic holding 
company was a state initiative that greatly increased the capacity of PT Semen Indonesia 
(Gresik). The company also was supported in its internationalisation by other government 
agencies, such as the Indonesian Embassy in Vietnam. Benefits also accrue through business 
relationships with other Indonesian SOEs which cover land transport and shipping, 
distribution and finance (Semen Indonesia 2012, p. 191). Before investing in Vietnam, PT 
Semen Indonesia received loans from Indonesian government. The oldest accessible data 
from Annual Report of Semen Gresik Semen Indonesia Tbk (2008, p. 274) disclosed that the 
company received loans for the project of Tonasa IV. Not merely financial support, being 
SOEs also helped the company to have comprehensive Mutual of Understanding (MOU) with 
other SOEs like Mandiri Bank (PT Semen Indonesia Tbk2012, see also table 6-1). In recent 
years the SOE bank-Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) provided a working capital loan facility 




                                                             
72
Some of the infrastructural projects in which PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) was a principal supplier 
(Persero) (2016) are:  
1. Toll Road Project: Bakauheni-Tebanggi Besar, Ciawi-Sukabumi, Bekasi-Cawang-Kampung 
Melayu, Medan - Kualanamu - Tebing Tinggi, Medan-Binjai, Pejagan-Pemalang, Kertosono-Mojokerto, 
Surabaya-Mojokerto, Depok-Antasari, Gempol-Pasuruan , Cinere-Jagorawi, Solo-Kertosono, Bawen-
Salatiga. 
2. Arterial Road Project: Improved road along the coast, south Java road, the outer ring of Surabaya, 
Jakarta's western ring road, Pakupatan Palima Serang road, Palima road Teneng Market and others. 
3. Power Plant Project: Pangkalan Susu, Bantaeng, Takalar 2, Belang-Belang Mamuju, Marisa, 
Pomala, Virtue Dragon Nickel Industry, Kuala Tanjung, Geothermal Power Plant North Sulawesi, Poso 1 
and others. 
4. Property Project: Spread in almost all major cities in Indonesia. 
5. Local Government Projects: Construction of public facilities such as hospitals, bridges, roads, 
offices, dams / reservoirs (Aceh, Banten, Central Java, NTT, North Sulawesi, Riau Islands, NTB, South 
Sulawesi and Bali), flats, stadium, irrigation, and others 
6. Airport Expansion Project: Sukarno Hatta Jakarta Airport, A Yani Semarang, Supadio Pontianak, 
Syamsudin Noor Banjarmasin, Jalaludin Gorontalo, Sai Sering Kalimantan, Mutiara Palu, El Tari Kupang, 
Halu Oleo Kendari, Sam Ratulangi Manado, DEO Sorong and Talut and others . 
7. Port Expansion Project: New Tanjung Priok, Banjarmasin, Teluk Lamong, Kuala Tanjung, 
Pontianak, Bitung, Makassar, Banjarmasin, Kupang and Halmahera. 
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There is however a political returns to be paid by PT Semen Indonesia, just like other SOEs 
and there are also political risks. One form of return from the company to the states involves 
the promotion of a government project such as the construction of toll road, railway, seaport 
(Kim & Chung 2018), and known as public service obligation (Hill 2000, p. 107). For 
example, Jokowi issued one cement price policy, which later comes with economic 
consequence such as losing profit margins and done extra works to serve the market. One 
form of risk is conflict of interest. Siegel, as quoted by Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012, p. 
72), underlined that political ties can lead companies to be caught between rival socio-
political networks. This might have affected PT Semen Indonesia on occasions where the 
company experienced difficulty in gaining expansion permits from particular ministries or 
agencies like in Rembang case for instance (Ministry of SOEs 2017).  
Table 6-1 PT Semen Indonesia Relationships and Types of Transactions with Parties. 
 State Owned Enterprises Links Transaction 
- PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk 
Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
(State Owned Enterprises) 
Penempatan dana 
dan/atau pinjaman  
- PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk 
  (placing funding, 
borrowing) 
- PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk   
- PT Bank Bukopin Tbk   
- PT Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) 
Tbk 
  
- PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Persero)  Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
(State Owned Enterprises) 
Pemakaian listrik 
(electricity consumption) 
- PT Batubara Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
(State Owned Enterprises) 
Pembelian Batubara 
(buying coal) 
- PT Pertamina (Persero) Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
(State Owned Enterprises) 
Pembelian produk dan 
jasa yang spesifik sesuai 
bidang usaha entitas 
sepengendalian   
- PT Petrokimian Gresik (Persero)   
- PT Varuna Tirta Prakarsa   
- PT Waskita Karya (Persero)  (buying specific product 
and services from same 
entities) 
- PT Hutama Karya (Persero)   
- PT Rekayasa Industri (Persero)   
- PT Kereta Api Indonesia (Persero)   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
8. Public Transportation Project: LRT. 
9. Other industrial projects: Paper mills in South Sumatra, smelter factories in Java, Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi, warehouses for industrial estate areas spread across Sumatra (3), Kalimantan (3), Sulawesi (5), 
Maluku (1), Papua (1) and Java (2). 
10. Other projects: fly over, water front reclamation and more. 
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- PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero)   
- PT Nindya Karya (Persero)   
- PT Adhi Karya (Persero)   
- PT Dahana (Persero)   
- PT Asuransi Jiwasraya (Persero)   
- PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (Persero)   
- PT Jamsostek (Persero)   
- PT Sucofindo (Persero)   
- PT Pelabuhan Indonesia IV (Persero)   
- PT Asuransi Jiwa Inhealth Indonesia   
- PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) Tbk   
- PT Barata Indonesia (Persero)   
- PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk 
  
- Dsb   
Source: Semen Indonesia Tbk(2012b). 
 
Regardless of it being a political agent, a publicly listed company like PT Semen Indonesia is 
supposed to be a commercial entity; making profits and providing returns through dividends 
to shareholders, and paying tax and non-tax revenue to the state. The company in point of fact 
has been one of the more profitable Indonesian SOEs, based on Forbes Global 2000 in 2012 
(Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2012b, p. 213). With success come increased 
expectations of return to the state. For example, the company was pushed to acquire other 
underperforming cement SOEs, like Semen Kupang (Agustiyanti 2013). Jokowi also ordered 
PT Semen Indonesia to reduce the cement price margin for consumers (Widyanita 2017). But 
PT Semen Indonesia is not required to pay a specified dividend to the government (World 
Bank 2017, p. 46). This policy is quite the reverse of the majority of countries in Europe, 
which have specific standard on their rate-of-return targets for SOEs (OECD 2015, p. 30).  
In these ways, the state directs significant economic activity through the mechanism of a 
publicly listed company especially since SBY in office. This, it is argued, demonstrates the 
transformation of state activism and raised what this thesis argues as the neo-developmental 
state model.  
In sum, the context of being state run can be summarised in the table below:  
Table 6-2 PT Semen Indonesia context as Indonesia's SOE 
Purpose Benefits Costs 
Political  
 Agent of development  
 Board of Directors 
 Gained government 
support to form 
holding  
 Used for political 
means through public 
service obligation like 
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appointed by minister, 
 Board of Commissioners 
appointed by minister 
were public officials,  
 Indirect ties with the 
government through 
irregular meeting outside 
the shareholder meetings 
 
 Gained support by 
other government 
institutions such as 
embassy  
one – cement price 






 Making profits  
 Through tax, dividend, 
Non-Tax State Revenue, 






access to credit from 
SOE banks, soft 
loan, government 
projects) 




 no standard of 
dividend and rate of 
return 
 
 government asked to 
cut cement price, 
reduce the margin 
profit 
Source: Adapted with some modification from Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012), multiple sources. 
Resulting from the findings on PT Semen Indonesia, it can be concluded that strong state 
ownership or direction of PT Semen Indonesia follows similar patterns to EMMNC formation 
in East and South East Asia. State-ownership is most common in strategic sectors like oil, 
airlines, and agriculture (Gammeltoft, Pradhan & Goldstein 2010, p. 3). State intervention in 
most emerging economies is not seen as a harmful because companies receive financial 
backing and other types of assistance (Marinov & Marinova 2013, p. 4). Indeed, market 
mechanisms in emerging economies differ significantly from market mechanisms in 
developed countries. In Indonesia, the state has stepped in where it is hard to rely on the 
private sector to deliver on state development policy priorities because projects in basic 
infrastructure irrigation, sanitation and clean water, are not appealing for business due to high 
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costs, duration and anticipated low returns (Setiawan 2013). For these reasons, state 
intervention, on balance, advantages the economy in sectors where markets fail to meet 
requirements.   
Thereof, the state strategic role of EMMNCs then is a significant point of difference with 
MNCs. In developed countries, MNCs are private and purely dividend-oriented serving to 
maximise investor returns while being independent from state interference, beyond regulatory 
requirements under corporations’ laws. In contrast, EMMNCs mostly either SOE or private 
must in some way serve the national interest and hence, SOEs like PT Semen Indonesia 
(Gresik) rely upon Indonesian economic nationalism as much as market mechanisms. 
Indonesia’s outward FDI thus mirrors that of ‘first wave’ developing economies in the 1980s 
in which privately-owned corporations also served government priorities. The earliest East 
Asia EMMNCs were in the heavy industry sector, because, after the Japanese model of 
industrialisation, governments wanted to increase investment in areas considered strategic to 
national economic growth. Observing the prevalence of close government-business relations 
in East Asia, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012, p. 71) argue, 
Political ties with governmental actors are imperative for survival and prosperity 
because the latter control access to major business opportunities and can provide 
crucial support through subsidies, favourable regulation, government contracts, 
protection against competitors, tax benefits and the like. 
In other words, good political ties constitute a key firm specific advantage, and this is evident 
in the emergence of PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik). First, while the decision of the Indonesian 
government to protect the cement industry can be critiqued from a liberal market perspective 
as price distortion, such intervention can be justified on the grounds that it promotes further 
investment (Öniş et al. 1991, p. 112). One must remember that, while there are many 
Indonesian SOEs that are given state privileges, state support is no guarantee of success. 
Being nurtured for so long through direct and indirect mechanisms, PT Semen Indonesia 
(Gresik) not surprisingly enjoyed a competitive advantage. To be the first Indonesian SOE as 
global player, PT Semen Indonesia has benefited from domestic economic and political 
support.  
Second, despite the cost and benefits as argued before, the success of PT Semen Indonesia to 
invest overseas confirmed points that Tihany (2015, p. 85) made, saying that there are 
differences in approaches to internationalisation between private firms and SOEs. Private 
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firms are more likely internationalise than SOEs because they are more adaptable, more 
customer-focused and not attached in a formal way to any state policy objectives. In contrast, 
SOEs have to be aware of political factors.  
Ownership matters aside, factors like management, performance, corporate governance, and 
technology all impact on the decision to go global. Growth too is an important consideration. 
The explanation behind why PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) was transformed into a strategic 
holding company was discussed in Chapter 5. Studies of diversified companies in emerging 
markets suggest that political connections have a positive link to business diversification (Li 
et al. 2012, p. 801; Marinov et al. 2012, p. 194). The question to be addressed here is whether 
or not there was a direct correlation between becoming a strategic holding company and 
taking on new subsidiaries and the decision to internationalise. The formation of a larger 
conglomeration, while politically sensitive, benefitted the company’s capacity to manage 
market imperfections (Guillén 2000, p. 363; Li et al. 2012, p. 363). The benefits of being a 
conglomerate or consolidated business group include being able to leverage finance through 
internal group capital markets (Tihany 2015, p. 385). Second, consolidation synergizes 
subsidiaries making business activities more efficient and cost-effective (Guillén 2000, p. 
363; Tihany 2015, p. 385), avoid the market imperfection effect such as high transport cost 
because location factor on resource transfer when there is unused resource in other 
subsidiaries (Li et al. 2012). The internationalisation of PT Semen (Gresik) has been of 
benefit to the company, which, as stated, leads the cement sector in Indonesia.  Placing the 
company as the national champion in Indonesian cement industry allowed it to surpass the 
previous dominant player, Indocement. Many EMMNCs have become the national 
champions and, because there is little room for them to expand at home, they seek new 
expansionary opportunities by internationalising (UNCTAD 2007, p. 26; Fan 2008, p. 355). 
In other words, growth is sustained through internationalisation.  
With regard to corporate governance and technology, EMMNCs have not focussed 
sufficiently on the former. As a consequence, poor corporate governance has been a 
significant disadvantage (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti 2014; Marinov & Marinova 2013). 
PT Semen Indonesia has also suffered from poor corporate governance and it is to assume 
that it has never had to deal with the issue of corruption, nepotism or professional 
misconduct. The board of PT Semen Indonesia, particularly Dwi Suciptjo, realized that it was 
crucial for the company to adopt corporate ‘best practice’ principles adapted from western 
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business cultures (PT Semen Gresik [Persero]8). Nevertheless, he acknowledged that it was 
impossible to ignore the personal ties and the value of collectivism that have been part of the 
company’s success, as it was in other East Asian ‘latecomers’ to industrialisation (Gilpin & 
Gilpin 2001, p. 165). He also acknowledged that host countries where the company invests 
also have certain accepted business practices which need to be respected and learned 
(Soetjipto 2014). The question after all is how the companies from EMs like PT Semen 
Indonesia adapt more open and consistent rules and practice of doing business? for the 
supporter of liberal economy, changing the ownership to be fully private may be the case. 
However, this thesis insists that full privatisation is not a best solution in where the market 
imperfection stills the biggest problem, without the government support of access to capital 
and resource, the company may hard to compete its counterparts and they are too big to fail. 
Therefore, the state activism will find its way to return back. What the government and 
Indonesians can do is balancing the role of the state and keeping the cement company to be 
accountable and operates based on better corporate practice without totally leaving the state 
role.  
EMMNCs from developing Asia are noted for suffering from a technology lag (Zhang 2009; 
Ramamurti 2012) case of PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik), early investments in technology 
gave it another advantage over its competitors, a fact that underlines that poor governance did 
not hinder the company’s evolution. Technology adoption was a direct consequence of 
Cemex’s involvement in the company, which, despite the political challenges discussed in 
Chapter Five, transferred important new energy efficiency technologies to the company 
(Athukorala 2007, p. 15). This validates the role of technology and innovation to the process 
of catching up by EMs and illustrates the ‘invisible’ innovation asset of PT Semen Indonesia 
(Gresik) (Amsden 2001; Marinov & Marinova 2013; Klaus 2011). PT Semen Indonesia 
(Gresik) was not held back in any way by a lack of technology in its efforts to internationalise 
and was a great pain to ensure technological compatibility with its Vietnam venture and 
subsidiaries back home. As is suggested in the literature, inward FDI can be a catalyst for 
technology diffusion.  
Taken together, above findings suggest that PT Semen Indonesia benefited from many firm 
specific advantages as much as its country specific advantages. The quality of its advantages 
made it possible for the company to be the first Indonesian SOE to invest offshore.  
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6.1.3 Market Seeking Within Asia 
If we look to the expansion path, PT Semen Indonesia appears to be late in its 
internationalisation. While it was the oldest and biggest cement company in Indonesia, prior 
to 2012, internationalisation was on the company’s agenda (PT Semen Indonesia [Persero] 
SEMEN INDONESIA TBK2012). For a long time, the government directed PT Semen 
Indonesia (Gresik) to be inward-looking, at least in the context of serving the national market 
first (Enterprises 2010, p. 12). Indeed, no Indonesian SOEs transformed from being an 
exporter to being an investor until PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) led then way from 2012 
onwards. Other Indonesian SOEs like PT Semen Indonesia faced the problem of rent seeking, 
and many of them were struggling with financial losses and were busy trying to prevent 
bankruptcy, which hindered their growth (Aziza 2017a).  
FSA and CSA are both important to the expansion of EMMNCs like PT Semen Indonesia. 
But the factor of motivation and types of FDI are also crucial in understanding the process of 
internationalisation of EMMNCs. In fact, the distinction between MNC and EMMNC lies 
behind the types of motivations and the entry mode which they chose. It is because most of 
the time although companies have similar FSA or CSA, their objectives or pathways may be 
different. However, an old study by Rugman (2006) found that both types of corporation 
establish subsidiaries overseas to avoid trade restrictions, including tariffs and import quotas. 
PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) was motivated by three business factors; market access, 
resource and asset seeking. However, market seeking was the dominant factor. 
There were two ‘internal’ reasons behind searching for overseas market as has been discussed 
in the previous chapter. Firstly, PT Semen Indonesia directors realised that competition was 
set to intensify as a consequence of the emergence of foreign cement companies.
73
 Overseas 
investment was thus a strategy to secure access to a bigger market where the company had 
established brand reputation, as is typical of EMMNCs (Guillen & Garcia-Canal 2009; Rajah 
et al. 2010). The company understood that by investing in Vietnam, it would achieve two 
aims, gain greater access to a new market and, at the same time, maintain competitiveness in 
established markets. That said, it did not lead to investment in other countries to which it 
exported, including Timor Leste, Sri Langka and Maldives with million tonnes of export 
(Semen Indonesia 2010, p. 88, 109). Internationalisation occurred at a time of growth in 
                                                             
73 Interview with Echelon Staff, Indonesian Ministry of SOEs, 26 October 2016 in Jakarta.  
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regional cement markets (Semen Indonesia 2016b, p. 110). Locating production closer to key 
markets was thus a good strategy for the company to reduce production costs, especially 
because PT Semen Indonesia has to compete with MNCs like Heidelberg, Holcim and 
Lafarge and other EMMNCs like Cemex and Siam Cement (Soetjipto 2014, p. 198). This is 
in accordance with Kumar’s argument of defensive business, which is that to protect market 
share, developing countries companies’ move their production in the exported countries 
(Kumar 1982, pp. 408–409). 
The internal and external context of Indonesia’s cement industry was changing, driven by 
domestic economic reforms and the deepening of regional economic cooperation within 
ASEAN. As Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) argue, investment in new markets can also be a 
response to economic reforms in the home country and can be interpreted as a business 
defensive strategy. PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) directors believed that economic 
globalisation and the formation of an ASEAN Economic Community were irreversible trends 
(Soetjipto 2014, p. 194). The other major concern was the growing influence of Chinese 
cement companies searching for new investment opportunities aboard, driven by the 
economic slowdown at home. As the former President Director of PT Semen Indonesia, 
Suparni, stated the logic behind the company’s aggressive strategy (Semen Indonesia 2016a): 
Like football, there are only two choices for the SMI (Semen Indonesia) Group 
facing this era of MEA, taking the position as a goalkeeper to guard and ward off a 
wave of attacks by competitors or become attackers. Compete directly and attack 
into the heart of the competitor's defence. And, SMI Group has taken the last 
position. The best defence is attacking. 
If anything, these decision-making processes illustrate the professionalism guiding PT Semen 
Indonesia strategy. Company direction was set with clear and direct reference to the 
imperatives of firm survival in a more open and competitive economic context. The core 
considerations of this strategy are apparent in the company’s annual report, which stated: 
The cement group (perseroan) tends to concentrate on regional buyers based on 
some consideration follows: Cement products are more economical if distributed 
close with the main marketing area; it can be the realization of the company's vision 
to be a leading player within the cement industry in the regional market; it 
demonstrates the participation of Indonesia to develop its role in the region; it is 
reducing the risk of the state as main marketing area by expanding the marketing 
area to the regional region; Southeast Asia is the region with a relative stable 
economic growth rates amid the global economic turmoil; as an anticipation of the 
AFTA [ASEAN Free Trade Area]. (PT Semen Indonesia Tbk 2012, p. 60-61). 
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Investing abroad was undertaken in order to access and exploit natural resources for the in the 
interest of secure industrial inputs, which is a common reason for EMMNC overseas 
expansion (Rasiah, Gammeltoft & Jiang 2010, p. 341). Reflecting the case of Chinese 
resources EMMNCs, one of the main drivers behind China’s ‘going out’ strategy was to 
secure sufficient natural resources to supply Chinese industry and promote national economic 
growth (Rugman, Nguyen & Wei 2014, p. 208). This was also a motive for PT Semen 
Indonesia expansion- to secure the resources of production in the region such as the raw 
material of limestone and clay (Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2015, p. 74). Like 
other EMs, Indonesia’s economy has growing demanded for resources like energy and oil and 
it also run out of cement raw material in the future.   
The acquisition of Than Long Cement Company gave PT Semen Indonesia access to that 
company’s technologies and, also very important, its brand name. Owning the brand enabled 
the company to operate under the guise of a Vietnamese entity (Semen Indonesia Tbk2014), 
while owning the technology enabled it to upgrade its resource and capabilities to compete in 
the new market and this is in line with Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) arguments. As a 
matter of fact, Thang Long was selected through careful process of due diligence.  The 
company found that Thang Long was a prominent cement company in Vietnam with 
European technology and integrated infrastructure (Semen Indonesia Tbk2015, p. 74-75). 
EMMNCs commonly use acquisitions and alliances as entry modes to gain footholds in new 
countries, instead of riskier green field investments (Yadong & Huaichuan 2009, p. 50). 
Through acquisition, EMMNCs are able to leverage the host country’s competitive advantage 
(Guillen & Garcia-Canal 2009, p. 28). This is in line with PT Semen Indonesia decision to 
acquire two companies; Thang Long Cement Joint Stock Company 2 (TLCC2) and An Phu 
Cement Joint Stock Company (APCC) in Vietnam (Semen Indonesia Tbk2012, p. 324) which 
more than 99 percent of share.  
The decision to acquire foreign company was not solely directed to Vietnam. The team for 
overseas expansion undertook comprehensive due diligence including the assistance of 
Indonesian embassy to provide information regarding the regulatory environment, which is 
common thing among EMMNCs (Rasiah, Gammeltoft & Jiang 2010, p. 340). In that process, 
there were actually some other host country options (Enterprises 2017). But at last, the 
company decided to take over TLCC in Vietnam. Taking everything into account, Vietnam as 
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a possible host country was selected on the basis of some determinant factors below (Semen 
Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2014, p. 67–68):  
1) Vietnam is a country that has a long coastline. This condition provides an advantage 
for the Company due to its excellent location as the Company’s hub to supply to the 
regional markets.  
2) Second, Vietnam had just experienced a decline in economic performance (GDP 
growth). This makes it easier for the Company to invest, as the countries with 
declining economy are much more welcoming towards the investors. Furthermore, 
Indonesia and Vietnam have an excellent relationship.  
3) Third, TLCC is a prominent cement company in Vietnam with comprehensive 
European technology and integrated infrastructure. It has total capacity of 2.3 million 
tonnes cement per annum. 
The theory of South-South Cooperation and the literature on resource seeking FDI states that 
developing country multinationals tend to invest in neighbouring countries with a similar or 
lower level of development than their home country (Dunning et al. 1996; Aykut & Goldstein 
2006; Goldstein 2007; Kumar 1982; Rasiah et al. 2010). This ensures familiarity with 
consumer demands and the social as well as political characteristics of the investment 
destination (Aykut & Goldstein 2006, p. 100). In fact, the selection of which host country the 
expansion will be located is one of the most crucial process. Specifically, the factor of 
sociocultural closeness has been the core driver of foreign investment (Guillen & Garcia-
Canal 2009, p. 26). While there are significant differences between Indonesia and Vietnam in 
terms of political and legal systems as well as religious beliefs, their social structure have 
more resemblance. Like Indonesia, that country which is located in the same region - South 
East Asia, just growing and modernising. The country which is also a large country with 60 
million population in the 1986 had experienced development issue such as poverty. Before 
the country was one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank 2019). 
6.1.4 Horizontal Acquisition 
The literature suggests that there are two types of outward investment, horizontal and 
vertical. According to Marinov et al. (2012, p. 58) most of EMMNCs today, especially in 
natural resources sectors, prefer horizontal strategy for their internationalisation. Horizontal 
FDI typically involves duplicating parts of the production process overseas (Navaretti et al. 
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2002; Frieden & Lake 2003). The last indicator which requires to explain in understanding 
EMMNCs is the type of FDI which they took. Taking the horizontal approach, PT Semen 
Indonesia established Thang Long as a subsidiary with an equal position with the other three 
subsidiaries (PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen Padang and PT Semen Indonesia) to produce and 
provide cement products for overseas market.  
Horizontal FDI was chosen by PT Semen Indonesia for two main reasons. First, there was an 
issue of products shipment to Vietnam and South East Asia. The nature of cement as bulky 
product (Umum 2012, p. 149) makes the duplication of whole business activities more 
reasonable rather than sending products through shipping, because it much be pricy in terms 
of variable costs such as transport. It is also easier because the company does not have to 
build new plant and equipment. The benefits of invest with this type of FDI helps the 
company to be more flexible in allocating resources and controlling transaction costs in the 
production process (Frieden & Lake 2002, p. 146).  
The next reason is related to the company’s competitive advantage. The problem with 
EMMNCs is they are latecomers (Luo & Tung 2007, p. 485). Consequently, they lack key 
competitive advantages including their limited capacity to play in a wider market (Navaretti 
et al. 2002). In that way, PT Semen Indonesia understood well that to go global, they had to 
establish a regional base in which key competitors, such as Holcim, Siam Cement and 
Cemex, were already present. These findings support the argument that horizontal FDI is 
usually undertaken with the motive of strategic resource and asset seeking (Marinov et al. 
2012, p. 60). PT Semen Indonesia might have been known for its quality and brand back 
home, and they were also familiar to consumer in a few Asian countries, but they were still 
way behind global competitors in terms of market scale and brand recognition.  
Interestingly, the findings did not confirm that the horizontal FDI was led by the motivation 
to get behind trade barriers (Caves 1971, p. 4). Regarding the implementation of ASEAN 
Economic Community in 2015 (as explained in the 7.1.1 part), the tariff barrier to Vietnam 
according to the data was around five to zero per cent (ASEAN 2012) for cement product 
which was so low. Thus, the factor of trade barrier was not significant to PT Semen Indonesia 
expansion.  
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6.2 EMMNC SOEs and PT Semen Indonesia: The Comparative Analysis 
The above discussion has referred to broader studies of EMMNC behaviour, highlighting the 
importance of a range of factors in shaping company strategy with regard to 
internationalisation. EMMNCs face complex challenges at the national and global level and 
yet these are the key to understanding of their decision-making processes. At this point in the 
thesis, it is useful to examine PT Semen Indonesia in closer comparison with EMMNCs from 
other countries. It is pivotal because first of all, it helps to show the similarities and 
differences with prior EMMNCs which raised in the 1980s, and enables identification of how 
this thesis contributes to the empirical study of EMMNCs. Such comparison can further help 
to explain why, among Emerging Economies particularly in Asia, Indonesia has made only 
very slow progress in generating outward FDI in past couple decades. What follows is an 
outline comparison of PT Semen Indonesia with the Mexican cement producer, Cemex, and 
the Singaporean state conglomerate, Temasek.  
6.2.1 Country Specific Advantage: The Comparison 
In this section, the politico-legal systems, cultural, and economic environments of Singapore, 
Mexico and Indonesia are broadly compared to identify where each held a country-specific 
commercial advantage. 
6.2.1.1 Singapore: Looking outward 
Singapore, although located in the same region with Indonesia, and with shared cultural 
characteristics of Chinese and Melayu ethnicity, has a different legal system, with its origins 
in British common law, and is less compromised by political interference and corruption. At 
least in the past decades, Singapore has been known for its low level of corruption and strong 
law enforcement with a bureaucracy that is regarded as professional. Reflecting Singapore’s 
strong corporate governance regulations, and its zero-tolerance for corruption, it is ranked 
third out of 180 countries for being ‘clean’ by the international anti-corruption watchdog, 
Transparency International, in its annual Corruption Perception Index (Transparency 
International 2018, p. 2; Koh 2009). This good system as a consequence, pushed Singaporean 
companies like Temasek to comply with the corporate governance system.   
Singapore’s economy is characterised as innovation-driven in contrast to Indonesia’s 
efficiency-driven economy (Schwab 2018, p. 320). This can be explained by Singapore’s 
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size, lack of natural resources and shortage of ‘cheap labour’, which are disadvantages that 
have compelled the Singaporean state and business to innovate. The country’s Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita of US$52,600 is the highest among Asian countries (World Bank 
2018), placing the country as the one of the highest income economies in the region. Unlike 
Indonesia’s economy, which is focused on domestic consumption and primary industry, 
Singapore has been a manufacturing and export-oriented economy since the 1970s 
(Athukorala 2007, p. 39). Despite its small territory, Singapore exploited the strategic 
advantage of its geographical location at the ‘crossroads of Asia’. It turned its stable system 
of government and legal system into factor endowments by creating conditions conducive to 
foreign investment. To attract FDI, Singapore established a ‘business-friendly’ regulatory 
environment (Vietor & Thompson 2003). Strategic transport infrastructure developments 
established the country as a regional business hub, including an international airport, rail 
transit system and port facilities, and placed it at the centre of global production networks 
(Phang 2003; Hill & Menon 2014, p. 7). As a consequence, Singapore was counted as one of 
East Asia’s newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia, together with Japan and 
South Korea, and ahead of its much larger and better resourced Southeast Asian neighbours 
(Frieden & Lake 2002, p. 378).  
Perhaps because of its size, Singapore was able to be more agile. But being outward-looking 
also involved hosting and investing in innovation (research and development) and using 
policy to direct Singaporean firms to expand overseas (Goldstein & Pananond 2008; 
UNCTAD 2007, p. 418). Economic agencies like Economic Development Board (EDB), 
provided Singaporean investors, particularly the GLC (government link company) with 
information and access to markets outside Singapore. For these reasons; transportation, 
governance, innovation, the country became a major regional headquarters for global MNCs 
(Hill & Menon 2014, p. 10).  
Of course, PT Semen Indonesia and the Singaporean state-owned conglomerate, Temasek 
followed different trajectories. However, their internationalisation reflected the influence of 
strong state direction.
74
 At the time when Temasek was built in 1974, Singapore has just 
started its economic development (Goldstein & Pananond 2008, p. 423). The country has a 
clear vision on economy and industry and was ruled by and authoritarian regime. As a result, 
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 Temasek was internationalised in 2002 (Temasek 2017, p. 20)  
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the country’s economy was under strong state control. (Pereira 2008) argued that the absence 
of industrial entrepreneurs in Singapore’s early days was the main reason why GLCs were 
created. Singapore’s economy depended on GLCs under Temasek which were backed by a 
virtual one-party state that made it politically easier for the government to provide adequate 
support for economic expansion (Ang & Ding 2006, pp. 66–67; Goldstein & Pananond 2008, 
p. 423). Like the Ministry of SOEs in Indonesia, the Singaporean state selected highly 
proficient managers to run its enterprises and retained a decisive role in shaping business 
directions, including a “right to veto any business proposition made by representatives of any 
of the 36 companies, to ensure that businesses were in the national interest” (On Huat 2016, 
p. 510). For this reason, if we talk about the political and regulation system as country’s 
specific factors then the two countries were more likely compatible than contradictory. The 
difference lies in the capacity of the government and the policy discipline established earlier 
in Singapore (Hill & Menon 2014, p. 13). 
 
 
Figure 6.4: MINT Economic Competitiveness.  
Source: reprinted Rachman (2016). 
6.2.1.2 Mexico: Structural Transformation 
Mexico and Indonesia have been bracketed together under NIMPT (Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Philippines and Turkey) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), which 
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are acronyms coined by investment brokers to denote countries whose economies share 
similar patterns of rapid economic growth, large populations and large emerging middle 
classes. This grouping of states is lauded as the successors to BRICS as the world’s ‘newly 
emerging economies’ (BBC 2014; Euromonitor 2015). Mexico faces three main 
vulnerabilities as it seeks to build upon its economic potential; corruption, inefficient 
bureaucracy and crime. The numbers from Figure 6.4 indicated that Mexico was in some way 
frail than Indonesia in regard to politics. In terms of corruption and crime, Mexico is more 
vulnerable than Indonesia. Both have been democracies for the past two decades, but Mexico 
is grappling with the entrenched interests of drug cartels, which are a legacy of many decades 
of weak governance and the social upheavals created by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which had welcomed reform from North America (Lessard & Lucea 
2009, p. 21; Randall 2006, p. 51; Krauze 2018; Villarreal 2010, p. 17). Influential criminals 
have been able to shape the economic policy making due to their political link with the public 
officials and the inability of Mexico’s justice system to prosecute crimes of corruption 
(Initiative 2018; Althaus 2018). Despite these limitations, Cemex was able to grow and to 
internationalise. To its advantage, Cemex was built under family business (Lessard & Lucea 
2009, p. 21). In Mexico, conglomerates were the most powerful in Latin America 
(Hogenboom 2004, p. 207). 
Mexico has become one of the fastest growing EMs, leading other Latin American economies 
and with a much larger GDP to Indonesia. Regardless the country’s smaller size when it 
compares to Indonesia, Mexico also has comparable factor endowments, like natural 
resources, cheap labour and a large domestic market. Since late of 1980s, and especially after 
the formation of NAFTA, Mexico became an investment priority for US companies looking 
to reduce production costs (Frieden & Lake 2002, p. 373; Otero 2018, p. 1). Mexico had paid 
a high price of its earlier oil dependence was like Indonesia before, suffered from oil boom 
and Dutch disease
75
 (Ten Kate 1992, p. 660). When its oil boom ended, Mexico was forced to 
                                                             
75 Dutch disease was once found based on Netherland economic experience in the 1980s. The more the 
Netherlands developed its natural gas sector, the more depressed its manufacture of tradable goods 
became, and this was widely known as the Dutch disease (Jayanthakumaran 2016). In general, the Dutch 
Disease is occurring when the resource export boom happened but it reduces the competitiveness of other 
exports Rosser (2007). Escaping the resource curse: The case of Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
37, 38-58. To identify Dutch Disease, it can be seen from the symptoms or effect to the economy which 
may happened such as: (a) real exchange rate appreciation; (b) a slowdown in manufacturing exports, 
output, and employment; and (c) an increase in wages IMF 2012. Indonesia : Sustaining Growth During 
Global Volatility. USA: 'IMF eLibrary '. 
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find a new source of wealth and, under IMF direction looked to liberalise its economy and 
internationalise Mexican companies, which it did under the Washington Consensus of the 
1990s and 2000s (Blázquez & Santiso 2004; Ten Kate 1992; Casanova 2009). However, 
apart from the liberalisation, industrialisation and increased exports to the US, the country 
remained a major destination for FDI (Randall 2006, p. 61), lately in energy sector. The data 
in 2015 revealed that the contribution of FDI to the country’s economy reached 44 percent of 
the GDP (Bank 2018).  
The effect of economic liberalisation has been varied in Mexico. There have been some 
setbacks, like the economic crisis in the end of 1994 (Otero 2018, p. 36). But the country 
managed to take some benefits from the free trade. Mexico has been one of the top sources of 
foreign investment among rapidly developing economies, with seven notable global 
companies in 2007 (Aguiar 2007, p. 8). Economic liberalisation and inward FDI especially 
from North America (Canada and the US) also propelled the export of investment from 
Mexico after the signed of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (naftanoworg 
2012). Cemex, as an example, first went global in 1992 by acquiring two Spanish cement 
companies-Valenciennes and Sanson, but continued to rely on government financial support 
(Emmott 2009). Mexico embarked on massive infrastructure projects to build pipelines, 
highways, and ports under the National Infrastructure Plan (Armijo 1999, p. 1). But Mexico 
(ranked 46
th
) was still far under Singapore (ranked 2
nd
) and Indonesia (ranked 45
th
) on the 
Global Competitiveness Index 2017–2018 (Schwab 2018, p. xi).  
Looking at these three cases (see Table 6-3), it may conclude that there is a similarity among 
them three, which is that country specific factors benefitted internationalisation in two ways. 
First, they all had poor political and regulatory conditions but strong links between the state 
and market, in fact Indonesia and Mexico are still struggling to make progress on this 
aspect
76
. Although they are all democracy today, it was true that the three of them were once 
ruled by authoritarian regimes or in other words they have strong state. That is to say that the 
weaker political and law system of one country’s, the stronger its state-market nexus. This 
seems to confirm the general acceptance on EMs study. Many believe that because of weak 
institutions, companies in Mexico and Indonesia seek to gain from state protection (Aguiar 
2007; Gammeltoft et al. 2008; Goldstein 2009; Gammeltoft et al. 2010; Marinov & Marinova 
                                                             
76 Only if definition of good political system means there is clear relation between political actors under 
democratically system 
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2013; Rasiah et al. 2010). Temasek, Cemex or PT Semen Indonesia were all large 
monopolies. However, it is important to point out that, among them, Singapore has the best 
working bureaucracy (Vietor & Thompson 2003; Zutshi & Gibbons 1998). Second, the weak 
governance becomes an incentive for them all to globalise especially to their Neighbour who 




Table 6-3 Singapore, Mexico and Indonesia Country Specific Advantage Comparison 
Determinants Singapore Mexico Indonesia 




Pre: ruled under 
authoritarian regime 
During: state was 
supportive 
Jakarta Post : Strong 
institutional and legal 
system, avoid state 
link yet still relies on 
state ownership 





system, state was 
supportive 
Jakarta Post : 
remained supportive 
(financial assistance) 
Pre: ruled by 
authoritarian and corrupt 
regime 
During: Weak 
institutional and legal 
system, states was 
supportive 
Jakarta Post : supportive 









During: High growth 
of economy, one of 
the best 
infrastructure in the 
world, but small 
consumers 
Jakarta Post : 
liberalised market 
system 
Pre: Lack of basic 
infrastructure 
During: competitive 
market, NAFTA   
Jakarta Post : Massive 
infrastructure projects, 
economy has been 
growing and 
liberalised 
Pre: Lack of basic 
infrastructure 
During: dynamic 
economic growth (rapid 
but volatile), massive 
consumers, hybrid 
economic system but tent 
to be nationalistic, AFTA 
Jakarta Post : Massive 
infrastructure projects, 
economy has been 
liberalized (with limited 
degree) 
Cultural Environment  
 
Chinese and Melayu 
Ethnicity Group, 
Mafia and violence Chinese and Melayu 
Ethnicity Group, 
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traditional  traditional  
All three countries experienced rapid growth with different degrees, with Singapore leading 
on this aspect, while Indonesia and Mexico are catching up. But they all differ in terms of 
economic policies, Singapore has clearer approach in export-oriented since 1970s, while 
Indonesia and Mexico have mixed economic strategies, retaining a focus on import-
substitution. Industrialisation in Singapore was achieved parallel to infrastructure 
development. Forth, in cultural aspect, Singapore and Indonesia have much in common than 
Mexico, because they shared similar ethnicities- Melayu and Chinese. Whereas, Mexico’s 
economy influenced much crime groups who had close link with state apparatus.  
Thus, generally speaking, the findings have been consistent with the prior theory on 
EMMNCs, in the points that the three companies born from poor governance and well-
established institutions, also they influenced by strong state support during the first stage of 
going global even for Singapore. 
6.2.2 Firm Specific Advantage: The Comparison 
EMMNCs like PT Semen Indonesia, Temasek and Cemex have varied capacities to go global 
in regard to the ownership, business capacity, performance and technology aspects. To 
compare and contrast between the three, it should be start with Temasek.  
6.2.2.1 Singapore Owned: Temasek 
Like PT Semen Indonesia, Temasek was transformed into a state-run holding company to 
serve state strategic priorities, although this occurred 20 years earlier, in 1974 (OECD 2015c, 
p. 74). The Temasek company was founded in 1959, when the Singaporean Government took 
control of British properties left behind as a legacy of colonial rule. The Ministry of Finance 
had the power to acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, dispose and manage state assets in order to 
accelerate the economic development. To that end, the ministry divided the assets with three 
major holdings and one institution; Temasek, MND Holdings, MOH Holdings and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC). Each had different responsibilities; 
Temasek is responsible for commercial entities includes managing the GLCs (Government-
linked Companies), MND Holding responsible for inactive companies, while MOH Holding 
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handled the hospitals, and GIC managed Singapore’s capital reserves (Ang & Ding 2006, p. 
67; OECD 2015c, p. 50).  
Temasek thus played key role in Singapore’s state-led development (Fan et.al 2014, p. 40). 
This is not only because it was established by the state, where the Singaporean President 
approves the Temasek Board (Kirkpatrick 2014, p. 7), but also because the GLCs under 
Temasek contributed 18% of the Government’s overall revenue (Budget 2018). Temasek is 
run by specific mandate, which states that the company exists with the express purpose of 
facilitating Singapore’s economic growth (Ang & Ding 2006, p. 70). As with PT Semen 
Indonesia, Temasek has benefitted from direct involvement in its government’s 
industrialisation projects and by state policy initiatives favouring the Ministry of Finance, 
which is the sole shareholder (Goldstein & Pananond 2008, p. 420). This clarifies that 
Temasek as the parent company of the holding (the investment company) owned 100 per cent 
by Singaporean government (Service 2017) but managed under private mechanism or 
separated entity. Yet, the subsidiaries under Temasek are partly owned by private or foreign 
entities.  
Temasek is shielded against direct political interference by its Charter, which recognises its 
autonomy to manage its affairs according to commercial as opposed to political priorities and 
by the fact that it deals within only one state agency, the Ministry of Finance, which does not 
appoint a representative to the Board (Temasek 2019; Kirkpatrick 2014). The board of 
directors consisted of ten members who are non-executive, independent private sector leaders 
and two of them were foreigners/expatriates usually with economic or business background. 
There has been a change inside Temasek management where previously the board member 
dominated by ex-military and civil servant (Ramirez & Tan 2004; Kirkpatrick 2014) 
especially after the issue of Temasek’s Charter in 2002 (Goldstein & Pananond 2008). 
Therefore, there has been reform inside Temasek and more independence than in the past, 
though undeniably the company retains its national economic development role (Singapore 
2017).  
From ownership and shareholders, the second aspect to measure is the management structure. 
Unlike PT Semen Indonesia which focused on cement and its related industry, Temasek is a 
super holding company which operated varied business. It owned at least 70 subsidiaries in 
varying sectors such as Singapore Telecommunication, Singapore International Airlines, 
Singapore Technologies and many more. The first-tier subsidiaries of Temasek, further, have 
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their own subsidiaries which some of them are publicly listed companies (Ang & Ding 2006, 
p. 67). In its first annual report released, Temasek noted that it had acquired companies in 35 
countries during the two-year period (Goldstein & Pananond 2008, p. 423).  
Other than ownership and management, Temasek is known for its asset portfolio, which has 
accounts worth US$235 billion in 2018 (see Figure 6.5). While the Temasek is an investment 
company, and does not actually produce anything any products, it has managed around a 
hundred companies across the world (see Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7). The list has been 
growing since 1974 when the holding first incorporated, there were only 35 companies under 
the group (Temasek 2017, p. 100). These subsidiaries later dominated markets in Asia and 
globally. Singtel for instance, had 735 million users across the world and 49 % market share 
of Singapore and 28 % in Australia in the end of 2017 (Singtel 2018). Similarly, Singapore 
Airlines (SIA), which gained $893 million net profit to March 2018 and is Australia’s 
second-largest foreign carrier (australianaviation.com.au 2018).   
Along with that, the hundred companies within Temasek Group have good reputation and 
profitable businesses. They also possess advance technologies and are highly innovative. 





Figure 6.5: Temasek Portfolio Companies Based on Sectors.  
Source: Temasek (2018, p. 5). 
                                                             
77 Temasek as well very concern on innovation. To compete in a competitive market, SIA apart from its 
achievement as World’s Best Airline’ in Skytrax’s World Airline Awards launched three years 
transformation program appointed as. The company not only invested in IT but as well had highly-built 
partnership with Oxford Sciences Innovation (OSI) in 2016 (Foo 16 September 2016 ). 
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Figure 6.6: Temasek Branch.  
Source: Temasek (2017, p. 99). 
Temasek’s success has been by degrees affected by its sound corporate governance. To this 
end, Temasek is led by a professional team committed to Temasek’s principle. Temasek 
boards and staff are selected for their business acumen. In 2013, the former World Bank 
President, Robert Zoellick, was appointed to the Temasek Board (Chan 1 August 2013). 
However, it has taken years for Temasek to build its outstanding reputation including the 
substantial changes followed after the massive divestment in the late 1980s, making the 
holding was opened for public (Chwee Huat 1990, p. 55). Chwee Huat (1990, p. 50) also 
revealed that in 1980s the information regarding Temasek was limited and not until 2004, 
Temasek became progressively a more transparent by issuing its annual consolidated account 
for the first time (Kirkpatrick 2014, p. 51). The holding also never been independent from 
state apparatus or ex-state officials. Taking the appointment of Lee Kuan Yew daughter in 
law and wife as parts of Temasek’s Board in 2002 for instance (Fan et.al 2014, p. 41), where 
state-link was being strengthened and even the boards after. Lee’s daughter stepped down to 
make way for a clearly independent CEO.  
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Figure 6.7: Temasek Net Portfolio Value since Inception.  
Source: Temasek (2018b). 
But while that is hard to avoid the fact that Temasek is owned by the state, the super holding 
remains committed to better corporate governance. This was particularly occurred after Lew 
Kuan Yew’s daughter’s replacement - the next Chief Executive, Chip Goodyear, was the ex- 
CEO of BHP Billiton, Australia’s largest mining company (Lim 2009). Temasek, hence, 
succeeded to manage between its state-asset and its primary principle- run under commercial 
principle which suggests that Temasek directed towards what they called as “pursuit of 
excellence with tomorrow’s mindset” (Temasek 2017, p. 12). As the company’s annual report 
stated, “our culture of ownership and accountability, which places the institution above the 
individual, has served us well over the years” (Temasek 2017, p. 11). As a result, in 2013, 
Temasek rated as the most transparent sovereign wealth funds in the world on Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index (Sim, Thomsen & Yeong 2014, p. 6).   
If Temasek is a sovereign wealth fund owned by Singaporean government which operated 
kinds of business, Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX) in contrast, is a private conglomerate 
specialising in the cement and construction sectors, founded in 1906 by Mexican 
conglomerate- Lorenzo Hormisdas Zambrano Gutiérrez (Lessard & Reavis 2009, p. 1). 
(Casanova 2009, p. 114). Regardless of it being a private company, Cemex has been 
supported by the Mexican government through import-substitution policies which protected it 
from outside competitors (Casanova 2009, p. 114). Cemex is a family-owned business which, 
under the leadership of CEO Lorenzo Zambrano, grandson of the company’s founder, 
became one of the world’s largest cement companies (Dolan 1998; Casanova 2009; 
Schumpeter 2014). Cemex was listed in Mexico’s stock exchange as a public company. 
Today, the company holds a virtual monopoly over the Mexican cement sector, and is the 
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third largest cement producer globally by capacity (Institute 2018). After Lorenzo Zambrano 
died in 2014 the company remained owned by Lorenzo family by having Lorenzo’s cousins 
Rogelio Zambrano Lozano as new chairman and Feranando Gonzalez as chief executive 
officer (Lopez 2014; Reuters 2014). Thus, while not an SOE, Cemex plays a comparable role 
to PT Semen Indonesia (Gresik) in the Mexican economy.  
6.2.2.2 Cemex: Mexico’s pride 
Despite being sectoral company, Cemex owns fifty subsidiaries across the globe involved in 
cement production and extensive upstream and downstream operations (CEMEX 2017b, p. 
3). Its operations span more 50 countries across the Americas, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia (SAB 2017) and the company employs 50,000 people (CEMEX 
2019; SAB 2017). Company expansion also occurred through acquisition, though not at the 
direction of the state. Cemex acquired cement companies in Mexico from merger with 
Cementos Portland Monterrey and became Cementos Mexicanos SA in 1931. It then acquired 
Cementos Maya in 1966 and Cementos Guadalajara in 1976. In 1987, the company bought 
Cementos Anahuac, added its production and widen its market to Gulf Region. The year after 
the company continued its expansion plan and acquired Cementos Tolteca (Vargas-
Hernández, López-Morales & Pavón Villegas 2015). By 1990s, the company controlled 
eleven subsidiaries and in 1992 the company started its internationalisation by taking over 
two Spanish cement companies (Lessard & Reavis 2009, p. 4). 
Table 6-4 Cemex Global Subsidiaries and Plants 




Subsidiary Country 2017 2016 
CEMEX Mexico, S. A. De C.V
1 
Mexico 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Espania, S.A.
2 
Spain 99.9 99.9 
CEMEX, Inc United States of America 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Latam Holdings, S.A
3 
Spain 73.2 73.3 
CEMEX (Costa Rica), S.A. Costa Rica 99.1 99.1 
CEMEX Nicaragua, S.A. Nicaragua 100.0 100.0 
Assiut Cement Company Egypt 95.8 95.8 
CEMEX Colombia S.A.
4 
Colombia 99.9 99.9 
Cemento Bayano, S.A.
5 
Panama 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Dominica, S.A. Dominican Republic 100.0 100.0 
Trinidad  Cement Limited Trinidad and Tobago 69.8 - 
CEMEX de Puerto Rico Inc. Puerto Rico 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX France Gestion (S.A.S.) France 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Holdings Philippines, Inc
6 




Philippines 100.0 100.0 
APO Cement Corporation
6 
Philippines 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Holdings (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Malaysia 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX U.K. United Kingdom 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX  Deutschland, AG. Germany 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Czech Republic, s.r.o. Czech Republic 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Polska sp. Z.o.o. Poland 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Holdings (Israel) Ltd. Israel 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX SIA Latvia 100.0 100.0 
CEMEX Topmix LLC, CEMEX Supermix LLC 
and CEMEX Falcon LLC
7 
United Arab Emirates 100.0 100.0 
Neoris N.V. 
8 
The Netherlands 99.8 99.8 
CEMEX International Trading, LLC
9 
United States of America 100.0 100.0 
Transenergy, Inc.
10 
United States of America 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: CEMEX (2017b, p. 172) 
The decision of Cemex CEO Lorenzo Zambrano to go global was one of the turning points of 
the company to be one of the top EMMNCs (Bank 2011, p. 92). Cemex was as well included 
in the 2008 BCG 100 Global Challengers List together with the other six of Mexican global 
companies (Aguiar 2007, p. 8). Internationalisation was driven by the need to expand, 
because the company was already the dominant cement producer in Mexico. In 1989, Cemex 
was the second largest cement producer in Mexico and one of the top ten in the world 
(CEMEX 2019). It was already a major cement exporter, contributing around six per cent of 
total US cement imports during 1991-94 (USGS 2018). Investment offshore in Europe and 
the US and was a logical next step. 
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Source: SAB (2017, p. 53) 
Currently, Cemex was able to produce ninety-two million tonnes cement with US$806 
million net income in 2017 and US$ 28.99 billion in total assets (CEMEX 2019, 2017a; SAB 
2017). It also has gone beyond cement product, by selling ready-mixed concrete and even 
housing. The capacity of its cement plants itself reached 52 million cubic meters of ready-
mix concrete and 151 million metric tons of aggregates (CEMEX 2017a). The market share 
also broadens to more regions and even continent. The sales of Latam (Cemex subsidiary in 
Latin America includes Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guetamala) reached 1,243 million of US dollars from the total of 13,672 for instance equal to 
13.9 percent of the capacity (Holdings 2017, p. 53, see Table 6-4). This is the reason that 
made the overseas subsidiaries has significant contribution to the company’s revenue (Aguiar 
2007, p. 24, see table 6-5). Cement companies in Mexico only account for 10 percent of 
Cemex assets (Holdings 2017, p. 53).  
Cemex prioritised efficiency and global competitiveness through the development of 
competitive practices and the adoption of the latest technologies. It and did not have to deal 
with bureaucratic interference or state direction, a factor that allowed the company to focus 
solely on profit making through “ruthless operating efficiency” (Institute 2018; Lessard & 
Reavis 2009). The company learned to be adaptive and internally disciplined with strict 
adherence to its code of conduct and following standards of performance benchmarked 
against international competitors (Lessard & Reavis 2009, pp. 5–7). Long before, the Cemex 
Way was brought about to the company, Zambrano, has made substantial innovation to 
Cemex technology. In 1989 he bought CEMEXNET in order to provide company’s own 
satellite (Casanova 2009, p. 115), which would connect people and CEMEX subsidiaries 
(Lessard & Reavis 2009, p. 3). In spite of being or technological platform, the concept has 
substantial impact to company’s overall performance. Because it mainly had made the 
coordination and communication between units or departments inside Cemex worked far 
better. The ‘Cemex Way’ meant perpetual innovation and the philosophy is applied across all 
of its holdings in Mexico and abroad (PMI) (UNCTAD 2007, p. 33; CEMEX 2018a).  
Despite the fact that Cemex has been managed by particular corporate governance and no 
longer having Lorenzo Zambrano as the majority shareholder anymore, critics to Cemex as 
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family business has been raised especially because most of the highest managerial continue 
held by the Zambrano family and there were some inscrutable financial transactions 
(Flannery 2011). Still, after Lorenzo Zambrano passed deceased, the company has integrated 
the two ways of leadership which was uncommon yet it balances the ‘power’ between the 
traditional/family value and professionalism, because at one side it kept the legacy and on the 
other side continue to respect the company’s professionalism. The chairman position given to 
Zambrano’s cousin and the CEO entrusted to chief financial officer Fernando A. Gonzalez. 
6.3 EMMNC Growth Factors 
Comparing PT Semen Indonesia, Temasek and Cemex, this thesis highlights some consistent 
factors behind their expansion and internationalisation (see Table 6-6). First, the role of the 
state in facilitating growth through acquisitions and protection of domestic market share. 
Even though Cemex is a privately-owned conglomerate, it benefitted significantly from a 
protective Mexican state that was for much of its history run by authoritarian governments. 
State protection does not necessarily make a company inefficient to the extent that it will fail. 
The critical point is how a company is managed, internally, and how the company relates to 
state authorities in order to maximise its global advantages.   
Second, the three companies are conglomerates structured as holding groups with multiple 
subsidiaries and which possess a monopolistic market position. This is in fact a common 
practice either in Indonesian or Mexico even in Singapore (Hogenboom 2004, p. 207). All 
three EMMNCs studied here became national champions before commencing their 
internationalisation. Temasek gained experience as a super holding in Singapore before 
investing abroad. Cemex started its expansion by acquiring competitors in Mexico before 
branching out to invest in Span and North America.  
Third, the merit of having a holding company structure with many subsidiaries is that a 
conglomerate can secure a strong or even dominant international market share.  Although 
Cemex’s markets are now mostly overseas, the company’s aggregate production outstrips 
most other cement companies in the world (Edwards 2017). Similarly, Temasek holds 
numerous subsidiaries which dominate Asian market from airlines to finance. In fact, only 
29% of Temasek assets are held in Singapore, the rest in Asia (Temasek 2017, p. 8). In 
contrast to both Cemex and Temasek, PT Semen Indonesia is dominant in Indonesia but not 
overseas. This is not surprising, realising that Indonesia has a relatively bigger domestic 
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economy and market for cement industry. Besides, the company is still in its earliest years of 
going global. This country specific factor is the most critical in explaining the growth and 
direction of PT Semen Indonesia.  
Fourth, the technology both Temasek and Cemex possessed had built their competitive 
advantage even before they expanded globally. If we take that as standard for PT Semen 
Indonesia, then it can reasonably be asserted that PT Semen Indonesia is neither better nor 
worse than Cemex or Temasek. The company had been for a decade prior to moving offshore 
acquiring the latest most eco-friendly technology, unlike China’s cement companies for 
instance. This prioritisation of innovative technology is a direct consequence of the 
company’s corporate governance agenda and parallels the emphasis on technology innovation 
which is a hall mark of many successful EMMNCs (Aguiar 2007, p. 19). The company has 
managed to have well equipped factories and cement plants, within the limits of its financial 
capability.  
Fifth, in the context of performance, prior to their internationalisation, Temasek and Cemex 
adopted a principle of professionalism, setting clear corporate standards, Temasek with the 
Temasek Charter and Cemex with Cemex Way. In this respect, PT Semen Indonesia was late 
in adopting comprehensive corporate guidelines. Robust corporate governance enabled 
Temasek and Cemex to boost their competitive advantage by making them accountable for 
their efficiency. However, the finding on PT Semen Indonesia revealed that although the 
company had missed on that and to some extent it was the consequence of being Indonesian 
SOEs, the former President Director Dwi Suciptjo had conducted massive reform within the 
company, built the company’s future on better management system. His legacy thereof will  
Table 6-6 Company Specific Advantage Comparison 
Determinants Temasek Cemex PT Semen 
Indonesia 
Business Capacity  Super holding (investment 
with 70 subsidiaries in 35 
countries), Big assets 
portfolio US$ 235 billion 
Private holding sector 
company in 50 
countries, US$ 28.99 
billion 
SOE holding sector 
company, the second 
largest in South East 






Best business practice, 
Temasek Charter  
Adaptive and led by 
transparency, Cemex 
Way  
Committed to good 
corporate 
governance, 
introduced CHAMPS  
Technology Advance technology and 
highly innovated  
The first innovator in 
cement sector through 
Cemexnet and Centro 
de Control Cemento 
very innovative, still 
follower   
Ownership 
 
State run holding (managing 
GLCs) under Singapore 
Ministry of Finance   
Private company, 
family business-
conglomerates,   
Indonesia State-
owned under ministry 
of SOE  
6.3.1 EMMNCs Motivation: The Comparison 
In the theory of FDI, the motivation for EMMNC formation and expansion is actually similar 
with MNC, whether they invest for market seeking, resource seeking, or asset seeking 
motive. The difference, however, lies on what type of motivations drive expansion and at 
what point on their growth trajectory. For instance, most developed countries MNC are 
looking for natural resources and markets. Therefore, they usually invest in lower-cost 
economies where the resources and the market are abundant. In contrast, EMMNCs usually 
have these assets at home, where they do not lack natural resources or human capital. 
However, their limited technology prevents them from invest in high income economies, 
notably in the earlier stage of internationalisation. Therefore, EMMNCs invest in other 
emerging markets to build their production and technological capacities.  
 
6.3.1.1 Temasek: ‘Do Well, Do Right, Do Good’ 
Such theoretical argument above on EMMNCs study perhaps does not fit into the case of 
Temasek. The holding started its foreign investment in 1990s, led by its telecommunication 
subsidiary-Singapore Technologies (Singtel). Telecommunication became a strategic sector 
that Singaporean government much focused on its earlier development strategy together with 
airline and shipbuilding (Pereira 2008). The challenges and opportunities of globalisation and 
Singapore Post industrialisation, not to mention economic recession in 1985, the company 
was being restructured to develop into regional telecommunication powerhouse (Singapore 
2019; Zutshi & Gibbons 1998). From changing its name to assigned former Minister of 
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Defence as the chairman, Singtel transformed into a global telecommunication company 
(Zutshi & Gibbons 1998, p. 228). The shift of economic focus from manufacturing to service 
had significantly impact Singapore to upgrade its labours as well as its GLCs (Pereira 2008, 
p. 1194).  
Prior to its investment in Australia, Temasek under Singtel beforehand had built partnership 
with some of leading international companies like Aztec Corporation, Brooktree Corporation, 
Rockwell Corporation and some other companies in Netherlands, Japan, US, and New 
Zealand (Zutshi & Gibbons 1998, p. 231). The company learned from success companies in 
developed countries. Temasek’s expansion continued with the acquisition of Australian 
carrier, Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd., in March 2001 for S$ 13.6 billion, followed by other 
acquisitions in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Singapore 2019). Not long after, 
Temasek, transformed to be not just holding company inside Singapore, but also global 
holding. It turned out that Temasek became the second biggest holding based on deals (Bank 
2011, p. 92).  
Apart from the driving factors for Temasek’s expansion, the question is how that 
developmental target was being pursued? The answer is technically, Temasek, unlike PT 
Semen Indonesia and even Cemex (as will be discussed) took advantage of the opportunity to 
acquire developed economy companies, like Optus, rather than invest in emerging market 
companies only (see Table 6-7). Because SingTel understood that only by asset seeking 
would it be able to meet its target to be a major telecommunications force. However, in 
acquiring an Australian based company with ‘only’ 3.4 million Australian mobile phone 
subscribers, it did not overreach or over-capitalise, and in return gained access to a developed 
country market and its communications network (Lau 2001). That kind of analysis was based 
on two justifications. First of all, finding the right host countries in developing world was not 
easy; SingTel had failed to take control over alternative potential host companies in Malaysia 
and Hong Kong (Lau 2001). Secondly, Optus could provide the brand, technology, human 
capital and networks for SingTel to serve in an appropriate market.  
6.3.1.2 ‘We are Cemex’ 
In the same way to PT Semen Indonesia which went global because unfavourable national 
condition in general because of intense competition after ASEAN Economic Community and 
to depend its traditional market outside Indonesia in particular, Cemex was facing difficult 
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situation as well after the anti-dumping penalties implemented by the US in 1989 and 
confronted NAFTA (Lessard & Reavis 2009, p. 2). Yet, Cemex decided to invest in Spain 
rather than its neighbour at first. The reasoning behind this move was market-driven but also 
cultural. The aim was to find strategic partners and gain a larger share in Spain’s domestic 
market, where Cemex held a natural cultural advantage over European competitors which 
were dominant in Span at that time. Thus, Cemex travelled a great geographical distance to 
Spain to find an appropriate partner in order to protect their traditional market or existing 
market positions (defensive strategy) (Dunning & Lundan 2008; Lessard & Reavis 2009).  
Thus, as one would expect that both Cemex and PT Semen Indonesia shared the same driven 
factor of internationalisation. Perhaps PT Semen Indonesia strategic decision was much likely 
influenced by its experience with Cemex. Dwi Soetjipto acknowledged that the presence of 
Cemex as the company’s partner had to some extent has been positive, in the context that the 
Indonesian SOE was able to learn from the Mexican company. In other words, there was 
useful knowledge transfer in terms of corporate internationalisation strategy between Mexico 
and Indonesia.  
Given the findings above, it appears that first, the motivation for emerging market companies 
to internationalise is most likely market seeking. Thus, even though Temasek decided to 
invest in Australia to acquire Optus assets, this decision was a matter of timing (in the 
company’s growth trajectory) opportunity and market sector type, rather than market size. 
Second, the motives of EMMNCs are mixed, even if their expansion strategies can be 
categorised generally as either market, asset or resource seeking. For this reason, we can 
conclude that it is indeed difficult to draw a clear dividing line between EMMNCs in terms of 
their decisions to internationalise. 
Table 6-7 Motivation to Internationalise: The Comparison 





Firm: to be the 
telecommunication 
powerhouse  
Country: Jakarta Post  
industrialisation  
Market seeking 
Firm: to defend its market 
share  
Country: NAFTA, open 
economy due to free trade  
Market seeking 
Firm: to defense its 
market share 
Country: AFTA, open 
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6.3.2 Investment Flows: The Comparison 
Following the discussion of the specific advantage and the motivation of the cases, the last 
thing to focus on is the investment flow. After understanding about the driving factors and 
motivation behind EMMNCs investment, the significance of investment flow helps to reveal 
how that investment was managed and what kind of strategy they took to protect their market. 
Hence, this part provides clear picture of the similarities and contradiction among Temasek, 
Cemex and PT Semen Indonesia. Thus, there are two areas that should be the focused on this 
part; the host countries and type of FDI (see Table 6-8).  
It was clear that as already explained above (Part 6.1.4) PT Semen Indonesia selected 
Vietnam to be its host country for geographical reasons and its economy as a developing 
country. The trend of EMMNCs has been around their favour to the other developing 
countries which so-called South – South Cooperation. The other two however were more 
compelling because they both decided to take different path. Temasek picked Australia while 
Cemex went far to Spain. The reason behind this was because Temasek early subsidiary – 
SingTel, which went global was in IT sector. At that time, IT business was not very suitable 
for Southeast Asia but it has been very potential for Australia which had been advance 
economy. The market share of Australian telecommunication was around 3.4 million 
Australian, which counted as more than double of Singapore’s market (Lau 2001). 
Meanwhile, Cemex decision to go to Spain based on market size consideration. Regardless 
the factor of production cost was actually not profitable, Spain has bigger potential market 
than Mexico in terms of cement. Thereof, it was inconsistent with the study of FDI from 
EMs. Taking everything into account, one can conclude that the factor of asset might much 
considerable than level of economy in SingTel case and the factor of market size was far 
imperative than geography for CEMEX.  
Next, in terms of FDI type, the findings of the three cases as previously explained, clearly 
demonstrated that first; PT Semen Indonesia has taken the same path with its counterparts, 
Temasek and Cemex, which affirms that FDI from EMs or developing countries are 
commonly horizontal structure (Aizenman & Marion 2004, p. 126). According to the 
theoretical explanation on horizontal structure in Chapter Two that through horizontal 
structure, company acquired other existing companies in foreign countries instead of opening 
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new subsidiary to increase gain competitiveness from transaction-cost advantage such as the 
brand, the technology or capacity production. The other substantial consideration is also to 
strengthen their market power (Marinov et al. 2012). To PT Semen Indonesia the process of 
took over Vietnamese cement producers was carried out in order to obtain new potential 
market. But as the nature of cement product is a heavy industry, the best strategy was to 
replicate the same production chain with its Indonesian subsidiaries. That has been consistent 
with Cemex’s strategy to find new market as the market competition inside Mexico was 
intense (Lessard & Reavis 2009, p. 4). To see the intense yet the potential competition, 
Cemex sold out some of its assets (Casanova 2009, p. 212), focused its business on cement 
industry and invested in two Spanish companies. After the acquisition of Valenciana and 
Sanson, Cemex controlled 25 percent market in total, making the company as the largest 
cement company in the country (Casanova 2009, p. 122). Similarly, SingTel/Temasek which 
took over the second largest Australian company, aimed to dominate the Asian and 
Australian market, and also stayed with its field of expertise in telecommunications.  
The interesting part after all was the experience of one EMMNC could be very inspirational 
to the other companies. PT Semen Indonesia, taking as an example, came after Cemex, to 
learn its business strategy and realised that by diversifying the business and applying 
defensive business strategy are must to be survived.   
Second, the factor of what kind of industry which pursue by EMMNCs have been crucial to 
determine the FDI. The mixed between country specific and firm specific factor have such 
big impact to the type of FDI EMMNCs took. This is because the country specific factors 
such as natural resources, market size, government policies, regulation influence the pre until 
the Jakarta Post -production and thus has big impact to the efficiency of investing overseas. 
This kind of advantage also benefited particularly to developing or emerging economies 
because it helps them to adapt better when they invest in the country with similar 
environment.  
Meanwhile, the firm specific factor is much connected with the three cases. Given the fact 
that the nature of EMMNCs is lack in terms of capital and most of everything, as they, has 
forced them to be very cautious in investing and disallows them to be risk taker. Otherwise 
speaking, they preferred to manage the risk by concentrating on similar business where they 
had sufficient experience and skills to compete. The inflexibility nature of cement business 
for instance required PT Semen Indonesia and Cemex’s commitment to run the single core 
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business for decades only on cement production. SingTel on the other side committed to the 
telecommunication industry because that industry was still limited from competitors. While 
Australia itself has the endowment for the whole chain of production, which made it fit with 
the conditionality to be host countries.  
 The risk of investing abroad also links to the factor of minimising the trade or investment 
cost, which has mostly the reason behind horizontal FDI. As expected, the deal between 
SingTel and Optus was success. Aside from the fact that the company had failed to acquire 
foreign companies before and the fact that SingTel might benefit from the assets of Optus, 
SingTel picked the Australian company based on market size. Cemex just like PT Semen 
Indonesia provides evidence on the urgency of doing global expansion in order to increase its 
efficiency. The transport cost of sending cement product was much higher than investing 
close to the foreign market. 
Table 6-8 Investment Flows 
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6.4 Beyond PT Semen Indonesia’s Expansion: What’s next? 
Before discussing about what next strategy and economic policy for Indonesia after the 
expansion of its SOEs, it is helpful to make sense of PT Semen Indonesia’s expansion from 
an International Political Economy perspective. In a narrowed-sense, PT Semen Indonesia 
was a part of Indonesian industrial policy and development as explained in the previous 
chapter. In a broader sense, the cement holding was about how the company built its power 
and seeks for wealth (economic benefits). In order to seek for economic benefits, this thesis 
proposes some explanations. In the first place, there have been structural changes in global 
economy particularly in Asia. The structural change here implies to the pattern of global 
investment from North-North relation to South-South Relations even South-North Relation. It 
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was not surprising that OFDI from developing countries had begun to increase from the 
1970s as this coincided with the emergence of Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) in 
Asia. Indonesian private companies have been active in global investment since that period, 
but, as noted, Indonesian SOEs were much slower to adapt, because they also had to abide by 
government domestic development priorities. The internationalisation of Indonesian SOEs 
has thus been overlooked in the scholarship on Indonesian overseas expansion. The narrative 
of Indonesian SOEs has mostly focussed on rent seeking, corruption, and inefficiency. For 
decades, there were never any Indonesian state-run countries listed by Forbes. This is not the 
case for EMMNCs from Singapore, Malaysia and of course, China.  
Today, PT Semen Indonesia has become the first example of Indonesian SOE which 
undertook South-South investment. Despite the fact that earlier than that, some of Indonesia’s 
SOEs have exported and expanded through joint ventures with overseas partners, PT SI was 
the first to become a majority shareholder in a foreign company. As Indonesian economy 
keeps growing, the country tended to exercise its economic power including in the free 
market competition. The Indonesian government has adopted the view that, to gain from 
global economy, Indonesia must try to be an active player in regional and global business, 
which means encouraging Indonesian investment overseas. In the world of market 
integration, emerging economy like Indonesia must fight so it is possible to survive (Luo & 
Tung 2007, p. 486). The regional free market system has brought an opportunity as well as 
challenge. Though realise that it is hard to win the high-end product competition, Indonesia 
has been trying to at least in the past decade to catch up with the West or even the other key 
players in the Asia.  
Besides, the case of PT Semen Indonesia expansion in Vietnam demonstrated the South-
South investment, in the same token, it indicated a ‘triangular diplomacy’ (firm-state) 
between PT Semen Indonesia, Indonesian Government and Vietnamese Government (Rajah, 
Peter & Yang 2010, p. 344; Strange 1992). Previously, the relation between firm and state 
mostly undertook by the private companies. Today, PT Semen Indonesia has proved that 
Indonesian SOE is also ‘powerful’ economic actor. Being powerful means that PT Semen 
Indonesia acquired 70 per cent company’s shares of a strategic economic sector in Vietnam, 
making Indonesia a more economically significant part of ASEAN (Semen Indonesia 2014, 
p. 67). Such was the company’s position of influence that even Dahlan Iskan – the former 
Minister of SOEs could intervene in the process of acquisition negotiation. The upshot of this 
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strategic economic partnership has been closer relations between Vietnam and Indonesia 
which signed a strategic partnership under a joint statement in a broad based, equal and 
mutually beneficial with the country since 2013 (nhandanonline 2017; Indonesia 2019). 
However, Indonesian government need to consider some better policy options than just 
following after the trend of advance technology economic-based or totally industrialised 
which some countries in East Asia had achieved. The raw materials or natural resources-
based economy is its nature as well as competitive advantage of Indonesia. Therefore, the key 
is not to leave that kind of economic model behind but to maximise the value-added process 
such as having better basic infrastructure and making effective industrial policy. That was 
China’s strategic approach, and it has worked. As Dahlan Iskan argued, “I have affirmed to 
all SOEs not to delay new investments, or delay the existing investment plan or even cancel 
the planned investment (the national and global expansion) (Semen Indonesia Semen 
Indonesia Tbk2012b, p. 6).” 
The further implication of having its subsidiaries in Vietnam was that it would widen 
Indonesia’s market share at a regional level. It changed the regional competition that 
previously won by giant cement company like Cemex. After the expansion, PT Semen 
Indonesia was not only the biggest cement conglomerate in Indonesia but also in the region, 
which meant greater economic opportunity. Enlarged market share meant that the company 
could secure raw materials for future production externally and thus decrease pressure on 
Indonesia’s resources. This has the added benefit of minimise the potential for land disputes 
to arise over land acquisitions for factory construction back in Indonesia. The case of 
expansion in Rembang for instance, has been an evidence of political risk. The government is 
able to focus on other pivotal targets and it prevents any political dispute.  
At the time of writing, the Indonesian state’s level of commitment to SOE internationalisation 
is uncertain. From Indonesia’s position, the decision to become outward looking as the 
globalisation today is changing the nature of international political economy is still unclear. 
Among Indonesian elites and bureaucrats, there is still difference in understanding outward 
looking policy. There is an optimistic view. Indonesian elites and expert as well as public 
who want to see Indonesia as foreign investor in international level. As Indonesia’s economy 
continue to grow and the free market mechanism like ASEAN economy community opened 
potential markets. At the time of PT Semen Indonesia’s acquisition of Thang Long, all 
evidence pointed towards a major push by Indonesia to increase its economic influence 
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within ASEAN. Therefore, they believed that the Vietnam subsidiary was only a beginning 
and PT Semen Indonesia is a good example to follow by other state-run companies. This led 
Dahlan Iskan and Rini Soemarno to push the go global initiative among Indonesian SOEs as 
the Ministry of SOE’s long term plan has targeted. In advance of the Thang Long acquisition, 
Dahlan assigned a delegation consisting of some Indonesian SOEs delegates for business visit 
to Vietnam, including representatives from PT Semen Indonesia. For Rini, PT Semen 
Indonesia is a strategic national asset. She appointed Hendi Prio Santoso the ex-President 
Director of PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (State Natural Gas Company) to lead PT Semen 
Indonesia after Rizkan Chandra (Aziza 2017b) the former President Director deceased. She 
also instructed the current President Director -Hendi Prio santoso to promote the international 
expansion (Semen Indonesia Semen Indonesia Tbk2017b).  
But there is a strong tradition of inward-looking economic nationalism in Indonesia and thus 
internationalisation occurs in tension with political pressures to concentrate on the domestic 
economy are also some pessimistic elites who more concern on domestic market and 
overlook the global business including Hendi Prio Santoso himself. Since Hendi is in office, 
he Jakarta Post poned all the overseas projects and focused more on national market, this 
evidenced by the process of the acquisition of Holcim Indonesia (Jakarta Post  2018). This 
has been the case since long ago, when Indonesia was seen to be reluctant to open market 
because the conflictual thinking between the pro ISI and EOI (as mentioned earlier in Chapter 
Three). The huge number of Indonesia’s population is the reason why Indonesia should stay 
as nationally focused (Jomo 2001, p. 195). They argued that goods and services better to be 
sell inside rather than selling them outside the country. The foreign market penetration is also 
costly. Meet the domestic demand will be profitable and easier to handle. Surely, Indonesia 
unlike Japan or Singapore is not depending on foreign market because in nature it has large 
population. Japan and Singapore in contrary did overseas expansion to find new markets. 
Nevertheless, in the globalised world, that thinking is not applicable. Many of international 
competitors are now not taking export as an option but rather invest and produce their 
product in the Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, the finding showed that Hendi Prio Santoso is sceptical about international 
expansion and does not adhere to the same thinking as Dwi or Rini and Dahlan. Hendi argued 
that instead of working on international market penetration, securing domestic market and be 
focus on the national level is the first priority for efficiency reason (Persero), 4 October 
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2017). He thought that the 2017 company’s outlook which was showed a stagnant condition 
was the proof that the company need more budget cut. Hendi likely to become business 
minded type. He seemed concern more on financial discipline (Segera 2018). This is very 
different with the former directors’ way of doing business. If Hendi decided to disregard 
Rini’s command and continue to limit PT Semen Indonesia expansion, then the effort has 
been made by Dwi Suciptjo and Dahlan such as the new vision of CHAMPS and global 
ambition will be pointless.  
Thus, the economic direction of the Indonesian neo-developmental state is subject to shifting 
political or policy sentiment. Unlike the Indonesian developmental state of the Suharto era, 
political leadership and policy formation is subject to genuine political contestation, meaning 
that continuity is not guaranteed in the way that it once was.  Further, the cement competition 
is fierce while cement consumption was not as great as predicted earlier by either the 
company or the government. In practice, the economic prediction by the government and by 
PT Semen Indonesia itself has not been working consistently with domestic demand. The 
problem of oversupply also to some degree caused by the Chinese’s cement sector go global 
policy (Fan 2008, p. 354) and PT Semen Indonesia was aware of the situation. There have 
been some preventive steps taken such as import policy or price policy but cement is no 
longer directly protected through state control as it was in the past through strict discipline 
policy mechanism. Even if the government is able to control the price, making some 
intervention to support the national businesses like financial support, but the risk of too many 
cement competitors inside Indonesia is inevitable. Indonesia needs more distribution areas to 
handle its cement oversupply. The fact is for Indonesia, as one insider of the government 
witnessed, there is lack of synergy among institutions. Hence, a state-run company like PT 
Semen Indonesia is regulated by different ministries. There is then still a governance-gap that 
rent seekers are able to exploit, to, for example secure a business license. The future of PT 
Semen Indonesia is therefore difficult to predict. Opening new subsidiaries outside the 
country in fact aimed to minimise the direct and indirect risks. Risks referred here could be 
political, social and economic. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter presents the implication of the findings, its theoretical contribution and policy 
implication. It as well explains the limitation of the study and suggestion for future work.  
7.1 Implications of the Findings 
7.1.1 Theoretical Contribution 
This thesis provides insights to following area of study; the study of EMMNCs, debate on 
DSM and understanding of Indonesia’s Jakarta Post -AFC political economy.  
To start with the expansion issue, the rise of EMMNCs though claimed have reached third 
wave, is still under study. Given that, a particular case on Indonesia as one of Emerging 
Economies in East Asia where outward FDI has been limited, illustrates the challenges as 
well as opportunities for Emerging Economy to internationalise. This research confirms 
previous theoretical and empirical studies on EMMNCs and contributes to better 
understanding on Indonesian SOEs. Previous researches have shown that EMMNCs are 
different MNCs from developed Countries. This study illustrates how FDI can flow from 
developing countries much earlier in the development process than envisaged by Dunning 
(DATE). The story of PT Semen Indonesia highlights the complexities of policy, economic 
and cultural contexts of emerging markets.  
Further, by taking PT Semen Indonesia as the case study, it was found in this study that first, 
the capacity of PT Semen Indonesia to go global has been demonstrated the durability of an 
old Developmental Model in South East Asia with some modifications and different national 
and international political economic context, identified as Neo-Developmental State Model. 
This analysis could be found from how Indonesian government in the Jakarta Post -AFC 
particularly under SBY and Jokowi’s periods urged infrastructural agenda to be the top 
national priority. The shared interest between PT Semen Indonesia and the government has 
been positive. It remarks the key role SOEs play in Indonesia’s development. This is could be 
a complementary of the EMMNCs literature especially on the private business, in Indonesia 
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context-the study of Salim group.
78
 The claim of this thesis therefore presences as an 
alternative to the case of Indonesian company expansion that the internationalisation of 
Indonesian capital can be explained other than oligarch perspective which has been so 
widespread. 
At the same time, SOE reforms in both company and ministry levels had carried out as 
responses to the crisis and economic development, and to some extent replacing the trust over 
Chinese conglomerates. Though this has been very slow, but it did change the corporate 
governance of PT Semen Indonesia from overlapped to ‘effective’ bureaucracy. It is worth 
nothing that the presence of leaders like Dahlan Iskan and Dwi Suciptjo had contributed to 
the growth of PT Semen Indonesia. By having the right people in office, the company would 
be able to show high performance. This finding is consistent with article by with careful 
analysis with general acceptance like Astami et al. (2010) found. They concluded that SOEs 
in the right hands of investors and professional management will performance better. 
However, further analysis of this project shows that the state’s development agenda are still 
part of SOE responsibility. This accords with Fitriningrum (2015) earlier study.  Thus, this 
thesis proposes that to be publicly owned and state-run at once is plausible.  
The same things applied in the context of actor’s mindset and economic connectedness. 
Despite the developmental mindset of the elites especially under SBY and Jokowi which 
were motivated the state support over cement SOEs, there were still overlapping functions 
and interests between government agencies, hindered the speed of the reform and 
transformation. This finding is in line with the findings of Fitriningrum (2015) which 
highlighted the potential conflict between ministries. The good news was there were some 
reforms that worked and outweighed the drawbacks of the system. After all, the discussion on 
the Neo-DSM is substantially important in understanding the political economy after AFC.   
Likewise, the globalisation of PT Semen Indonesia would not be happened without the 
company’s adjustment to the dynamic of economic structure in domestic and international 
sphere. Since the expansion is the result of growth and innovation in business strategy, it is 
important to analysis the three aspects of company’s growth: ownership, business capacity, 
                                                             
78 By the time this thesis will submitted, the PhD thesis on the internationalisation of Indonesian 
EMMNCS (Salim Group) in Murdoch University is published by AL-FADHAT, M. F. January 2017. The 
Rise of Internationalized Capital: ASEAN Economic Governance and Indonesian Conglomerates. Doctoral 
Murdoch . In fact, his thesis indicated similar conclusion to this thesis although used different perspective.  
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performance and technology. Looking at the ownership changes illustrate the continuity of 
state power over its asset despite the structural adjustment after AFC in 1997, as the 
government is still the majority shareholder. The SOE also transformed into a giant and 
professional company following the status of becoming partly public business entity and 
cement holding. The implication of the two then reflected on the company’s production 
capacity and market shares which significant in year. That is was certainly achieved under 
Dwi Suciptjo leadership. There was strong evidence about his significance role on the 
company’s transformation. He played leading role in the success of the company, backed up 
by Dahlan Iskan - the minister of SOEs during that time. The explicit lesson learned to this 
transformation is that mix ownership between public and government could coexist and 
beneficial. In one side, the company followed the corporate law and the other side; the 
company maintained the state support which gave it access to resources.  
Second, the present study also identifies that the expansion of the SOE had been driven by 
some key factors both internal (FSA) and external determinants (CSA). In this regard, this 
thesis comes up with four notable points to note. Start with the internal factor the company 
expansion or FSA, it should be noted that the quality of good corporate governance, business 
capacity, innovation, and technology have strong impacts to the EMMNC growth. Those 
qualities then supported by the fact that the company is an SOE which supported by the 
government helped them to have better access of resource and funding.  Second, the FSA was 
not mainly driven by internal factors although it is as well very crucial. On some level the 
CSA or Indonesia’s regulatory, economic and cultural environment likewise give rise to PT 
Semen Indonesia as EMMNC. The absence of specific policy of holding for instance has 
given Dahlan Iskan ‘permission’ to allow the holding creation of PT Semen Indonesia.  
At the same time, the global expansion of PT Semen Indonesia was motivated by market 
seeking factor, due to the importance of the lower cost of production. Thereafter, in order to 
internationalise, the holding group decided to undertake horizontal FDI strategy to capture 
international market. This was driven by the fact that the external factor of growing market, 
the ASEAN economic community and most of all the intense competition had been 
motivated the state company to move forward from national player to be global player. 
Slightly in contrast with those determinants, the comparison between PT Semen Indonesia 
with Cemex and Temasek indicate that weak regulatory environment could not prevent 
EMMNCs to grow. This is because the three companies were born out from corrupt and lack 
217 
of transparency countries (though Singapore only experiences this in its early day). However, 
corruption in particular is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Third, the current study makes several contributions to the current literature on EMMNCs 
especially in adding some findings relate to state role and leadership factor. On the top of 
that, the late coming and the raising of Indonesia SOE in the global investment at once help 
us to understand the challenges facing by Indonesian company to expand from the 
bureaucratical constraint and double roles of the SOE at one side, and the opportunities of 
being supported by the government and being public altogether in the other side. That 
situation seemed problematic and it was indeed problematic. There were contradictions 
between one factors to another. Yet, those contradictions have been giving PT Semen 
Indonesia space to move forward from national to regional player. Meaning the system 
undoubtedly has been working.  
Forth, the results of this research indicate that the previous model of EMMNCs has not been 
sufficient to explain types of the global company from Emerging Markets particularly in 
Southeast Asia and in Indonesia specifically, because each of the case has peculiarities. 
Recent research by Al-Fadhat (2017) on internationalisation of Indonesian conglomerates 
from regional trade governance perspective has recommended further research on Indonesian 
SOEs internationalisation and how that also leads to better understanding of capitalist 
expansion in the region. Linking his work and Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012)‘s article, one 
can see that the case of PT Semen Indonesia and the case of Salim Group are actually 
supportive. The two seminal works shared substantial conclusions with this research 
especially on the incentive of state role and expansion strategy.  
In the end, as Beeson (2009) stated that “In the continuing saga of competing capitalisms, 
there may yet be life in East Asian developmentalism”. This thesis reaches the same 
conclusion which I identified as Neo-Developmentalism. 
7.1.2 Policy Implication 
7.1.2.1 For the government 
In the discussion of MNC, government always seen in a negative light, to the case of 
EMMNCs the situation is different. Government either to private EMMNCs or SOEs has 
significant role. This thesis outlines two important points to note when it comes to the 
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government role on Indonesian SOEs internationalisation particularly on the bureaucracy 
(insulation) and network in policy input and negotiation. This is because the key of East 
Asian success and the past loss of Indonesia to catch up, stood at the quality of their 
government intervention (Amsden 1995). First of all, it is crucial for Indonesia to bring back 
the role its bureaucrats as strong as before, to put careful analysis and better policy making. 
As long as Indonesian government could manage the merit of government role to be effective 
then the industrial targets will be achieved. The failure of policy making in Indonesia is not 
only lay on the lack of policy implementation but start at the policy formulation. However, if 
the policy is formulated, controlled and evaluated in a discipline manner with better data 
management then any development targets are possible to achieve. Although the political and 
regulatory environments are two factors which were very difficult to manage, there will be 
always a space for reforms. The key is commitment and political will. The success or failure 
of developmental agenda is not solely upon the competing individual or group interest 
between politicians and oligarchs, but the capacity of the institution, bureaucrats and the 
executives to control the system and lead the networks between actors; at least it happened in 
the prior DSM countries and the case of PT Semen Indonesia. This thesis once again, is not 
neglected the high cost of Indonesian political system. However, the economic progress is not 
impossible to be made.  
During this time, the country’s struggle to catch up was fundamentally affected by political 
commitment and coordination. It is important for the state apparatus and bureaucrats to be 
disciplined, while have the same vision on the economy despite their bias of their own 
interest, agenda and political logic like Moon and Prasad (1994) argued. The problem on 
having the reforms and making them work not only because there were rent seekers behind 
the policy making, but also fairly because the sectoral egoism between government agencies 
on administrative discretion. It was unsurprising to see how developmental targets did not 
work well even until today. The more solid and insulated the bureaucracy run and directed, 
the harder the rent seekers could gain in political process. It sounds impossible even today in 
the time when money politics is massively happened in Indonesian. But this study identified 
that Jokowi himself has tried to manage limited policy choice under his administration and 
this has been supported by Power (2018) on his article “Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and 
Indonesia’s democratic decline’.   
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Further, although this thesis is not aimed to investigate corruption case and it found no direct 
relation to specific notion, this thesis object that Indonesia is free from rent seekers and 
expect huge changes. However, weak regulatory settings and complex bureaucratical chain 
are the problem of most developing economies especially in Asia. Yet, many of them were 
success to turn it into good account and gain from economic globalisation. Cement sector for 
instance managed under several ministries yet some of them were working on the same main 
function and duty (Tugas pokok dan fungsi-Tupoksi), making the bureaucracy even 
complicated and as a result inefficient. But in contrast, out from the mess, the ministry of 
SOEs in the case of PT Semen Indonesia succeeded in taking the institutional role, supporting 
and protecting the company from uncertainties and weak regulatory environment in direct 
and indirect ways. Again, it is not to say that Indonesia’s political economic structure does 
not need better reform. In contrast, in order to achieve development objectives, it is critical 
for the Indonesia to solve the overlapping regulations and sustain the prior best policy 
practices such as the formation of holding.   
To the latest point on weak regulatory environment, the case of Indonesian SOE especially 
PT Semen Indonesia has shown how the absence of some fundamental or vague regulations 
has affected the growth of SOEs. Having said that, the government sometimes has to find the 
gap between those problems and either continued to undertake any strategic decision (like 
what Dahlan Iskan did by creating Holding) or issued new sub-regulations like ministerial 
regulations/decrees (like what Rini Soemarno did by passing (PP) No. 72/2016 on state 
capital injections into SOEs). This is an example where the key instruments of political 
regulation or hardware play a significant role in insulating the SOE from conflicting interests.  
Aside from that, better coordination might help the SOEs to achieve more than they could 
today. The government can focus to supply more political and financial support for the 
company to expand, guide them in the lobbying process and sending minister or even vice 
president to be in the negotiation, deciding who in charge for the outward FDI and build a 
coordination around the related agencies – in this case BKPM should take an active role. This 
would minimise the cost and time for the company. During the interview, the institution has 
mentioned that in the past few years there have been some discussion on BKPM focus on 
outward FDI
79
. This should be continued and improved. In addition, as mentioned above by 
                                                             
79 Interview with BKPM director of business cooperation 27 July 2017 in Jakarta 
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the former director of PT Semen Indonesia, it is important for the SOEs to give assistance 
because they operate with special mandate either for national energy security or others. This 
is in fact in line with the experience of prior Indonesian EMMNCs which were private 
business. In fact, they found their way to expand by using personal connection and ethic 
proximity (see Chapter 5; Al-Fadhat 2017). 
Above all, to boost industrial competitiveness by building more infrastructures are not 
enough. In sector level, many of Indonesian government projects are funded by China and to 
some extent affected cement sector. Considering this, closing the sector for foreign 
investment particularly from China will be seen negative. But, the ministry of industry should 
be firm on protecting the sector, because the tariff barrier will not work on handling the 
overcapacity issue. Cement sector maybe has strong relation with local context especially in 
bringing FDI to province and districts. However, the national government has to consider the 
negative impact of inward FDI in this industry which is still a part of the national government 
jurisdiction. In fact, by looking at the global economic situation in the past few years, it is 
hard to expect any other constraint to the economic growth.   
In national and international level, the internationalisation of FDI has been a potential target 
within Indonesia’s foreign interest. Jokowi was quoted by Sheany (2018) stated that, "Don’t 
feel as if we’re a small country. We must be ready to invest, so our efforts must be synergized 
between attracting investors but also making investments in other countries”. The global 
expansion is not just about investing abroad but making the most out of the globalisation. 
Indonesia has been a part of the ASEAN economic community and one of leading economy 
in the region; thereby it has to engage with the new reality. Besides, for the couple years back 
the trade balance has been deficit. This is sending strong signal that Indonesia immediately 
has to move from inward looking to be outward looking in terms of trade. But allowing SOEs 
to go global need to be strategically managed includes sending them based on how capable 
and strategic the sector is rather than which SOEs that strong in lobbying.  
7.1.2.2 For PT Semen Indonesia and other Indonesian SOES 
Having to know that PT Semen Indonesia has been the first Indonesian SOE that go global, it 
is possible for the company and other SOEs to learn from the cement company. However, the 
success of PT semen Indonesia needs to be interpreted with caution. First, looking at each 
determinants of internationalisation, tells us that going global is not an easy and quick 
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process in doing business especially for state company. However, the benefits of going 
beyond national borders outweigh the challenges, in particular to deal with the reality of 
oversupply condition years after. However, to prevent also the risk of oversupply for few 
years to come, it is probably the best strategy to maximise the role of subsidiary in Vietnam 
for wider market outside Indonesia for couple years to come before widening the targets of 
host countries. 
The second lesson to take is for other internationalisation project in the future, PT Semen 
Indonesia or any other SOE must continue to undertake comprehensive process especially on 
due diligence process. The success of Dwi Suciptjo and the management in making the 
company internationalised was due to the result of professional assessment both from inside 
and outside consultants. They also kept track of the new subsidiary under Jakarta Post  
Merger Program. If the process will be done, in contrary, under opaque process, then business 
failure should be expected.  
The other factor is the appointment of Dwi Suciptjo to be the PT Semen Padang and then PT 
Semen Gresik’s director by the majority shareholder (the minister of SOEs) have substantial 
impact to the company growth. Because of that the government as the controlling shareholder 
in the future must carefully select the best people to lead the state companies. The case of PT 
Semen Indonesia should remind the government that having a company’s leader with similar 
background will work better than those who come from different work background.  
First and foremost, the discipline over Indonesia’s SOEs is crucial. As mentioned by the 
Bappenas staff, stated that the success of South Korea or China is because their capacity to 
undertake intense evaluation and monitoring over their SOEs which has not been happened in 
Indonesia.  
7.1.2.3 For other stakeholders 
Besides, the state actors and company itself, the internationalisation also relates to other 
stakeholders, which is here referring to any non-ministerial institutions. The point is it needs 
more than just one actor to bring success to Indonesia’s SOE to go global. In spite of being 
accuse for making monopolistic business, the role of business association for example is 
pivotal to connect actors within the industry, helping to build fair mechanism and minimise 
market failure. The regulatory aspect also is another factor to manage in order to create 
insulated bureaucratical structure. In other words, a clear, sustain and consistent legal system 
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is then crucial for the company to run in professional base. Nonetheless, the legal aspect must 
guarantee to put national interest first over particular group interest and minimise the gap that 
is possible to use for individual benefits.  
7.2 Limitation of the Study 
Generally speaking, the expansion of PT Semen Indonesia would not happen in a night. It 
was a result of a long-term process, shaped by the pre and Jakarta Post  periods, multiple 
actors and interests. As a consequence, to investigate the overseas expansion of the SOE, it is 
quite impossible to cover all parts of the story particularly on the continuity of the expansion 
projects. It turns out that few leadership changes both in the ministry as well as the company 
levels had significant impact on the company’s management and that is beyond the capacity 
of this thesis. However, the facts that the company earned net profits and continue to do so 
(Franedya 2018), there is likely chance of the company to capture more international market.  
Nonetheless, looking at the case of PT Semen Indonesia, the further question to ask is: was 
the success of PT Semen Indonesia to go global could be followed? Or can the success of the 
SOE be generalised and reproduced for other Indonesian SOEs? The answer is there are 
various factors that partly applicable, yet there are some characteristics which were sectoral-
specific. However, factors of state ownership, regulatory and economic environment need to 
be considered in order for other SOEs to learn from PT Semen Indonesia. Therefore, given 
unique context of cement sector, caution must be exercised with regard to 
internationalisation.  
That is also applied to the puzzle of Neo-developmental State, what worked for PT Semen 
Indonesia in terms of industrial policy, SOE governance and institutional links may come 
with different output to other industry. Technically, the nature of the business and the key 
actors within the institutional arrangements are pivotal for making the company ready to 
move forward. It is worth mentioning that cement is considered a strategic commodity within 
industrial policy. Because it has directed its significance to the other development targets like 
the construction and infrastructure has inseparable to the growth of the Indonesian economy. 
This is also the reason why the industry among others was the latest to be deregulated 
(Plunkett et al. 1997). In addition to that, if we also look closely to cement industry in 
Indonesia, we can see that in contrary to oil sector, cement sector although is a heavy industry 
but is not as much as oil in terms of capital-intensive industry. Thus, it has been more 
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possible for private business to entry. In consequence, the SOE tend to operate independently 
rather than become an object of power contestation like SOE in oil industry. The nature of 
being heavy industry likewise has made the expansion strategy was much efficient by doing 
an acquisition. In other words, the difference of the industry nature influences the strategy of 
SOE.  
It can be thus suggested that in the future, a better understanding of other Indonesian SOEs 
internationalisation needs to be developed. Different SOEs in different sectors may show 
peculiar internal and external determinants, from institutional structure to competition 
dynamic. Further investigation of Indonesia SOE internationalisation is important because the 
dynamic within international economy will continue to shift and Indonesia may continue to 
grow. It is safe to say, thereof, that the country will inevitably turns into industrialised 
economy which relies upon energy, oil, cement and service sectors which push more SOEs to 
seek for more resources and market.  
 
224 
Appendix 1: List and Details of Interviews 
In order to support the most update data related the topic on global expansion of PT Semen 
Indonesia, we will interview a number of decision makers including the officials from the 
institutions related. The table follows contains details information about the interviewees 
which traced from openly accessed media, publication sources and official information. 
1. PT Semen Indonesia  
1.1 Parent Company: One board member/Ex Board of Thang Long Subsidiary  
1.2 Subsidiary: Head of Sales Bureau of Semen Tonasa 
2. Indonesian Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises  
2.1 Mining, Strategic Industry and Media I: One Assistant of Deputy Director  
2.2 Law and Regulation: Two Officials 
3. Indonesian Ministry of Finance: One junior Researcher/Official  
4. National Development Planning Board  
4.1 Industry, Tourism and Creative Economy: One Junior Associate 
4.2 One Senior Associate  
5. Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: One Director  
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Appendix 2 Semi-structured Interview Questions Used For PT 
Semen Indonesia Executives 
















































How the state matters in 
expansion of PT Semen 
Indonesia?  
What the government had been 























What are the significant changes 
since the firm first built until 




What are PT Semen Indonesia’s 
long term overseas investment 
strategy priorities?  
Targets:  
Has the target to be a leading 




In the ownership of 51 per centof 
the firm share by the Indonesian 
government, to what extent 
Indonesian government has right 
in running the firm?  
Through the trajectory of PT Semen 
Indonesia at the time when SBY became 
president, was there any particular policy 
that he implemented? How about today 
during Jokowi’s presidency?  
What motivated the decision of PT 
Semen Indonesia to invest overseas in 
Vietnam or any other country? Why is it 
important to acquire the firm outside 
Indonesia? (From inside the firm 
perspective)  
As SOE, in the case of expanding abroad 
who must decide to do so? Was it fully 
considered by the board of directors and 
commissioners? Or Was the minister of 
SOEs?To what extent she is able to shape 
the firm activities?  
Is it possible for the PT Semen Indonesia 
Board of Directors to defer to 
government direction concerning 
company strategy?  
Before decided to expand, on which level 
the expansion was being proposed? is it 
the motivation came from a long time 
ago inside the firm? Or was it initiated by 
the government?   
What do you think about ‘self-
sufficient’? Is it the best way to catch up 
with established players in the cement 
industry such as Cemex?  
 
What kind of firm PT Semen Indonesia at 
the early period? Was it run by the 
government since its early age? Was it a 
small or medium firm?  
 
 
How the strategy does has been 
reshaping since 2009?  
How was this achieved?  
 
 
Is it any possibility that at some points in 
the future the firm will be fully owned by 
Indonesian government? Or opposite, 




























































As a holding company, would 
you describe the firm’s 







Organizational culture:  
How the Indonesian values such 
as  gotong royong influenced 







How strong the business 







Do you think the government 
regulations have been supportive 
to help the firm grow?  
 
Economic environment: 
Do you think the economic 
environment today inside and 
outside Indonesia has been 
encouraging the firm?   
 
Investment flows: 
What kind of market entry that 
PT Semen Indonesia has taken 









Does PT Semen Indonesia have 





Based on the firm structure, PT Semen 
Indonesia consists of four firms. How are 
these firms governed? Do they operate as 
independent companies? 
How has the company developed 
extensive global subsidiary networks? 
What is the purpose of these?  
 
Is the firm having the sense of 
community based values? 
Is there any family –style gathering? 
Or special occasion held by inviting 
the whole employees? How the higher 
level communicates with the rest of 
the firm’s employees?  
How the firm coordinate with the 
associated- ministries?  
 
 In the context of competitive advantage 
compare to the players in the same 
industry, how competitive do you think 
the firm is? 
How about the firm asset, what the 
positive aspects that the firm has 
(managerial, human resources, 
leadership)? 
 
What kind of crucial regulations that has 
been and could be positive that the firm 
need?  
If it has not been, why do you think it 
could be?  
 
In what way the national and global 
economic environment has been 
beneficial for the firm to expand?  
If it has not been, why do you think it 
could be?  
 
Why this kind of market entry that the 
firm took rather than any other mode 
such as alliance or joint venture?  
How has the company managed prior 
business relations in Vietnam? 
In relation to taking Vietnam as the 
subsidiary, why does it so? Was it 
because ownership (trademark, 
technique, entrepreneurial skills or return 
to scale?), internalization (own 
production), or location (raw materials, 















Competition:   
Was it PT Semen Indonesia is 
the first one that competes 
globally compares to the other 
cement producers from 
Indonesia? How about 
compared to the other countries 





Compare to Chinese EMMNCs –
the biggest emerging economies, 
what is the most essential 




Compare to Cemex – a cement 
producer from other emerging 
economies , what is the most 
essential characteristic of 
Cemex?  




Do you know any significant 
competitors in the region?   
 Did PT Semen Indonesia is the first who 
initiated to expand compare to them?  
 
 
Do you think Indonesian SOEs have 
similarity and differences with 
EMMNCs from China? In what way 
they are the same and different?  
What do you think their competitive 
advantage is? 
  
Do you think Indonesian SOEs have 
similarity and differences with Cemex? 
In what way they are the same and 
different?  
What do you think Cemex competitive 
advantage is?  
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Appendix 3 Semi-structured Interview Questions Used For 
Government Officials/Policymakers 
















































Is the industrialization is 
the number one priority of 
the government today? 
More than agriculture? 
How the state matters in 
expansion of PT Semen 
Indonesia?  
What the government had 
been doing to run the firm 























What are the significant 
changes since the firm first 
built until today in the 
context of firm structure?  
Strategies : 
What are PT Semen 
Indonesia’s long term 
overseas investment 
strategy priorities?  
Targets:  
How the target to be a 
leading cement company 
has been achieved? 
 
Ownership: 
Through the trajectory of PT Semen 
Indonesia at the time when SBY became 
president, were there any particular policies 
that he implemented? How about today 
during Jokowi’s presidency?  
What motivated the decision of PT Semen 
Indonesia to invest overseas in Vietnam or 
any other country? Why is it important to 
acquire the firm outside Indonesia? (From 
inside the firm perspective)  
As SOE, in the case of expanding abroad 
was the minister of SOEs also were inside 
the decision making process? To what 
extent you are able to shape the firm 
activities?  
How it works? Does the government have 
full authority to make decisions for PT 
Semen Indonesia? Or any particular 
limitation or standard in doing so?  
Before decided to expand, on which level 
the expansion was being proposed? is it the 
motivation came from a long time ago, 
before you act as a minister?  
Based on the news, the Indonesian 
government will make a more SOE turn to 
be holding company, are those companies 
will still be under state-ownership? Or is it 
a strategic plan to build a more independent 
SOE in the future?  
What do you think about ‘self-sufficient’? 
Is it the best way to catch up with prior 
players in the cement industry such as 
Cemex?  
 
What kind of firm was PT Semen Indonesia 
at the early period? Was it run by the 
government since its early age? Was it a 
small or medium firm?  
 
How has the strategy has been reshaping 
since 2009?  
 
 




























































In the ownership of 51 per 
cent of the firm share by the 
Indonesian government, to 
what extent Indonesian 
government has right in 




As a holding company, 
would you describe the 
firm’s structure? Is it 
vertical? Or horizontal?  
 
 
Organizational culture:  
How the Indonesian values 
such as gotong royong 
influenced employees’ 






How strong the business 






Do you think the 
government regulations 
have been supportive to 
help the firm grow?  
 
Economic environment: 
Do you think the economic 
environment today inside 
and outside Indonesia has 
been encouraging the firm?   
 
Investment flows: 
What kind of market entry 
that PT Semen Indonesia 
has taken through its 








Is it any possibility that at the same points 
in the future the firm will be fully owned by 
Indonesian government? Or opposite, will it 
be independent, so the firm has more 




Based on the firm structure, PT Semen 
Indonesia consists of four firms. Do those 
firms operate independently or are they all 
guided by the same board? 
How has the company developed extensive 
global subsidiary networks?  
 
Is the firm having the sense of community 
based values?  
Is there any family-style gathering? Or 
special occasion held by inviting the whole 
employees? How the higher levl 
communicates with the rest of the firm’s 
employees?  
 
How the firm coordinate with the 
associated- ministries?  
 
In the context of competitive advantage 
compare to the players in the same industry, 
how competitive do you think PT Semen 
Indonesia is? 
How about the firm asset, what the positive 
aspects that the firm has (managerial, 
human resources, leadership)? 
 
How do you think is the regulatory 
environment for business like PT Semen 
Indonesia can be improved? 




In what way the national and global 
economic environment has been beneficial 
for the firm to expand?  




Why this kind of market entry that the firm 
took rather than any other mode such as 
alliance or joint venture?  
How has the company managed prior 
business relations in Vietnam? 
In relation to taking Vietnam as the 






Models of EMNCs 








Does PT Semen Indonesia 
have access to the most 
advanced technologies?  
 
Competition:   
Was it PT Semen Indonesia 
is the first one that 
competes globally 
compares to the other 
cement producers from 
Indonesia? How about 
compared to the other 
countries in the region?  
 
Compare to Chinese 
EMMNCs –the biggest 
emerging economies, what 
is the most essential 
characteristic of them?  
 
Compare to Cemex – a 
cement producer from other 
emerging economies, what 
is the most essential 
characteristic of Cemex? 
ownership (trademark, technique, 
entrepreneurial skills or return to scale?), 
internalization (own production), or 
location (raw materials, low wages, taxes, 
or tariffs)?  
 





Do you know any significant competitors in 
the region?   
 Did PT Semen Indonesia is the first who 





Do you think Indonesian SOEs have 
similarity and differences with EMMNCs 
from China? In what way they are the same 
and different?  
What do you think their competitive 
advantage is?  
 
Do you think Indonesian SOEs have 
similarity and differences with Cemex? In 
what way they are the same and different?  
What do you think Cemex competitive 
advantage is? 
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Appendix 4: Invitation to Participate in a Research Project 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
Project Title: Global Expansion of Emerging Market Multinational Corporations 
(EMMNCs): International Political Economy Perspective (Case Study: PT Semen Indonesia).  
Investigators:  
Principal Supervisor 
A/Professor Paul Battersby  
  
Associate Supervisor  
Dr Julian CH Lee  
  
PhD Student  
Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
  
Dear …………., 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of 
the investigators.  
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
 The researchers are Farahdiba R Bachtiar, the PhD student who designed the project 
and is collecting the data, supervisor Paul Battersby and Julian Lee whose contact 
details are listed above.  
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 This research is being conducted as part of a Doctor of Philosophy degree at the 
Global, Urban and Social Studies Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.  
 This project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee.  
 This study is partly funded by Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (Lembaga 
Pengelola Dana Pendidikan-LPDP)  
Why have you been approached?  
This project seeks to interview person associated professionally with PT Semen Indonesia to 
ascertain their perspectives on company strategy in relations to offshore expansion. You have 
been selected for interview due to your professional position as stakeholder in this company. 
Your contact details were obtained by means of search of open access media, primarily the 
internet. 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
I am conducting doctoral research into the Global Expansion of Emerging Market 
Multinational Corporations (EMMNCs) with a focus on PT Semen Indonesia. Even though 
Indonesia’s global economic significance is increasing, little is known about the motives and 
strategies of guiding the internationalisation of Indonesian owned companies. Therefore, the 
core of the study will include the growth and expansion of PT Semen Indonesia and its 
structure, strategies and targets to adjust to new global and regional economic challenges and 
opportunities. The study will investigate the extent to which PT semen Indonesia is 
representative of EMMNCs are sufficient and why this is so.  
This project will include six informants to be interviewed who qualified to share ideas 
regarding the topic.  
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
If you agree to participate you will be asked in the semi-structure interview about your 
knowledge, experience and ideas about PT Semen Indonesia. The interview duration will be 
around an hour or more (no longer than two hours) due to the purpose in obtaining details 
information about the topic and also to prevent clash with interviewee schedule. Location was 
chosen to be convenient for the interviewee and likely takes place in conducive area such as 
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office or meeting room. Before you decide to anything feel free to examine the questions 
material as follows: 
 What motived the decision to invest offshore? 
 Why PT Semen Indonesia choose to expand into Vietnam and Bangladesh? 
 In decision to expand, how much Indonesia’s national interests play a role?   
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
There are no risks or disadvantages associated with your participation with your on-going day 
to day activities or outside of it. However, we are aware that you have important professional 
responsibility and thus your time and privacy will be crucial issue. Thus, some steps have 
been taken to prevent any risks that might rise by using interview protocol.  
To mitigate the risk of timing and privacy the following steps will be taken:  
Every interviewee will be contacted three months prior to the fieldwork through your 
professional contact details. In order to give you time to choose the most convenient time and 
venue for the session that both available for you and also myself and research assistant.  
Every interviewee will be given options on the form whether they are agreed to be recorded 
or not. If ‘yes’ then the interview team member will use audio recorded. In contrast, if the 
interviewees do not agree then the team member will only taking note in order to avoid loss 
of data.  
The information given in this session will be keep strictly and save in the storage on the main 
researcher personal computer and on-site campus computer by password. The raw data will 
only available to the interviewee and supervisory team to proceed including being 
transcribed.  
Before committing to any of the interview part please free to ask me or my supervisors if you 
have any enquiry or upset about your response, you should contact me or either of my 
supervisors as soon as convenient. I or my supervisors will discuss your concern 
confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up, if necessary. The contact details are on the 
top of the invitation form. 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
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There are no any direct and indirect benefits including financial benefits that may accrue to 
you in participating.  
However, the information you give will be beneficial for PT Semen Indonesia as its shows 
the success story as state-owned enterprises in particular and its possibility to be a significant 
global multinational corporations. In bigger picture, this project will also contribute to the 
study of Emerging Markets Multinational Corporations and locate Indonesian firm in this 
evolving category of corporate activity. 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
In preventing misunderstanding, we keep the data in confidentiality; we clearly explain that 
we will identify data by a small number of people (the research team including myself, two of 
my supervisors and an assistant).  
The information interviewees give during the interview will be processed and published in 
the findings section of the thesis in RMIT Repository. This is an online open access library of 
RMIT University. While the raw data including any images or recording will be kept securely 
at RMIT for 5 years after publication before being destroyed. Yet, the final thesis will remain 
published online. The findings (the data which have been analysed) are possibly also to re-
write through presentation, journal, or any publications.   
However, any information gather can be disclosed only if; 1) it is to protect the interviewee 
or others from harm; 2) if specifically required or allowed by law; 3) or you provide the 
researcher with written permission. The interview undertakes only if the interviewee agreed 
on being interview shown by sign the interview consent.  
In the future after the session, if you are not sending or contacting us to withdraw your 
general and specific comments or statements during the interview, we assume that you have 
given consent to the re-produce of the data by your completion. 
What are my rights as a participant?  
 The right to withdraw from participation at any time  
 The right to request that any recording cease  
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 The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant  
 The right to have any questions answered at any time  
Whom should I contact if I have any questions?  
 Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
 A/Professor Paul Battersby Dr Julian CH Lee  
What other issues should I be aware of before deciding whether to participate?  
Decision making is a complex process and involved numbers of stakeholders. 
Unintentionally, the interview reveals more unrelated information. In order to mitigate the 
risk, the strategy used as follows. The supervisors have been reviewed the question list and 
assured that the questions will not be out of topic. If it still occurs then it will be excluded 
from being mentioned in any part of the thesis. To emphasize the commitment before, the 
raw information not to be seen by anyone other than the research team, unless explicitly 
requested.  
It should be stressed that this project has no interest in finding illegal activities, political 
views, political issue such as corruption or any confidential firm activity.  
Yours sincerely 
A/Professor Paul Battersby  
Signature:  
  …………………………………….  
Dr Julian CH Lee  
Signature:  
  ……………………………………. 
Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
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Signature:    
…………………………………….. 
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not wish to discuss 
with the researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, Research Integrity, Governance and 
Systems, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V  VIC  3001. email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au  
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Appendix 5: Undangan Keikutsertaan Dalam Proyek Penelitian 
INFORMASI INFORMAN   
Judul Proyek: Ekspansi Global Perusahaan Multinasional Negara Emerging Market 
(EMMNCs): Perspektif Ekonomi Politik Internasional (Studi Kasus: PT Semen Indonesia).  
Peneliti:  
Pembimbing Utama 
A/Professor Paul Battersby  
 
Pembimbing Kedua  
Dr Julian CH Lee  
 
Mahasiswa Doktor 
Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
  
Kepada …………., 
Anda diundang untuk berpartisipasi dalam penelitian yang dilakukan oleh RMIT University. 
Silakan Anda membaca dengan seksama paparan pada lembar ini dan merasa yakin bahwa 
Anda memahami isinya sebelum memutuskan untuk ikut serta dalam penelitian ini. Apabila 
anda memiliki pertanyaan terkait penelitian ini, Anda bisa langsung menghubungi salah satu 
peneliti. 
Siapa yang terlibat dalam penelitian ini? Untuk apa penelitian ini dilakukan?   
 Penelitian ini melibatkan Farahdiba R Bachtiar, mahasiswa doktoral yang merancang 
penelitian dan mengumpulkan data, pembimbing utama Paul Battersby dan 
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pembimbing kedua Julian Lee dengan rincian informasi sebagaiman diterangkan di 
bagian atas.  
 Penelitian ini dilakukan sebagai bagian dari syarat kesarjanaan sebagai PhD di 
Fakultas Global, Urban dan Studi Sosial RMIT.  
 Proyek ini telah disetujui oleh RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee.  
 Proyek ini juga ikut didanai oleh Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan-LPDP  
Mengapa anda diikutsertakan?  
Proyek ini bertujuan untuk mewawancarai orang yang terkait secara profesional dengan PT 
Semen Indonesia untuk memastikan perspektif mereka tentang strategi perusahaan terkait 
ekspansi lepas pantai. Anda telah dipilih untuk ikut serta dalam wawancara karena posisi 
profesional Anda sebagai pemangku kepentingan di perusahaan ini. Rincian kontak Anda 
diperoleh dengan cara pencarian pada media massa, terutama melalui internet. 
Penelitian mengenai apa? Pertanyaan apa yang akan diberikan?   
Saya melakukan penelitian doctoral terhadap Ekspansi Global Perusahan Multinasional dari 
Negara Emerging Market (EMMNCs) dengan berfokus kepada kasus PT. Semen Indonesia. 
Meskipun signifikansi ekonomi global Indonesia meningkat, sedikit yang diketahui tentang 
motif dan strategi internasionalisasi perusahaan yang dimiliki Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, inti 
dari penelitian ini akan mencakup pertumbuhan dan ekspansi PT Semen Indonesia serta 
struktur, strategi dan target untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan tantangan dan peluang baru di 
ranah ekonomi global dan regional. Penelitian ini akan menyelidiki sejauh mana PT Semen 
Indonesia cukup mewakili perusahaan multinasional dari Negara Emerging Market dan 
mengapa demikian. 
Proyek ini akan melibatkan enam orang informan untuk diwawancara yang memiliki 
kualifikasi untuk berbagi ide terkait topik penelitian.  
Jika saya bersedia ikut serta, apa yang akan harus saya lakukan? 
Jika Anda setuju untuk berpartisipasi Anda akan ditanyai dalam wawancara semi-terstruktur 
tentang pengetahuan, pengalaman dan ide-ide anda tentang PT Semen Indonesia. Durasi 
wawancara sekitar berkisar antara satu jam atau lebih (tidak lebih dari dua jam) oleh karena 
tujuan wawancara untuk memperoleh rincian informasi dan sekaligus untuk mencegah 
239 
bentrokan dengan jadwal kegiatan anda. Lokasi dipilih di tempat yang nyaman untuk anda 
dan kemungkinan berlangsung di daerah yang kondusif seperti kantor atau ruang pertemuan. 
Sebelum Anda memutuskan terkait apa pun, anda bebas untuk memeriksa bahan pertanyaan 
sebagai berikut: 
 Apa yang memotivasi keputusan untuk melakukan investasi lepas pantai?  
 Mengapa PT Semen Indonesia memilih untuk berekspansi ke Vietnam dan 
Bangladesh? 
 Dalam putusan untuk berekspansi, berapa besar kepentingan Indonesia ikut andil?   
Kerugian atau resiko apakah yang bisa menimpa saya?  
Tidak ada risiko atau kerugian yang terkait dengan partisipasi Anda dengan kegiatan sehari-
hari atau di luar itu. Namun, kami menyadari bahwa Anda memiliki tanggung jawab 
profesional yang penting dan dengan demikian waktu dan privasi akan menjadi masalah 
krusial. Dengan demikian, beberapa langkah telah diambil untuk mencegah risiko yang 
mungkin timbul dengan menggunakan pedoman wawancara. 
Untuk menanggulangi resiko terhadap waktu dan privasi dilakukan beberapa langkah di 
bawah ini:  
Setiap informan akan dihubungi tiga bulan sebelum pengumpulan data dilakukan berdasarkan 
rincian kontak professional masing-masing. Dengan tujuan memberikan Anda waktu untuk 
memilih waktu dan tempat yang paling nyaman untuk Anda, saya dan asisten peneliti. 
Setiap informan akan diberikan pilihan pada lembaran apakah mereka setuju untuk direkam 
atau tidak saat wawancara berlangsung. Jika 'ya' maka anggota tim wawancara akan 
menggunakan perekam audio. Sebaliknya, jika pewawancara tidak setuju maka anggota tim 
hanya akan melakukan pencatatan untuk menghindari hilangnya data. 
Informasi yang diberikan dalam sesi ini akan disimpan dengan hati-hati di dalam 
penyimpanan komputer pribadi dan komputer kampus peneliti utama menggunakan kata 
sandi. Data mentah hanya akan tersedia untuk informan dan tim peneliti termasuk data yang 
akan ditranskrip. 
Sebelum berkomitmen terhadap bagian apapun dalam wawancara anda bebas untuk bertanya 
kepada saya atau pembimbing saya, jika Anda memiliki pertanyaan atau kecewa terhadap 
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respon Anda, Anda harus menghubungi saya atau salah satu dari pembimbing saya sesegera 
mungkin. Saya ataupun pembimbing akan membahas kekhawatiran Anda secara rahasia dan 
menyarankan tindak lanjut yang sesuai, jika diperlukan. Rincian kontak kami berada di 
bagian atas lembaran undangan. 
Manfaat apa yang bisa diperoleh?  
Tidak ada manfaat langsung dan tidak langsung termasuk keuntungan finansial yang 
mungkin Anda peroleh dalam berpartisipasi  
Namun, informasi yang Anda berikan akan bermanfaat bagi PT Semen Indonesia dengan 
menunjukkan kisah sukses perusahaan milik negara khususnya dan kemungkinan baginya 
untuk menjadi perusahaan global yang signifikan. Dalam skala yang lebih besar, proyek ini 
juga akan memberikan kontribusi dalam studi mengenai Perusahaan Multinasional Emerging 
Market dan memposisikan perusahaan Indonesia dalam kategori tersebut. 
Apa yang akan terjadi dengan informasi yang saya berikan? 
Dalam mencegah kesalahpahaman, kami menyimpan data secara hati-hati; kami menjelaskan 
bahwa kami akan mengidentifikasi data dengan sejumlah kecil orang (tim peneliti termasuk 
saya, dua pembimbing saya dan asisten). 
Informasi yang diberikan selama wawancara akan diproses dan diterbitkan di bagian 
penemuan tesis pada RMIT Repository. Ini adalah online akses terbuka pada perpustakaan 
RMIT University. Sedangkan data mentah termasuk gambar atau rekaman akan disimpan 
dengan aman di RMIT selama 5 tahun setelah publikasi sebelum dihancurkan. Namun, tesis 
akhir akan tetap dipublikasikan secara online. Temuan (data yang telah dianalisis) mungkin 
juga akan ditulis ulang melalui presentasi, jurnal, atau dalam publikasi apapun. 
Namun, informasi yang terkumpul dapat diungkapkan hanya jika; 1) dilakukan untuk 
melindungi informan atau orang lain dari bahaya; 2) jika secara khusus diperlukan atau 
diizinkan oleh hukum; 3) atau Anda memberikan izin tertulis kepada peneliti. Wawancara 
dilakukan hanya jika informan menyepakati untuk diwawancara yang ditunjukkan dengan 
tanda tangan pada lembar persetujuan wawancara. 
Di kemudian hari setelah sesi, jika anda tidak mengirimkan atau menghubungi kami untuk  
membatalkan komentar atau pernyataan baik yang umum maupun yang spesifik selama 
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wawancara dan ketika selesai, kami berasumsi bahwa anda telah memberikan persetujuan 
terhadap re-produksi data yang anda berikan.  
Apa hak saya sebagai informan? 
 Hak untuk menarik diri untuk berpartisipasi kapan pun  
 Hak untuk meminta rekaman dihentikan  
 Hak untuk meminta data yang belum diproses untuk ditarik dan dihancurkan, dengan 
syarat data tersebut dapat diidentifikasi, dan tidak merugikan informan 
 Hak untuk bertanya dan dijawab kapan pun 
Siapa yang bisa dihubungi apabila ada pertanyaan? 
 Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
 A/Professor Paul Battersby  
 Dr Julian CH Lee  
Apa isu-isu lain yang harus saya ketahui sebelum memutuskan apakah akan 
berpartisipasi? 
Pengambilan keputusan merupakan proses yang kompleks dan melibatkan berbagai. Secara 
tidak sengaja, wawancara bisa mengungkapkan informasi yang tidak terkait. Dalam rangka 
untuk mengurangi risiko, strategi yang digunakan sebagai berikut. Pembimbing telah 
meninjau daftar pertanyaan dan meyakinkan bahwa pertanyaan yang diajukan tidak akan 
keluar dari topik. Jika masih terjadi maka data yang diperoleh tidak akan disebutkan dalam 
bagian apapun di dalam tesis. Untuk menekankan komitmen sebelumnya, informasi mentah 
tidak akan diperlihatkan oleh orang lain selain tim peneliti, kecuali jika diminta secara 
eksplisit. 
Perlu ditekankan bahwa proyek ini tidak memiliki kepentingan dalam meneliti kegiatan 
ilegal, pandangan politik, isu politik seperti korupsi atau kegiatan perusahaan yang bersifat 
rahasia. 
Hormat Kami 
A/Professor Paul Battersby  
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Tandatangan  
  …………………………………….  
Dr Julian CH Lee  
Tandatangan:  
  ……………………………………. 
Farahdiba R Bachtiar  
Tandatangan :  
  …………………………………….. 
Jika Anda memiliki pertanyaan mengenai apapun tentang partisipasi Anda dalam proyek ini, namun 
anda tidak ingin berdiskusi dengan para peneliti, maka Anda dapat menghubungi Ethics Officer, 
Research Integrity, Governance and Systems, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V  VIC  3001. email 
human.ethics@rmit.edu.au   
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Appendix 6 Consent to Participate In Semi–Structure Interview 
1) I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
2) I agree to participate in the research project as described  
3) I agree to be identified  
4) I agree to be interviewed by the researcher or his/her assistant and  
YES, my voice will be recorded  
NO, the researcher will only take notes  
5) I acknowledge that: 
a) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied 
when I find misconduct in the research  
b) The withdraw of participation is delivered in a written form to the researcher 
c) The project is for the purpose of research. It may not be of direct benefit to me  
d) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where  have consented to the disclosure or as required by law 
e) The security of the research data will be protected during and after completion of 
the study.  
f) The data collected during the study may be published. Any information which will 
identify me will be used for research purposes only.  
6) I would like to send any related information even after the interview if needed  
YES 
NO 
7) I would like a report sent to me on the research’s completion 





                        ( signature ) 
 
Researcher:_____________________                                           
( signature ) 
 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this PICF after it has been signed. 
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Appendix 7 Persetujuan Untuk Mengikuti Wawancara Semi-
Terstruktur 
1) Saya telah dijelaskan mengenai proyek ini dan telah membaca lembar informasi   
2) Saya setuju untuk berpartisipasi dalam proyek riset sebagaimana yang dijelaskan  
3) Saya setuju untuk diidentifikasi  
4) Saya setuju untuk diwawancara oleh peneliti atau asisten peneliti Terstruktur 
  YA, suara saya akan direkam  
TIDAK, peneliti hanya akan mencatat 
5) Saya mengakui bahwa: 
a) Saya memahami bahwa partisipasi saya adalah sukarela dan saya bebas untuk 
menarik diri dari proyek ini setiap saat dan untuk menarik data yang diberikan 
sebelumnya yang belum diolah jika saya menemukan kesalahan dalam penelitian 
ini. 
b) Penarikan partisipasi disampaikan dalam bentuk tertulis kepada peneliti.   
c) Proyek ini untuk tujuan penelitian. Ini mungkin tidak memberi manfaat langsung 
kepada saya.  
d) Privasi terhadap informasi pribadi yang saya berikan akan dijaga dan hanya 
diungkapkan jika pengungkapannya telah disetujui atau seperti yang 
dipersyaratkan oleh hukum. 
e) Keamanan data penelitian akan dilindungi selama dan setelah masa studi.  
f) Data yang dikumpulkan selama masa studi mungkin akan diterbitkan. Informasi 
apapun yang mengidentifikasikan saya akan digunakan hanya untuk keperluan 
penelitian.  










                        (  tanda tangan ) 
 
Peneliti :____________________________________________ 
                                              (  tanda tangan ) 
 
Peserta harus mengembalikan fotokopi formulir ini setelah ditandatangani. 
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Appendix 8 Indonesia Ministry of SOEs Institutional Structure 
 
Figure A1: Ministry of SOE Institutional Structure.  
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2015b) 
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Appendix 9 PT Semen Gresik Annual Report 2008 on Loans from 
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